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Jordan THE ORGANIZATION OF SOCIETY: COHESION AND CONFLICT
In the pre-1948 East Bank, the dominant sociopolitical order
was tribalism. Tribalism was characteristic not only of the beduin
nomads and seminomads upon whom the Hashimite (also seen as
Hashemite) rulers relied for support, but also of many of the
village people and even those who were technically urban. After
1948 this sociocultural system was inundated by masses of
Palestinians, largely sedentary village and town dwellers, many of
them literate and well educated. The sheer numbers of Palestinians
who came to the East Bank after 1948 and the comparatively simple
economy and society of the indigenous Transjordanians made the
assimilation of the Palestinians to the local patterns improbable.
Indeed, some analysts have argued that by the early 1970s
Palestinians had established a cultural dominance in the East Bank.
In any case, by the late 1980s, Palestinians had considerable
economic and cultural influence.
Jordanians responded in part to the development of Palestinian
economic and cultural elites by upgrading education. By the late
1980s, the gap between Transjordanian and Palestinian educational
achievements had narrowed considerably. Jordan's position also was
changing in the global political economy. Agriculture and nomadism
had gradually given way to more viable livelihoods based on skilled
labor, secular education, and increasing levels of literacy. Labor
migration, particularly of the skilled and educated, was a key
factor in social mobility in the 1970s and 1980s. A concomitant
shift in values was apparent: prestige was increasingly associated
with modern occupations, and education came to be seen as the key
to social mobility.
Aside from the fundamental distinction between Jordanians of
East Bank origin and those of Palestinian origin, other
sociocultural distinctions or affiliations were evident in
Jordanian society, including ethnic and regional origins, gender,
class, tribe, religion, and life-style (e.g., nomadic, village, or
urban). These various patterns of affiliations structured the ways
in which Jordanians related to one another and gave rise to
different sorts of individual identity. For example, most Christian
Jordanians were Arabs and shared many cultural habits and values
with Muslim Jordanians. Their sense of identity, however, was based
less on Islamic influences than that of Muslim Jordanians.
Christians interacted daily with Muslims, working, studying, and
socializing together. But intermarriage between Muslims and
Christians remained infrequent in the late 1980s. Little
information was available on the extent to which these social
interactions contributed to conflict or tension. The most that
observers could conclude was that religious differences carried a
potential for conflict.
Class structure in Jordan was exceedingly difficult to assess.
Many social divisions, such as East Bank or Palestinian origins and
identity, tribal affiliation, ethnicity, and rural or urban
lifestyle, cut across class divisions. The forces of the political
economy in the late 1970s and 1980s were forging embryonic classes;
however, it was debatable to what extent they were self-conscious
and cohesive.
Class structure in Jordan resembled a pyramid. At the top was
a small, wealthy group comprising large landowners, industrialists,
leading financial figures, and members of their families. The oil
boom of the 1970s and early 1980s also had created a new class of
wealthy Jordanians who made large amounts of money abroad, which
was displayed by conspicuous consumption at home in Jordan. Just
below this group were professionals, army officers, and government
officials who lived a somewhat less grand but still comfortable
life. White-collar workers, schoolteachers, and returning migrants
struggled to retain a style of life that separated them socially
from the small shopkeepers and artisans below them. At the bottom
of the pyramid, a large lower class included increasing numbers of
the unemployed. The system of family support tended to cushion
unemployed university graduates and professionals from falling into
the ranks of the poor.
Data as of December 1989
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