Soviet Union [USSR] SOVIET-UNITED STATES RELATIONS
A central concern of Soviet foreign and military policy since
World War II, relations with the United States have gone through
cycles of "cold" and "warm" periods. A crucial factor in SovietAmerican relations has been the mutual nuclear threat
(see Soviet Union USSR - The Soviet Union and Nuclear Arms Control
, this ch.). A high point in
Soviet-American relations occurred when the Strategic Arms
Limitation Talks
(
SALT; see Glossary) resulted in the May 1972
signing of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the Interim
Agreement on the limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. This event
marked the beginning of the beginning of Soviet-American détente.
The Soviet Union and the United States differed over the
meaning of the détente relationship. In the West, détente has
usually been considered to mean a nonhostile, even harmonious,
relationship. The Soviet Union, however, has preferred the terms
mirnoe sosushchestvovanie (peaceful coexistence) or
razriadka napriazhennosti (a discharging or easing of
tensions) instead of the term détente. Brezhnev explained the
Soviet perception of the détente relationship at the 1976 and 1981
CPSU party congresses, asserting that détente did not mean that the
Soviet Union would cease to support Third World national liberation
movements or the world class struggle. In the Soviet view, détente
with the West was compatible with sponsoring Cuban intervention in
the Third World. However, Soviet-sponsored intervention in the
Third World met with growing protest from the United States. The
détente relationship conclusively ended with the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan in December 1979.
Following the Soviet invasion, the United States instigated a
number of trade sanctions against the Soviet Union, including an
embargo on grain shipments to the Soviet Union, the cancellation of
American participation in the 1980 Summer Olympics in Moscow, and
the shelving of efforts to win ratification in the United States
Senate of the Second SALT agreement. In April 1981, under the new
administration of President Ronald Reagan, the United States
announced the lifting of the grain embargo but also moved to
tighten procedures concerning the export of strategically sensitive
technology to the Soviet Union. As part of this effort to limit
such exports, the Reagan administration in 1982 unsuccessfully
attempted to convince West European governments to block the sale
of American-developed technology for the construction of Soviet
natural gas pipelines. A freeze on cultural exchanges that had
developed after the invasion of Afghanistan continued during
Reagan's first term in office.
The Soviet Union began deploying SS-20 intermediate-range
ballistic missiles equipped with nuclear warheads along its western
and southeastern borders in 1977. The United States and its NATO
allies regarded this deployment as destabilizing to the nuclear
balance in Europe, and in December 1979 NATO decided to counter
with the deployment of Pershing II intermediate-range ballistic
missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs), both equipped
with nuclear warheads. In November 1981, Reagan proposed the "zero
option" as the solution to the nuclear imbalance in Western Europe.
Basically, the zero option included the elimination of SS-20s and
other missiles targeted against Western Europe and the
nondeployment of countervailing NATO weapons. The Soviet Union
refused to accept the zero option and insisted that French and
British nuclear forces be included in the reckoning of the balance
of nuclear forces in Europe and in any agreement on reductions of
nuclear forces. Feeling forced to match the Soviet nuclear threat,
NATO began countervailing deployments in late 1983. As the
deployment date neared, the Soviet Union threatened to deploy
additional nuclear weapons targeted on Western Europe and weapons
that would place the territory of the United States under threat.
Also, Soviet negotiators walked out of talks on the reduction of
intermediate-range nuclear forces (the INF talks) and strategic
forces (the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, or START). The refusal
to come back to the negotiating table continued after General
Secretary Iurii V. Andropov's death and Konstantin V. Chernenko's
selection as general secretary in early 1984. The Soviet Union
finally agreed to resume the INF and START talks around the time of
Chernenko's death and Gorbachev's selection as general secretary in
March 1985. Progress was then made on the revamped INF talks. In
1987 the Soviet Union acceded to the zero option, which involved
the elimination of NATO Pershing IIs and GLCMs targeted against the
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and Soviet missiles targeted
against Western Europe and Asia. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear
Forces Treaty (INF Treaty) was signed in Washington on December 8,
1987, during a summit meeting between Reagan and Gorbachev.
Between November 1982 and March 1985, the Soviet Union had four
general secretaries (Brezhnev, Andropov, Chernenko, and Gorbachev)
while the United States had a single chief executive. The changes
of leadership in the Soviet Union had a noticeable effect on
Soviet-American relations. Until Gorbachev assumed power and
partially consolidated his rule by 1986, the frequent changes in
Soviet leadership resulted in the continuation of policies
formulated during the late Brezhnev period. Soviet foreign policy
toward the United States during this period increasingly took the
form of vituperative propaganda attacks on Reagan, who, it was
alleged, was personally responsible for derailing Soviet-American
détente and increasing the danger of nuclear war. The low point in
Soviet-American relations occurred in March 1983, when Reagan
described the Soviet Union as an "evil empire . . . the focus of
evil in the modern world," and Soviet spokesmen responded by
attacking Reagan's "bellicose, lunatic anticommunism." The Soviet
shoot-down of a civilian South Korean airliner in September 1983
near the Soviet island of Sakhalin shocked world public opinion and
militated against any improvement in Soviet-American relations at
that time. In 1983 the United States was increasingly concerned
about Soviet activities in Grenada, finally directing the military
operation in October 1983 that was denounced by the Soviet Union.
In November 1983, the Soviet negotiators walked out of the arms
control talks.
In August 1985, Gorbachev declared a unilateral moratorium on
nuclear testing. The United States, in the midst of a nuclear
warhead modernization program, refused to go along with the
moratorium. Some Western analysts viewed Gorbachev's unilateral
moratorium as a Soviet attempt to delay weapons modernization in
the United States and, in the event that the United States refused
to abide by the moratorium even unofficially, an attempt to depict
the United States and the Reagan administration as militaristic.
The Soviet Union ended the moratorium with an underground nuclear
test in February 1987.
A general improvement in Soviet-American relations began soon
after Gorbachev was selected general secretary in March 1985.
Annual summit meetings between Reagan and Gorbachev were held at
Geneva (November 1985); Reykjavik (October 1986); Washington
(December 1987); and Moscow (May 1988). At the Geneva summit
meeting between Reagan and Gorbachev in November 1985, a new
general cultural agreement was signed that involved exchanges of
performing arts groups and fine arts and educational exhibits. At
the Reykjavik summit, some progress was made in strategic arms
reductions negotiations, although no agreements were reached. At
the Washington summit, the INF Treaty was signed. At the Moscow
summit, an agreement increasing the level and type of educational
exchanges was signed. Although no major arms control agreements
were signed during the Moscow summit, the summit was significant
because it demonstrated a commitment by both sides to a renewed
détente.
During the mid- to late 1980s, the Soviet Union also stepped up
media contacts. Soviet spokesmen appeared regularly on United
States television, United States journalists were allowed
unprecedented access to report on everyday life in the Soviet
Union, and video conferences (termed "tele-bridges") were held
between various United States groups and selected Soviet citizens.
Data as of May 1989
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