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Dominican Republic HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE ARMED FORCES
Spanish colonial militias were the first organized
military
forces in what is now the Dominican Republic. These forces
maintained law and order over the entire island of
Hispaniola (La
Isla Española), which from 1496 was ruled from Santo
Domingo, the
center of Spanish colonial administration in the New World
(see Dominican Republic - The First Colony
, ch. 1). By the mid-1500s, when Spain's
interests shifted to the richer colonies of Mexico and
Peru, the
Dominican colony had a well-established hierarchical
social
system that was based on authoritarian rule by a small
white
elite. The colony also included a large black slave
population
(see Dominican Republic - Ethnic Heritage
, ch. 2).
The shift in Spain's colonial interests and the
consequent
withdrawal of most of Spain's military from the Dominican
colony
was followed by a long period of economic and political
decay,
during which domestic order deteriorated. The colony was
threatened by pirates along the coast as well as by
periodic
encroachment by the forces of France and England, which
were
competing with each other and with Spain for territory and
power
in the New World.
As a result of this competition, Spain was forced in
1697 to
cede the western third of Hispaniola to France. Tension
over the
boundary and continued international competition between
France
and Spain manifested itself in border disputes, and by
1797
France had prevailed on Spain to cede the rest of the
island.
Before French rule became established in the Dominican
colony, however, a slave revolt broke out in the western
portion
of the island, which came to be known as Haiti. In what
proved to
be the first in a series of Haitian incursions into
Dominican
territory, the rebellious Haitians invaded the poor and
less
populous eastern side of the island in 1801. Haitian
forces were
repulsed, but the rebellion within Haiti continued, and
the
French were forced to withdraw from the island by 1804. In
1809,
helped by Britain, Spain regained control of the Dominican
portion of the island. Spain ruled only until 1821,
however, when
the Dominican colonists revolted. Independence lasted just
a few
weeks before Haiti invaded in 1822. The Dominicans were
not able
to expel the Haitian forces until 1844
(see Dominican Republic - Haiti and Santo Domingo
, ch. 1).
The long-delayed achievement of independence did not
bring
peace to the new Dominican Republic, nor did it improve
public
order. Political power was extremely decentralized, and
competition among factions of the landowning white elite
produced
a level of national disunity that had disastrous effects
on
public safety. Although the central government had
established a
national army, this force essentially consisted of a small
group
of officers who were interested chiefly in personal
enrichment
and whose duties were largely ceremonial. The national
army was
far outnumbered by armed militias that were organized and
maintained by local caudillos, who had set themselves up
as
provincial governors. Using these militias, the caudillos
waged
bloody civil wars as they contended for regional and
national
power. National political life was characterized by
repeated
coups and military uprisings against whichever
caudillo--usually
self-promoted to general-officer status--had gathered
enough
power to grab the presidency.
The continuous civil war, political upheaval, and
misrule
that characterized the republic's early years was
punctuated by
repeated Haitian attempts to invade. During such periods
of
danger, forces larger than the small national army were
needed to
defend the nation. These forces, hastily raised and poorly
equipped, were essentially conglomerations of regional
militias
that had been filled out by poor farmers or landless
plantation
workers who had been impressed into service. Once the
threat had
subsided and Haitian forces had been repulsed, the
militias would
return to advancing the cause of particular regional
leaders. The
impressed troops would return home, where some would
contribute
to the general state of disorder by taking up banditry.
During its first thirty years of independence, the
Dominican
Republic was run directly, or indirectly, by General Pedro
Santana Familias and General Buenaventura Baez Méndez,
whose
bitter rivalry was played out in civil wars that resulted
in
alternating Santana and Baez regimes
(see Dominican Republic - Santana and Baez: The Caudillos Take Charge
, ch. 1). Each of the two generals
used his
position to enrich himself, his relatives, and his
followers at
public expense. In order to deal with the national
bankruptcy
caused by civil war, corruption, and mismanagement,
Santana
called on Spain in 1861 to restore colonial rule.
Nationalistic
rebellions during 1861-65, however, forced the Spanish
out.
General Ulises Heureaux took over the presidency in
1882.
During his rule, political factionalism was repressed, and
the
nation enjoyed relative internal peace. Heureaux ruled in
an
increasingly brutal, autocratic, and corrupt manner,
however,
employing a network of spies and assassins. After he was
himself
assassinated in 1899, political factions again warred for
power
and for access to the national treasury. By 1904 the
economy was
a shambles, and foreign governments were threatening to
use force
to collect defaulted loans. Citing the need to avert
European
intervention, the United States assumed control of the
management
of Dominican customs receipts in 1905. During the next
decade, a
growing contingent of United States marines and other
American
officials attempted to establish internal order. Their
limited
efforts were apparently unsuccessful. The marines were
authorized
by President Woodrow Wilson to take full control of the
Dominican
government in 1916
(see Dominican Republic - Occupation by the United States, 1916-24
, ch. 1).
The marines disbanded the regional militias, and they
ruled
the nation directly for eight years, acting as police in
cities
and in rural areas. As part of its effort to build
effective
institutions of government in the Dominican Republic, the
United
States formed a new Dominican Constabulary Guard to
replace the
old national army. Up to this time, both the civilian and
the
military elites had been drawn from the same wealthy
landowning
class. Intense resentment, among the elite, against the
United
States presence made it impossible to find recruits for
the new
constabulary among the landowning class. The ranks became
filled
by the lower strata of Dominican society, and, as a
result, the
new force had neither ties nor debts to the traditional
elite.
The most notable representative of the new military
leadership
was Rafael Leónidas Trujillo Molina, who entered the
Dominican
Constabulary Guard in 1919 as a second lieutenant.
In 1924, after the Dominican Republic had adopted a new
constitution and had elected a civilian president, the
United
States forces withdrew. The same year, the guard was
renamed the
Dominican National Police, a somewhat misleading title for
what
had become more a military entity than a law enforcement
organization. By that time, Trujillo had risen to the rank
of
major and had assumed one of the nation's two field
commands. He
had also emerged as one of the most influential voices
within the
force, increasingly able to mold its development to suit
his
personal ambitions. In 1928, when the National Police was
renamed
the National Army (Ejército Nacional), Trujillo became a
lieutenant colonel and army chief of staff. As head of the
nation's only centralized military force, Trujillo was the
most
powerful individual in the nation, even before his
election to
the presidency in 1930
(see Dominican Republic - The Era of Trujillo
, ch. 1).
By 1930 the new Dominican military establishment had
developed into a centrally controlled and well-disciplined
force
that was both larger and far better equipped than any
previous
Dominican military force. The unified, apolitical, and
professional force that had been envisioned by the United
States
military government had not been realized, however.
Instead,
traditional Dominican patterns of military service
persisted,
including factionalism, politicization, and the perception
that
position entitled one to personal enrichment. Trujillo
encouraged
and strengthened these patterns, and he used them both to
retain
the support of the armed forces and to control them.
Military
officers became an elite national class, gaining wealth,
favors,
prestige, and power, and developing an ésprit de corps
that
Trujillo carefully nurtured. Under these conditions, a
career in
the military came to be esteemed as an avenue of upward
mobility.
The services themselves were built up, large quantities of
arms
were imported, and a defense industry was established.
Trujillo rationalized maintenance of a large military
by
citing the purported need for vigilance against Haiti and,
particularly after the Cuban Revolution of 1959, against
communism. For the most part, however, Trujillo used the
large
and powerful military establishment to maintain internal
control
over the nation. The army and the navy intelligence
services were
among the numerous agencies Trujillo employed to maintain
close
surveillance and rigid control over the population. In
1957 the
intelligence and the secret police organizations were
unified
into the State Security Secretariat. With a personnel
strength of
5,000, this new organization was larger than either the
regular
National Police, the air force, or the navy.
Trujillo did not rely solely on rewards to keep control
over
the military. From the time of his election in 1930 until
he was
assassinated in 1961, he maintained personal command of
all
aspects of military organization, including promotions,
logistics, assignments, and discipline. He constantly
shuffled
personnel from assignment to assignment, and he prevented
any
potential rival from gaining an independent power base.
Trujillo
also used the tactic of frequent inspection, sometimes in
person
and sometimes by undercover operatives, to keep tabs on
both men
and operations. In addition, he brought many of his
relatives and
supporters into the armed forces, promoting them rapidly
as a
reward for loyalty.
As part of his effort to keep control over the armed
forces,
Trujillo also built up the air force as a political
counterbalance to the army, and he encouraged factionalism
in all
the services. During a major expansion of the military
after
World War II, Trujillo acquired armored fighting vehicles
from
Sweden and formed a full armored battalion at San Isidro
Air Base
outside Santo Domingo. This battalion, which was directly
subordinate to the Ministry of Defense, essentially
constituted a
fourth armed force, further splintering power within the
military.
After Trujillo was assassinated in 1961, the military,
as the
nation's most powerful and best-organized interest group,
claimed
a major role in the political competition that followed.
It soon
became clear, however, that the factionalism encouraged by
Trujillo prevented the military from acting as a unified
institution. Instead, elements in the armed services
allied with
various civilian politicians. After Juan Bosch Gaviño of
the
center-left (or, social democratic) Dominican
Revolutionary Party
(Partido Revolucionario Dominicano--PRD) won the
presidential
election in 1962, portions of the military became alarmed
over
his reforms and his tolerance of leftists and legal
communist
parties. In 1963 armed forces officers, led by Elías
Wessín y
Wessín (a colonel at the time), overthrew Bosch and
replaced him
with a civilian junta. Another military faction made up
principally of army officers who called themselves
Constitutionalists favored the return of Bosch. In 1965
this
faction overthrew the civilian junta. In the following
days,
civil war erupted as the armed forces split into warring
camps.
The majority within the armed forces united behind Wessín
y
Wessín (who by this time had become a general) and
attacked the
new government with armored and air support. The
Constitutionalists armed their civilian supporters in
order to
defend the capital
(see Dominican Republic - Civil War and United States Intervention, 1965
, ch. 1).
United States intervention in the conflict halted the
fighting, but subsequent efforts to reunify the armed
forces were
only partly successful. The agreement to reintegrate those
officers who had supported Bosch was never fully
implemented, and
only a few gained readmission. Politically, the outlook of
the
officer corps as a whole remained right of center after
the civil
war.
Although the armed forces continued to be a significant
factor, their influence on national political life
steadily
declined. This decline began during the administration of
Joaquin
Balaguer Ricardo, who made effective use of some of the
same
tactics employed by Trujillo to maintain control over the
military, including the encouragement and the manipulation
of
factionalism within the officer corps and the frequent
shuffling
of top assignments. At the same time, Balaguer gave senior
officers a stake in his regime by appointing many to
positions in
government and in state-run enterprises. He also increased
the
number of general officers from six in 1966 to forty-eight
by
1978.
The process of reining in the military advanced
significantly
during the terms of Balaguer's successors, Silvestre
Antonio
Guzmán Fernández (1978-82) and Salvador Jorge Blanco
(1982-86),
each of whom made a determined effort to institutionalize
the
armed forces and to remove the powerful group of officers
who had
supported Trujillo and Balaguer. The partial success of
their
efforts was demonstrated in 1984 to 1985, when the armed
forces'
leadership repeatedly and publicly supported Jorge's
government
in the face of social unrest provoked by adverse economic
conditions. Although Jorge had not been the military's
preferred
candidate in the 1982 elections, the leadership chose to
support
him as constitutional head of state rather than to take
power
itself.
Military capability in the years after the 1965 civil
war
declined to an even greater extent than did the armed
forces'
national political role. After that time, each
administration
faced increasingly difficult national economic constraints
that
forced stringent limits on defense spending. Although
force
levels and personnel budgets were generally left
untouched, aging
equipment was not replaced. As a result, equipment in all
three
services was outmoded, in short supply, and in poor repair
as of
1989.
Data as of December 1989
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