Jordan The Palestinians and the Palestine Liberation Organization
Figure 12. Structure of the Palestine Liberation Organization
(PLO), 1989
Palestinians have been a complicating factor in the Jordanian
political process since the annexation of the West Bank in 1950.
Transjordanians tended to fear that the numerically preponderant
Palestinians could emerge as a dominant force if competitive
politics were permitted to resume. For years many Palestinians
openly opposed Hussein's monarchical absolutism and demanded
equality and proportional participation in the political process.
Their frustrations under Hussein's rule, at least through the 1960s
and early 1970s, provided a fertile ground for their empathy and
support for the PLO. Since 1971, when the PLO guerrilla forces were
crushed and driven out of Jordan, Palestinians generally have been
politically dormant. Given the authorities' effective
discouragement of political expression critical of the regime, it
was difficult in 1989 to ascertain what the political aspirations
or preferences of the Palestinians in Jordan might be.
The Palestinian equation became further complicated after
October 1974 as external pressures were brought to bear on Jordan.
The catalyst was the unanimous decision of the Arab states meeting
in Rabat to recognize the PLO as the sole authorized representative
of the Palestinian people. Strongly prodded by Egypt, Syria, and
other Arab states, Hussein was obliged to assent to the Rabat
decision although he still claimed the West Bank as Jordanian
territory until 1988. This development has portended uncertain
implications for Jordan's domestic politics and its relationship
with the West Bank.
Following the Rabat Summit, Hussein and PLO leader Yasir Arafat
met to reconcile relations, strained since the 1970-71 civil war.
Their discussions resulted in the decision in early 1975 for Jordan
and the PLO to cease mutual recriminations. Hussein rejected,
however, a PLO demand that it be permitted to reestablish its
military and political presence in the East Bank. After 1974 there
was a noticeable resurgence of Palestinian empathy for and
identification with the PLO in many parts of the world. This
sentiment was nowhere more evident than in the West Bank. There, in
the municipal elections that Israel permitted to be held in April
1976, candidates supporting the PLO defeated most of the candidates
identified with Hussein. The outcome was a reversal of the
municipal elections held in 1972, when pro-Hussein candidates
handily won over pro-PLO candidates.
The process of reconciliation also was complicated by the
linkage of the Jordanian-PLO equation to the broader configuration
of Middle East problems. In March 1977, Hussein and Arafat met in
Cairo as part of the Egyptian-Syrian efforts to prepare for an
upcoming Geneva peace conference on the Middle East. The two
leaders addressed, inter alia, the question of future relations
between Jordan and a proposed Palestinian state on the West Bank.
Their discussions focused on whether the PLO should be represented
as an independent delegation at the conference in Geneva or as part
of Jordan's delegation. The latter course was preferred by Hussein.
The Hussein-Arafat contact became more frequent in the wake of
Egyptian president Anwar as Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in November
1977 and his signing of the United States-mediated Camp David
Accords in 1978 and the Treaty of Peace Between Egypt and Israel in
1979. Nevertheless, Arafat and other PLO leaders were suspicious of
Hussein's ultimate intentions vis-à-vis the Camp David Accords.
Although Jordan had no part in the Egyptian-Israeli negotiations,
it was directly linked to the process for settling the future of
the West Bank. The first agreement, called "A Framework for Peace
in the Middle East," stipulated that Egypt and Israel would
negotiate with Jordan and Palestinian representatives for a
transitional self-governing authority to administer the West Bank
and the Gaza Strip, a noncontiguous Palestinian enclave on the
Mediterranean Sea that also was occupied by Israel. Jordan declared
it was neither legally nor morally obligated to this agreement and
refused to participate in the negotiations, which consequently made
no progress. Hussein's decision to maintain a dialogue with the
United States, however, fueled the fears of some Palestinians that
the monarch tacitly supported the Camp David Accords and was
seeking ways to preclude the PLO from gaining control of the West
Bank.
The expulsion of the PLO from Lebanon in the wake of Israel's
1982 invasion of that country brought the contradictory Jordanian
and PLO objectives into open conflict. Initially, relations
improved because Hussein agreed to accept a small contingent of
expelled fighters and to permit the reopening of PLO political
offices for the first time since the 1970-71 civil war. In several
face-to-face meetings held between September 1982 and April 1983,
Hussein and Arafat discussed Jordan's role in future negotiations
over the fate of the West Bank. Because neither the United States
nor Israel was willing to talk with the PLO at this time, Hussein
tried to obtain Arafat's endorsement for Jordan to serve as
spokesman for the Palestinians. More extreme Palestinian guerrilla
leaders--often called "rejectionists" because they rejected any
compromises that would circumscribe their goal of an independent
Palestinian state that included all of pre-1948 Palestine--
distrusted Hussein and would not be assuaged by Arafat's
reassurances. Without a broad-based consensus within the PLO,
Arafat apparently felt he could not agree to a common negotiating
strategy with Hussein. Consequently, Hussein broke off the talks in
April 1983; for the remainder of the year, Jordan's relations with
the PLO were strained.
Violent factional feuding engulfed the PLO beginning in May
1983, inducing the moderate elements (who generally coalesced
around Arafat) to revive contacts with Hussein. By this time,
Jordan had decided to assert its influence in the West Bank more
aggressively, albeit within the limits tolerated by the Israeli
occupation authorities. The National Assembly, dissolved following
the Rabat decision in 1974, was recalled in January 1984 and
deputies were appointed to fill vacant West Bank seats in the House
of Representatives. Nevertheless, Hussein seemed to welcome the
rapprochement with the moderate faction of the PLO and gave his
blessing to the holding of a Palestine National Council (PNC)
meeting in Amman in November 1984. The PNC meeting was an historic
event that was broadcast on Jordanian television and picked up by
viewers in the West Bank. The meeting strengthened Arafat's
authority as leader of the PLO and enabled him to negotiate with
Hussein without fear of the inevitable recriminations from
extremist factions who had boycotted the Amman meeting.
Hussein and Arafat continued to cooperate after the PNC
meeting, both leaders speaking of the need for Jordan and a
Palestinian state to maintain a special relationship. In February
1985, they announced a joint Jordanian-Palestinian agreement on a
peace framework. This agreement called for the convening of an
international peace conference whose participants would include the
five permanent members of the United Nations (UN) Security Council
and all parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Although the PLO
would represent Palestinians, its PLO delegates would not attend
the conference separately but rather as part of a joint Jordanian-
Palestinian contingent. The agreement stipulated that the
Palestinian people would have the right to exercise national self-
determination within the context of a proposed confederated state
of Jordanians and Palestinians.
Following his agreement with Arafat, Hussein pursued two
policies simultaneously. While trying to serve as a spokesman for
the Palestinians in talks with the United States, and eventually
even with Israeli politicians, Hussein also tried to persuade
Arafat to make a public declaration of PLO support for UN Security
Council resolutions 242 and 338, both of which implicitly
recognized Israel's right to exist. Arafat, who still felt he had
to be wary of the influence of the more extreme factions in the
PLO, was unwilling to be pushed as far toward moderation as Hussein
had hoped. The extremist guerrilla groups criticized Arafat for the
agreement, claiming that it would deny Palestinians the right to
establish a sovereign state within the pre-1948 boundaries of
Palestine. Some of the extremists demonstrated their potential for
undermining any possible compromise solutions by carrying out
sensational terrorist acts in September and October of 1985. The
international response to these incidents, especially the Israeli
aerial bombing of PLO headquarters in Tunisia, increased Arafat's
reluctance to make the political concessions that Hussein believed
were required to obtain United States support for an international
conference.
Hussein's disappointment in Arafat contributed to an erosion of
their political relationship. In February 1986, Hussein announced
that he was terminating the year-old Jordan-PLO agreement. Tensions
with the PLO were exacerbated in May by the student demonstrations
at Yarmuk University in the northern Jordanian city of Irbid. In
July Hussein ordered the offices of Arafat's Al Fatah organization
closed following criticisms of the harsh manner in which Jordanian
security forces had put down the Yarmuk demonstrations.
During 1986 both Hussein and Arafat intensified their
competition for influence in the West Bank. The king appeared to
have the upper hand in this contest because Jordan's banking system
controlled the disbursement of pan-Arab funds earmarked for West
Bank (and also Gaza Strip) development projects. However, the
Palestinian uprising, the intifadah, which began in December
1987, exposed the fragility of Hussein's influence in the occupied
territories. It became obvious during the first half of 1988 that,
compared with the PLO, pro-Hashimite sympathizers had little
support. Hussein decided that political circumstances required a
bold move that would preserve Jordan's interests. Thus, in July he
renounced all claims to sovereignty over the West Bank. By doing
so, Hussein apparently hoped to enhance the Jordanian position in
a post-intifadah era. If the PLO succeeded in consolidating
its influence in the occupied territories and in winning
international support for its claim to rule the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip, then Hussein's abdication of responsibility would stand
Jordan in good stead. It would enable Jordan to forge political and
economic links with a new state, which, because of its small area
and lack of natural resources, would be dependent in various ways
on its only neighbor to the east. If the PLO failed to deliver on
the political aspirations being expressed by the intifadah,
then Hussein would be ready to offer Jordan's services as
negotiator in terminating the Israeli occupation.
The PLO accepted Hussein's challenge. Arafat met with the king
during the late summer and early fall to discuss strategy. Among
the practical measures agreed to was a scheme for the PLO to assume
responsibility for payment of the salaries of West Bank and Gaza
Strip municipal employees through Jordanian financial institutions.
Subsequently, at an historic PNC meeting in Algiers in November
1988 at which all major factions were represented, the PNC declared
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to be the independent state of
Palestine. The PNC also renounced the use of terrorism, accepted UN
Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 (both of which recognized
the existence of Israel), and declared its willingness to negotiate
the end of the occupation. Jordan was one of the first nations to
recognize the new state and announced its readiness to discuss how
the two countries could maintain a special relationship.
In 1989 the PLO remained essentially an umbrella organization
of numerous civilian and military groups
(see
fig. 12). It was
originally founded in 1964 as a political organization to represent
the interests of Palestinians. The various Palestinian guerrilla
groups were formed independently of the PLO, and they initially
were critical of the PLO's objectives and policies. In 1968-69,
however, most of the guerrilla groups joined the PLO, and their
leaders assumed dominant roles in the organization. Although the
PLO has greatly expanded its various service functions in the
cultural, diplomatic, economic, educational, health, humanitarian,
political, social, and welfare fields since 1969, for most Western
observers these functions have been overshadowed by the military
and terrorist activities associated with the guerrilla groups.
The PLO guerrilla groups recruited most of their fighters from
the Palestinian refugee camps in Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria.
Although some of these camps were established as early as 1948 and
all have long since been transformed into permanent villages or
urban neighborhoods, high levels of poverty and unemployment remain
dominant characteristics. Many young men raised in these camps
found the guerrillas' idealization of Palestinian nationalism and
politico-military organization appealing alternatives to the
despair fostered by routine idleness and lack of opportunity.
Joining one of the guerrilla groups enabled such men to assert
their identity and channel their energies. Although the various
guerrilla organizations differed in temperament, ideology, and
tactics, they all shared the objective of establishing an
independent Palestinian state.
The oldest, largest, and best equipped of the PLO guerrilla
groups was Al Fatah--the Palestine National Liberation Movement as
the group was officially known. Arafat (also called Abu Ammar) has
led Al Fatah since its formation in 1957. Since 1969, Arafat has
also been chairman of the PNC's fifteen-member Executive Committee-
-and hence the dominant figure of the PLO leadership. For more than
thirty years, Al Fatah has been a coalition of moderate,
conservative, and radical nationalists who accepted the tactical
necessity of cooperating with Arab governments, including those
they regarded as reactionary, to help achieve their goals.
Predominantly Muslim in membership, Al Fatah generally has eschewed
commitment to radical ideologies such as Islamic revolution or
Marxism and refrained from interference in the internal affairs of
Arab states.
The progressive moderation of Al Fatah's goals after 1973 led
to major splits within the organization. The original objective to
liberate all of pre-1948 Palestine was replaced in 1974 with the
aim of establishing a transitional state on the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip. Sabri Khalil al Banna, known by his code name of Abu
Nidal, vehemently opposed this change. Abu Nidal and a small group
of his supporters defected from Al Fatah and formed the Al Fatah
Revolutionary Council. A more serious split occurred in 1983 when
Said Musa Muragha (also known as Abu Musa) organized Al Fatah
fighters in Lebanon who feared Arafat's reconciliation with Egypt
would lead eventually to recognition of Israel. The supporters of
Arafat and Abu Musa fought each other for control of Palestinian
refugee camps in Lebanon during 1983 and 1984, with heavy
casualties on both sides. The anti-Arafat forces received support
from Syria that helped them expel Arafat loyalists from camps in
areas occupied by the Syrian army. Abu Musa and the Al Fatah
dissidents eventually formed a new group called Al Fatah Uprising.
From a tactical and ideological standpoint, the Popular Front
for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) was the principal
counterpoint to Al Fatah. George Habash and Ahmad Jibril founded
the PFLP after the June 1967 War. The PFLP was a consciously
Marxist-Leninist organization. It defined as enemies not just
Israel and Zionism, but also imperialism and the Arab regimes that
cooperated with the United States, the country it proclaimed to be
the main imperialist power. It called such Arab regimes
reactionary, advocated their overthrow, and the establishment of
progressive, democratic, and secular governments in all Arab
states, including Palestine. Habash and the other PFLP leaders soon
were divided, however, on the issue of whether armed struggle or
political considerations should take precedence in achieving their
objectives. Jibril broke with Habash in 1968 and formed a rival
organization, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-
General Command (PFLP-GC), which placed primary emphasis on armed
struggle. The following year Nayif Hawatmah, who was an East Bank
Jordanian, also split from the PFLP and organized the Democratic
Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP). Hawatmah's DFLP
tended to stress exploring political options before resorting to
armed struggle.
The PFLP, PFLP-GC, and DFLP held attitudes toward reactionary
Arab regimes that precluded cooperation with Hussein, whose
government they regarded as a prime candidate for revolutionary
overthrow. Their openly professed ideology and maintenance of armed
bases within Jordan's Palestinian refugee camps were major factors
in precipitating the 1970 conflict between the guerrillas and the
Jordanian army. After the guerrillas were suppressed, Habash,
Hawatmah, and Jibril remained hostile and unforgiving toward
Hussein. When Arafat began the process of reconciliation with
Hussein in 1973, they opposed any PLO ties or even dialogue with
Jordan and publicly called for Hussein's overthrow. Habash and
Jibril were the principal organizers in 1974 of the rejectionist
front of guerrilla groups, which refused to accept the PLO decision
to establish a Palestinian state on the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip. The rejectionists were those groups that rejected any
negotiations or compromises with Israel and insisted on using armed
struggle to liberate all of historic Palestine. In 1983 Jibril
supported Abu Musa and the Al Fatah dissidents, joining with them
to form the National Alliance, which opposed any diplomatic
initiatives or cooperation with Hussein.
In addition to Al Fatah and the Marxist groups, several smaller
guerrilla organizations were active in 1989. The most important of
these were As Saiqa, the Arab Liberation Front (ALF), the Popular
Struggle Front (PSF), and the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF). As
Saiqa was formed in 1968 in Damascus and has continued to be
politically and financially dependent upon Syria. Palestinians who
lived outside of Syria generally perceived As Saiqa as a tool of
the Syrian government. As Saiqa's counterpart was the ALF, formed
in Baghdad in 1969. In the 1970s, the ALF supported the
rejectionist front, as did Iraq. In the 1980s, however, the ALF
aligned itself with Arafat's Al Fatah, a position consistent with
that of Iraq. The PSF has consistently advocated armed struggle
since it was founded in 1967. Prior to 1980, the PSF was supported
by Iraq, but since 1980 Syria has been its principal backer. The
PLF was formed in 1977 as a result of a split within the PFLP-GC.
Originally part of the rejectionist front, since 1983 it has been
one of the groups trying to effect a reconciliation between Arafat
and Abu Musa.
The PLO's organizational equivalent to a parliament was the
Palestine National Council (PNC), in 1989 based in Algiers. The
PNC's 301 deputies represented the Palestinian diaspora. Included
among them were representatives of the Palestinian parties (the
political wings of the various guerrilla groups); the six guerrilla
groups which accept the policies of the PLO (Al Fatah, PFLP, DFLP,
ALF, PLF, and the Palestine Communist Party); student and
educational groups; youth and women's groups; professional
associations; labor unions; and the Palestine Red Crescent Society.
In addition, the Palestinian communities in various Arab and non-
Arab countries were represented.
The PNC was supposed to meet once a year, but political
complications often forced the postponement of annual gatherings.
The factional strife that plagued the PLO following the sixteenth
PNC conclave in February 1983 prevented convening a full session
for four years. Although a PNC meeting was held in Amman in
November 1984, its legitimacy was questioned because several of the
guerrilla leaders, including Habash of the PFLP and Hawatmah of the
DFLP, refused to attend. The eighteenth PNC, which met in Algiers
in April 1987, represented the first effort to heal the rift in the
PLO and achieve a consensus on policy. Although the PFLP-GC, As
Saiqa, the PSF, and the Abu Musa faction did not participate, the
PFLP, DFLP, and the Palestine Communist Party--the three guerrilla
groups that, like Al Fatah, had a reputation for independence of
Arab governments--did attend and agreed to accept PNC decisions.
Abu Nidal also attended the eighteenth PNC. However, the other
leaders voted not to grant his group representation on the PNC
because they believed his reputation as a notorious terrorist would
tarnish the PLO's image at a time when the organization was seeking
diplomatic support for an international peace conference.
The 1987 PNC meeting adopted several significant resolutions
pertaining to the PLO's conflict with Israel. It voted to endorse
an international peace conference on the basis of UN General
Assembly resolutions that recognized the PLO and the right of the
Palestinians to self-determination; it called for PLO participation
in such a conference as a full partner, and not as part of a
Jordanian delegation; it abrogated the PLO-Jordan accord of 1985,
but also advocated maintaining "special" ties between Jordanians
and Palestinians; and it authorized the PLO to develop relations
with groups in Israel that supported Palestinian self-
determination. These decisions were a prelude to the even more
significant resolutions that were passed at the historic nineteenth
PNC meeting in Algiers in November 1988.
Between PNC congresses, the Palestine Central Committee (PCC),
created in 1973, set policies and carried out specific programs and
actions undertaken by the PLO's cabinet, the fifteen-member
Executive Committee. The PCC's actual function, however, was
limited to a consultative role; its sixty members, appointed by the
PNC based on the recommendation of the Executive Committee,
included representatives from the Executive Committee and the major
guerrilla groups. The PNC's speaker or chairman presided over PCC
meetings. The legislative and executive functions of these top PLO
bodies were in accordance with the principles and policies
contained in three key documents: the Palestinian National Charter;
the Fifteen-Point Political Program; and the National Unity
Program.
Although the PNC was officially described as the highest
policymaking body and supreme organ of the PLO, the real center of
power was the fifteen-member Executive Committee. The committee's
members were elected by and collectively responsible to the PNC.
The manner of their election ensured representation of the major
guerrilla and political groups on the committee. Arafat was re-
elected chairman of the Executive Committee in 1988, a position he
has held since 1969. Al Fatah had three seats on the committee; in
addition, Arafat generally obtained the support of the seven
"independents," the committee members who were not affiliated with
any of the guerrilla groups.
The administration of the PLO was grouped under nine main
functions that were carried out in different countries depending on
local Palestinian needs. These were supported by funds collected
and distributed by the PLO's treasury and financial arm, the
Palestine National Fund. The fund obtained its revenues from
payments made by Arab governments in accordance with agreements
made at the summit level (i.e., the Baghdad Summit of 1978); from
voluntary contributions by Palestinians; from the 3 to 6 percent
income tax levied by some Arab states on the salaries of resident
Palestinian workers; and from loans and grants by Arab as well as
non-Arab countries. Iraq and Syria provided financial aid directly
to particular guerrilla groups despite persistent efforts by the
PLO to terminate this practice and to centralize fund-raising and
fund-distributing procedures.
In 1989 the PLO maintained "diplomatic" missions in more than
120 countries that recognized it as the legitimate representative
of the Palestinian people. Although the PLO had not proclaimed a
government-in-exile for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, more than
twenty-five countries recognized it as the de jure government of
the independent state of Palestine, declared at the 1988 PNC
meeting in Algiers. The PLO has maintained a mission at UN
headquarters in New York since being granted observer status in
1974. The PLO also operated numerous "information offices" in the
major cities of the world. In 1988 the United States government
ordered the closure of PLO's information office in Washington.
The PLO's nearest equivalent to a Red Cross Society was called
the Palestine Red Crescent Society (PRCS). The PRCS supported
hospitals and clinics for Palestinians in Arab countries as well as
in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Prior to the Israeli invasion
of Lebanon in 1982, the PRCS operated ten major hospitals and
eleven clinics in that country. These facilities provided a broad-
range of medical services to Palestinian refugees at no cost or for
nominal fees. The hospitals and clinics were severely damaged
during the occupation of south Lebanon and the siege of Beirut.
Since 1983, the periodic fighting in Lebanon has seriously impeded
the PRCS's efforts to reconstruct medical centers and provide
health services.
The PLO also sponsored numerous educational and cultural
projects and operated an economic enterprise called the Palestine
Martyrs' Works Society, better known by its Arab acronym SAMED,
which ran small factories. SAMED's workshops produced such items as
blankets, tents, uniforms, civilian clothes, shoes, handicrafts,
furniture, and toys. SAMED was originally established in 1970 to
provide vocational training for the children of Palestinian men and
women killed in service to the Palestinian national cause. After
1976 SAMED decided to accept any Palestinian needing employment if
work were available. Most SAMED workshops were in the refugee camps
in northern Lebanon and thus were not affected by the Israeli
invasion of south Lebanon in 1982. SAMED workshops and activities
were disrupted, however, during the 1983-84 fighting between Arafat
loyalists and dissidents in Palestinian camps in northern Lebanon.
The military function of the PLO was under the supreme command
of the chairman of the Executive Committee. The PLO's regular
military arm was called the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA). Its
units were stationed in various Arab countries where they
coordinated their activities with those of Arab armies. The
coordination was centrally handled by the Palestinian Armed
Struggle Command, which also was responsible for law and order
among Palestinian refugee camps in Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria.
Data as of December 1989
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