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Dominican Republic Public Administration
The fall of the Trujillo dictatorship in 1961 did not
produce
a corresponding disruption of the traditions and practices
characteristic of the government service. Corruption,
nepotism,
wholesale dismissals for purely political reasons, loyalty
checks, patronage, and the sowing of distrust and
suspicion had
become ingrained habits which, unlike Trujillo, did not
disappear
overnight. However, the old habits were challenged by new
pressures: demands that the bureaucracy provide real goods
and
services, that public functions be carried out honestly
and
efficiently, and that the government respond to the
pent-up needs
and demands of the population. The clash between the
traditional
patterns of bureaucratic behavior and new demands for
public
services, such as health care, education, water supplies,
and
electricity, contributed significantly to the political
instability of the post-Trujillo period.
No effective law existed to protect Dominican public
officials in their jobs. From the cabinet level to the
lowest
ranks, virtually all civil servants were appointed,
served, and
could be removed largely at the will of the president. The
result
was a patronage-dominated system in which public sector
jobs were
given out in return for loyalty and service.
Merit, achievement, and competence, therefore, were not
always the main criteria guiding government appointments.
The
public bureaucracy was often characterized by genuine
incompetence, even at the highest levels. Nepotism and
corruption--defined as a favor in return for a favor, the
granting of special governmental privileges to favored
persons,
private enrichment stemming from public service, or
outright
bribery--were also widespread. Those who tried to be
honest were
scorned; they were considered foolish by their colleagues.
Indeed, government service was thought of, not so much as
an
honored career, as a brief opportunity to indulge oneself
at the
public trough. The frequent failure of government programs
could
often be attributed directly to the corruption and
incompetence
of the bureaucracy. Patronage and related activities were
often
tolerated at lower levels, so long as they were kept
within
reasonable bounds; however, when the corruption became
blatant,
as it did under President Jorge, the government was likely
to
suffer at the polls.
Under the president, were a number of technical
offices--
administration, planning, budget, personnel--designed to
help him
perform his job more effectively. These offices generally
did not
function well, however, and most Dominican presidents
continued
to operate as personalistic and patronage leaders.
The size of the cabinet could vary; in 1989 it
consisted of
sixteen secretaries of state, three without ministerial
portfolio. There were also an administrative secretary of
state
for the presidency, a technical secretary of state for the
presidency, and twelve additional secretaries of state
administering various ministries. The cabinet did not
function as
an independent arm of, nor very often as an advisory body
for,
the presidency (although some of its individual members
might);
rather, it was a loose collection of administrators,
operating
almost entirely according to the wishes of the president.
In addition to the cabinet ministries, there were in
1989
fourteen autonomous agencies and eleven semiautonomous
agencies.
The autonomous and semiautonomous agencies were
established in
the early 1960s to administer new public programs as well
as the
vast properties and enterprises inherited by the state
after the
death of Trujillo, who in addition to his political power
had
vast economic holdings. These agencies administered an
array of
programs and enterprises, ranging from farm loans to
cooperatives
and vast sugar lands. The largest of these were the State
Sugar
Council (Consejo Estatal de Azúcar--CEA), the 85,000
employees of
which made it the largest employer in the country, and the
State
Enterprises Corporation (Corporación Dominicana de
Empresas
Estatales--Corde), into which a number of smaller
state-owned
enterprises had been consolidated.
Dominated by patronage considerations and plagued by
corruption, the autonomous and semiautonomous agencies
were
frequently mismanaged. Some officials, believing that
these
agencies could be run more efficiently by the private
sector,
periodically proposed putting them up for sale. The usual
reactions to such efforts included objections from
nationalists
about selling out the national patrimony; from
politicians,
seeking to preserve patronage opportunities; and from the
employees of the state-run agencies, who feared layoffs
under
private sector management.
Data as of December 1989
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