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Jordan PERSONNEL: COMPOSITION, RECRUITMENT, AND TRAINING
Because such heavy reliance was placed on the military to
safeguard the monarchy, the composition and attitudes of armed
forces personnel have been of vital importance to Hussein.
Recruitment policies and promotion of senior personnel were subject
to the approval of the king. During the early years of the
Hashimite regime, a traditional system of recruitment was followed
that grew out of British practices associated with the formation
and maintenance of the Arab Legion. The legion was officered,
trained, and financed by Britain. The enlisted personnel were all
locally recruited villagers and tribesmen. Most British officers
detached to serve with the legion were contract employees of the
Transjordanian government; others were simply seconded from the
British army.
Initial public reaction to the Arab Legion was indifferent or
at times even hostile, and recruiting was difficult. The military
establishment, however, soon developed high standards of
organization, discipline, and training. Tribal uprisings and
raiding practices were suppressed, and criminal activity by restive
tribal elements diminished. Civic assistance activities enhanced
the legion's public image, and it evolved into a proud and
respected professional force. Its well-trained regulars gained a
reputation for firm and effective action, as well as for discipline
and justice in dealing with the civilian population. As a result,
recruiting became easy, with the further incentive of generous pay
scales in the enlisted ranks in relation to other Middle Eastern
armies.
The flow of volunteers made it possible to impose a system of
selection that strengthened confidence in the army as a stabilizing
factor in defense of the monarchy. As Glubb later wrote, "The
character and antecedents of every recruit were checked by the
police before his acceptance. Then again, in the Arab Legion, a
confidential report was submitted on every officer and man every
year." This careful screening to exclude potential subversives and
those of doubtful loyalty was expensive and time-consuming. But
support of a monarchy was at stake, and the background
investigation of even the lowest recruit was an important detail in
the process. The long-term success of the effort was evident in the
devotion the armed forces demonstrated to Hussein through three
decades of conflict with Israel, internecine Arab strife, and
repeated assassination attempts.
The system produced good soldiers, as the legion's record of
performance amply demonstrated, and this tradition has persisted.
Jordanian troops have proved to be tough and resilient fighters.
Men of bedouin origin, long accustomed to living in a harsh
physical environment and enduring Spartan conditions, showed a
particular affinity for and pride in military service. For many
years, the system of carefully selected volunteers resulted in an
army in which the bedouin element constituted the vast majority,
particularly in infantry and armored units. According to Glubb's
account, nearly all of the legion's troops before and during World
War II were recruited from the bedouins of southern Transjordan.
After the war, enlistment of bedouins of northern Transjordan as
well as residents of the West Bank was also encouraged.
Following the dissolution of the National Guard in 1965, many
of its Palestinian members were accepted into the Jordan Arab Army
after careful security screening. Palestinians formed about 40
percent of the armed forces. The Palestinian component fell to 15
percent during the 1970s, when the country was wracked by internal
turbulence (highlighted by the assassination of the prime minister
in 1971 and the coup attempt financed by Palestinian bribes in
1972). As many as 5,000 Palestinians were estimated to have
succumbed to PLO pressure to defect during the 1970-71 civil war,
but approximately 20,000 remained loyal to the king and the armed
forces. Although no official statistics were available, observers
believed that the proportion of Palestinians in the armed forces
had risen to between 30 percent and 40 percent by 1986. Observers
expected this percentage would probably continue to rise as a
result of conscription and as doubts over Palestinian loyalty
further subsided. Although education standards among the bedouins
had risen sharply, there continued to be a premium in the late
1980s on the educational and technical attainments that Palestinian
recruits could more readily offer.
Families of traditional background still dominated among senior
military officers. The principal tribes were well represented, but
a balance was deliberately maintained so that no one group enjoyed
a prevailing influence. A significant portion of lower echelon
officer positions, excluding first-line combat units, were held by
Palestinians. In the upper reaches of the officer corps, however,
Palestinians still constituted well under 10 percent.
Data as of December 1989
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