|
Jordan The Palestinian Factor
Over a long period, the most serious threat to Hussein's
continuance in power had been posed by the militant and
rejectionist elements of the PLO that were supported by Syria and
Libya. Although the PLO's avowed goal was to regain the traditional
Palestinian homeland for millions of Palestinians scattered
throughout the Middle East, the PLO's actions at times had given
the impression that the initial phase of its program was to gain
control over Jordan. In the aftermath of the June 1967 War, Hussein
was persuaded by fellow Arab leaders to permit the PLO to station
some of its military forces in the East Bank. By 1970 the fedayeen
(Palestinian guerrillas) had acquired a powerful presence in the
country and had become openly defiant of Hussein's government. They
threatened to topple the monarchy and replace it with a regime that
would not interfere with guerrilla operations against Israel. After
a series of crises during which Palestinian behavior became
increasingly disruptive, a fierce civil war broke out in September
1970. By the summer of 1971, after suffering heavy losses, the
organized PLO militia was forced to withdraw to new bases primarily
in Lebanon
(see Jordan - The Guerrilla Crisis
, ch. 1).
Having ended the Palestinian military threat, Hussein was
determined not to permit its reappearance. The departure of the PLO
meant relief from Israeli retaliatory shelling and incursions in
reprisal for PLO raids and rocket attacks on the West Bank.
Hostility between Hussein and the PLO gradually abated after the
October 1973 War. The king reluctantly assented to a decision taken
at a conference of Arab leaders in 1974 to designate the PLO as the
sole authorized representative of the Palestinian people, in effect
relinquishing his traditional role as representative of
Palestinians residing on the West Bank. In 1988 the king formally
renounced Jordanian claims to sovereignty over the West Bank. At
the same time, Hussein intensified his efforts to promote national
unity in the East Bank by encouraging the integration of
Palestinians into the indigenous political and social structure.
Many Palestinian residents had by 1989 become well absorbed into
Jordanian society, achieving prominence in government, business,
finance, and industry, with an investment in the stability of the
Hashimite regime. But there was still widespread discrimination
against Palestinians in favor of Transjordanians, and thousands of
Palestinians remained in Jordan as impoverished refugees.
As of 1989, the remaining potential for political subversion
among the Palestinians appeared to be confined to scattered and
poorly organized extremist groups operating mostly out of refugee
camps. These groups included radical factions of the Syriansupported anti-Arafat wing of the PLO, such as the Popular Front
for the Liberation of Palestine General Command (PFLP-GC) and the
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP). In late
1987 and early 1988, the government detained without charge or
expelled more than 100 Palestinians to prevent them from agitating
in support of the intifadah (the Palestinian uprising in the
West Bank) and against Hussein's inaction. The Black September
terrorist group, claimed responsibility for bomb explosions in
Amman later in 1988 and charged the king with "conspiring against
the Palestinian revolution."
Data as of December 1989
|
