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Jordan Relations with the United States
Although Amman established diplomatic relations with Washington
in 1949, the United States did not become actively involved in
Jordan until 1957, when it replaced Britain as the Hashimite
Kingdom's principal Western source of foreign aid and political
support. Jordan and the United States never entered into treaty
commitments, but Washington's policy was to ensure Jordan's
continued independence and stability. Thus, the United States
assisted Jordan in equipping and training its military forces.
During the civil war of 1970-71, the United States firmly supported
Hussein, although it did not become directly involved in the
conflict. After Jordan's army had defeated the PLO guerrillas,
Washington extended substantial budgetary and military aid to the
Hashimite Kingdom. This aid contributed significantly toward
Jordanian recovery from the damages suffered not only in the civil
war but also in the June 1967 War and during the intensive Israeli
shelling of the Jordan valley between 1968 and 1970. Hussein's
close alignment with the United States before and after the civil
war predictably aroused strong anti-American sentiment among
Palestinians in Jordan and elsewhere.
The October 1973 War, in which Jordan was not a direct
participant, brought Jordan and the United States much closer in
the peace process that began after the conflict. Jordan joined with
the United States in support of UN Security Council Resolution 338.
This resolution called on the parties involved in the October 1973
War to cease their hostilities and to implement UN Security Council
Resolution 242 of 1967 providing for a peace based on Israeli
withdrawal from occupied territories. Hussein hoped to obtain
American backing for a return of the West Bank to Jordanian
control. His expectations were buoyed by Washington's success in
negotiating disengagement and limited withdrawal of forces
agreements between Egypt and Israel and Syria and Israel.
The failure of the United States during 1974 to persuade Israel
to pull back its forces from part of the West Bank as an initial
step toward a peace agreement with Jordan disillusioned Hussein
with respect to the ability of the Americans to pressure Israel on
the issue of withdrawal from the occupied Palestinian territories.
Although he continued to value Washington's reaffirmations of
support for Jordan's security and economic progress, Hussein became
increasingly skeptical of American assurances that the West Bank
would be reunited with the East Bank. Consequently, he refrained
from participation in the Camp David process, which he was
convinced would be used by Israel to perpetuate its control of the
West Bank. After Egyptian and Israeli negotiations on the autonomy
plan had stalled, Hussein tried to rekindle United States interest
in an international conference to deal with territory for the
Palestinians.
Throughout the 1980s, the United States continued to assign
Jordan a key role in a resolution of the status of the West Bank.
Hussein believed, however, that Washington did not understand how
essential it was for the stability of his regime to regain full
control over all of the West Bank and how politically dangerous it
would be for him to agree to any partial measures. For example,
Hussein did not publicly criticize President Reagan's September
1982 proposal for Middle East peace: but since this plan restricted
self-determination for Palestinians on the West Bank to an
"autonomous authority" in association with Jordan, he regarded
American expectation of his endorsement as unrealistic. Hussein
accepted that political developments since 1974 made it impossible
to ignore the PLO in any peace negotiations. Thus, one of his
policy aims vis-à-vis the United States became to convince
Washington to deal--at least unofficially--with the PLO. From the
end of 1982 until the end of 1988, Hussein served as an
intermediary between the United States and the PLO, attempting to
get both parties to make the kind of political concessions that
were necessary before a dialogue could be initiated.
During the early 1980s, Hussein seriously considered expanding
Jordan's military relations with the United States. He gave
tentative approval for the creation of an unpublicized 8,000-strong
Jordanian strike force that would respond to requests for
assistance from Arab countries within a 2,400-kilometer radius of
Jordan. The intended target of this special force was to be the
Persian Gulf, where the traditional allies of both Jordan and the
United States feared the potentially destabilizing consequences of
the Iran-Iraq War. The United States agreed to provide the special
Jordanian unit with weapons and other military equipment. In an
apparent effort to obtain approval of the United States Congress
for the extra funding needed to arm the strike force, in early 1984
the Reagan administration disclosed its formation. This unexpected
disclosure caused consternation in Amman, and news of the Jordanian
strike force provoked harsh criticism from Syria and from
Palestinian guerrilla groups opposed to Hussein. In order to
minimize negative repercussions, Hussein tried to distance his
country from the strike force by portraying it as a United States
initiative in which Jordan had no real interest or substantive
involvement. Congress did not approve the requested funds, and the
plan was subsequently abandoned.
Hussein's disappointment with American policy increased when
Congress later refused to authorize selling weapons to Jordan and
voted to reduce the amount of aid the administration requested as
punishment for its perception that Amman had failed to cooperate
with Israel. Hussein resented these measures because he believed he
had exerted great efforts in persuading Palestinian and other Arab
leaders to adopt more moderate and flexible positions and had
himself agreed to several private meetings with Peres. In 1989
Jordan's relations with the United States remained friendly and
cooperative in economic and military matters but were clouded by
Hussein's lack of confidence in Washington's policy toward Israel
and the occupied territories.
Data as of December 1989
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