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Soviet Union [USSR] SOCIAL COMPOSITION OF THE PARTY
The Bolshevik organization began as a tightly knit group of
revolutionaries whose leadership was dominated by members of the
Russian, Jewish, and Polish intelligentsia but whose mass base
consisted mainly of industrial workers from Russia's largest
cities. By the late 1980s, for the most part the social
characteristics of the party membership reflected the social and
economic changes the Soviet Union had undergone over the more than
seventy years of its existence. Consequently, professionals made up
a percentage of party membership that exceeded their percentage of
the population, and the number of party members with a secondary or
higher education has constantly risen since the mid-1930s.
Similarly, the party has recruited its members from all
nationalities. As a result, the gap between the ethnic groups that
dominated the party and other ethnic groups in the early years has
narrowed. However, this gap has not disappeared completely. By
contrast, the percentage of women in the party has continued to lag
behind the percentage of women in the population. Altogether, the
social characteristics of party members confirmed their status as
an elite in the society. The social composition of the party
reflected the decision made by Stalin in the 1930s and reaffirmed
since that time both to make professional achievement and merit the
primary criteria for admission into the party and to strive for the
proportional representation of all groups within the party's ranks.
In 1987 the CPSU numbered more than 19 million members (see
table 23, Appendix A). Party members constituted about 9.7 percent
of the adult population. This figure represented an increase of 4
percent since 1956. Most of that increase, however, reflected the
CPSU's rapid growth between 1956 and 1964 under the leadership of
Khrushchev. Since 1971 the share of party membership in the adult
population has risen only 0.3 percent.
In general, party members possessed a high occupational status
in society, which belied the party's claims to be the vanguard of
the working class. The party did not publish statistics on the
social status of its membership. Nevertheless, the CPSU did publish
statistics on its membership's "social position," which denoted the
class affiliation of members at the time they joined the CPSU.
Workers and peasants who joined the party often used their
membership to advance into white-collar positions. Were statistics
available on the social status of party members, they would reveal
the disproportional representation of white-collar professionals in
party ranks. Available figures on the social position of party
members, however, also indicated the importance of professionals in
the party (see
table 24, Appendix A). In 1987 persons who were
members of the white-collar professions when they joined the CPSU
made up 43.1 percent of the party, while those who were members of
the working class made up 45.3 percent and those who were peasants
made up 11.6 percent. By contrast, in 1987 Soviet sources reported
that 27.8 percent of the working population consisted of white-
collar professionals, 62.7 were workers, and 9.5 percent were
peasants. The high percentage of members who were professionals
when they joined the party, together with the accelerated
advancement into white-collar positions by members who were workers
or peasants, suggested that the CPSU was not a proletarian party
but rather one dominated by white-collar professionals.
Statistics on the percentage of party members with higher
education replicated this pattern (see
table 25, Appendix A).
Between 1967 and 1987, the percentage of party members who had
completed higher education almost doubled. In 1987 over 32 percent
of the party membership had received a degree from an institution
of higher education. By contrast, in that same year only 7.3
percent of the general population had received a similar degree.
Again, the figures indicate that the CPSU was less the party of the
working class than the party of the white-collar intelligentsia.
The ethnic composition of the party reflected further
disproportions between the party and the population as a whole (see
table 26, Appendix A). In 1922 the share of Russian members in the
party exceeded their proportion of the population by 19 percent.
Since that time, the gap between Russians and other nationalities
has narrowed. In 1979 Russians constituted 52 percent of the Soviet
population; however, they constituted 60 percent of the party in
1981. Moreover, the percentage of Russians in the party apparatus
was probably even greater than their percentage in the party as a
whole.
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, other major nationalities
whose share of party membership exceeded their proportion of the
population were the Belorussians, the Georgians, and the Jews (the
percentage of Jews in the party was twice their percentage in the
Soviet population as a whole). The proportion of Ukrainians and
Armenians in the party equaled their share of the Soviet
population. Armenians and Jews shared certain characteristics that
help explain their relatively high proportion of party membership.
Members of these nationalities tended to be more urbanized,
educated, and geographically mobile than the norm. These
characteristics correlated strongly with party membership. The
Georgians, although not as urbanized as the Armenians or the Jews,
tended to be highly educated. Other reasons explained the
relatively high percentage of party membership among the
Belorussians and Ukrainians. These two East Slavic nationalities
are culturally close to the Russians. In addition, the central
party apparatus has sought to demonstrate that political
opportunities for Belorussians and Ukrainians equal those for
Russians.
Those major nationalities having the lowest proportion of party
members compared with their share of the population were the
Tadzhiks, Uzbeks, Kirgiz, and Turkmens of Central Asia, and the
Moldavians. The Central Asians resisted membership in an
organization they perceived to be dominated by East Slavs in
general and Russians in particular. Similar considerations applied
to the Moldavians, whose territory the Soviet Union seized from
Romania in World War II
(see Soviet Union USSR - Other Major Nationalities
, ch. 4).
The percentage of women in the party lagged far behind the
proportion of women in the population (see
table 27, Appendix A).
In 1987 women comprised 29.3 percent of the party and 53 percent of
the population. Several reasons explained women's lack of interest
in joining the party. First, party work required a substantial
commitment of time from each member
(see Soviet Union USSR - Selection Procedures
, this
ch.). Approximately 80 percent of Soviet women held jobs and, in
addition, spent long hours caring for children, shopping, and
running households. Second, Muslim peoples, who constituted a high
percentage of the Soviet population, discouraged female
participation in politics. Third, Soviet women might not enter the
CPSU because they perceived that the social mores of that
organization restricted their ability to move up the hierarchy into
positions of power. The 307 members elected to the CPSU Central
Committee at the Twenty-Seventh Party Congress in 1986 included
only 13 women. In the 1980s, women made up only about 33 percent of
PPO secretaries, 20 percent of district party organization
secretaries, and 3.2 percent of obkom bureau members. No
woman has been a full member of the Politburo. Thus, the higher the
level in the party hierarchy, the lower the percentage of women.
In his report to the CPSU Central Committee on January 27,
1987, General Secretary Gorbachev called for the promotion of more
women and representatives of national minorities and ethnic groups
into leading positions in the party. That policy, together with the
pursuit of other policies that encourage greater urbanization,
geographic mobility, and higher education levels, may lead to a
greater proportion of women and national minorities in influential
party positions. If women and national minorities perceive the
opportunity to move up the hierarchy into positions of power, a
greater number of these underrepresented groups might be willing to
join the party and thus help to balance the sexual and ethnic
composition of the CPSU with that of the population as a whole.
* * *
A plethora of works has been written on all aspects of the
CPSU. The following general works on the Soviet Union contain
chapters on the party: John A. Armstrong's Ideology, Politics,
and Government in the Soviet Union, John N. Hazard's The
Soviet System of Government, and Frederick C. Barghoorn and
Thomas F. Remington's Politics in the USSR. The best general
treatment of the CPSU is found in The Soviet Communist Party
by Ronald J. Hill and Peter Frank. A number of specialized
treatments of various aspects of the party also have been written.
Alfred G. Meyer's Leninism remains a classic study of the
thought, political program, and tactics of Lenin. Nina Tumarkin's
Lenin Lives! examines the Lenin cult in the Soviet Union.
George Breslauer's Khrushchev and Brezhnev as Leaders treats
attempts by Khrushchev and Brezhnev to build authority in the
political system. For thorough analyses of intermediate-level and
local-level party organizations, works by Joel C. Moses are
helpful. Scholars who have examined the nomenklatura and
patron-client relations include John P. Willerton, Jr., Bohdan
Harasymiw, and Gyula Jozsza. Michael Voslensky's
Nomenklatura provides an insider's account of the ruling
class. John H. Miller's "The Communist Party" treats the social
characteristics of the CPSU's membership. (For further information
and complete citations,
see Soviet Union USSR -
Bibliography.)
Data as of May 1989
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