|
Jordan The Camp David Accords and Inter-Arab Politics
During the spring of 1977, the international climate strongly
supported some type of superpower-sanctioned settlement to the
Arab-Israeli dispute. Newly elected United States president Jimmy
Carter and Soviet leader Brezhnev advocated a comprehensive ArabIsraeli settlement that would include autonomy for the
Palestinians. On October 1, 1977, in preparation for a reconvened
Geneva Conference, the United States and the Soviet Union issued a
joint statement committing themselves to a comprehensive settlement
incorporating all parties concerned and all questions. The proposed
summit, however, was preempted by events in Egypt.
Jordan, like the rest of the Arab states, was taken by surprise
by President Sadat's decision to travel to Jerusalem in November
1977. Hussein, however, muted his criticism of the Egyptian
president's historic trip and called on the Arab states to reserve
judgment. The king feared that an outright rejection of the
Egyptian initative might provoke an alienated Sadat to seek a
separate agreement with Israel. He also saw many positive elements
in Sadat's opening statement to the Knesset, such as his rejection
of a separate settlement to the Palestinian problem, his emphasis
on the need to find a solution to the Palestinian problem, the
recognition of Jordan's special relationship with the West Bank,
and the proposal to incorporate Jordan, rather than the PLO, into
the peace process.
Despite his enthusiasm for Sadat's speech, Hussein was
reluctant to join the Egyptian-Israeli peace process. He feared
that by joining the negotiations he would isolate Jordan in the
Arab world, incur Syria's wrath, and potentially destabilize
Palestinians on the East Bank with little possibility for Jordanian
gains. Moreover, Hussein did not want to represent Palestinian
interests at such negotiations unless he had a clear Arab and
Palestinian mandate to do so.
The final version of the Camp David Accords signed by Egyptian
president Sadat, Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin, and United
States president Carter separated the issues of the future of the
West Bank and the return of Sinai. Whereas the sections dealing
with the return of Sinai were very explicit, the sections on the
West Bank were vague and open to various interpretations. They
called for Egypt, Israel, and "the representatives of the
Palestinian people to negotiate about the future of the West Bank
and Gaza." A five-year period of "transitional autonomy" was called
for "to ensure a peaceful and orderly transfer of authority." The
agreement also called for peace talks between Israel and its other
Arab neighbors, particularly Syria.
The Camp David Accords fell far short of meeting even Jordan's
minimal demands. Hussein expressed anger that Jordan was included
in the Camp David framework without his prior knowledge or
approval. He viewed the division of the accords into two agreements
with no linkage between Israel's withdrawal from Sinai and progress
on the Palestinian issue as a sign that Sadat was more interested
in regaining Sinai than in brokering a viable peace settlement on
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Hussein was further alienated
from the Camp David peace process because Israel refused to
negotiate over East Jerusalem, insisted on its rights to establish
settlements in the occupied territories, and reserved the right to
demand sovereignty over those areas at the end of the transition
period.
Following the signing of the Camp David Accords, Jordan
accepted an Iraqi invitation--accompanied by a US$30 million Iraqi
grant--to attend the Baghdad Conference. The summit conference's
decision to allot to Jordan the relatively large sum of US$1.25
billion per year helped keep Jordan in the Arab fold. At the
Baghdad Conference held in November 1978, the Arab states
unequivocally rejected the Camp David Accords and officially
ostracized Egypt from the Arab League.
Jordanian-Egyptian relations deteriorated even further after
the signing of the Treaty of Peace Between Egypt and Israel in
March 1979. The Israeli government's limited view of Palestinian
autonomy became apparent shortly after the peace treaty was signed.
In April the Begin government approved two new settlements between
Ram Allah and Nabulus, established civilian regional councils for
the Jewish settlements in the territories, and prepared autonomy
plans in which Israel would keep exclusive control over the West
Bank's water, communications, roads, public order, and immigration
into the territories. The acceleration of settlements, the growth
of an increasingly militaristic Jewish settler movement, and
Israel's stated desire to retain complete control over resources in
the territories precluded the participation in the peace process of
either moderate Palestinians, such as the newly formed National
Guidance Committee composed of West Bank mayors, or of Hussein. The
PLO refused from the beginning to participate in the peace process.
In response, the Jordanian government recalled its ambassador
from Cairo on March 28 and on April 1 it severed diplomatic
relations with Egypt. Not all ties were broken, however; the
Jordanian and Egyptian airlines still flew about ten flights a week
between their respective cities and, most important, Egyptian
workers in Jordan continued to enjoy the same status as before. The
Jordanian media and public officials intensified anti-Israel
rhetoric, showing particular hostility toward the United States for
supporting the accords. Hussein's greatest fear was that, with
Egypt removed from the Arab-Israeli military balance, Israel might
be tempted to transform the East Bank into an "alternative
homeland" for the Palestinians. Jordanian fears were fueled when,
at the end of March 1979, Israeli minister of agriculture Ariel
Sharon issued a statement to the effect that the Palestinians ought
to take over Jordan and establish a government there.
Hussein, although fully backing the Baghdad accords, sought a
very different objective than the more hard-line Arab states such
as Syria and Iraq. His goal was not to punish Egypt or overthrow
Sadat, but rather to set up an alternative strategy to the Camp
David framework supported by an Arab consensus that would provide
a more equitable and viable solution to the Middle East conflict.
The essence of the Jordanian alternative was to return the
Palestinian problem either to the UN Security Council or to the
Geneva Conference where all the relevant parties--including the
United States, the Soviet Union, and the European Economic
Community--could work together in reaching a comprehensive Middle
East peace plan.
Hussein's attempt to develop a united Arab stand did not
succeed. At the Tunis Summit of November 1979, in the face of
strong Syrian objections, Hussein was unable to mobilize an Arab
consensus behind an alternative to the Camp David Accords. Syrian
president Assad's strong objections to Hussein's proposal marked
the beginning of rapid deterioration in Syrian-Jordanian relations.
Hussein was further rebuffed when Assad revived the Steadfastness
and Confrontation Front consisting of Syria, Libya, Algeria, the
People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen), and the PLO.
The Syrian leader accused Jordan of supporting Syrian elements of
the Muslim Brotherhood, which had been involved in a series of
attacks against his regime. Although Syria continued to be a major
Soviet ally in the Middle East, Jordan joined nearly the entire
Arab world in condemning the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
Finally, Syria, unlike Jordan, was unwilling to participate in any
alternative to the Camp David Accords.
Data as of December 1989
|
