|
Soviet Union [USSR] Chapter 13. Agriculture
IN THE 1980s, AGRICULTURE continued to frustrate the leaders of
the Soviet Union. Despite immense land resources, extensive
machinery and chemical support industries, a large rural work
force, and two decades of massive investment in the agricultural
sector, the Soviet Union continued to rely on large-scale grain and
meat imports to feed its population. Persistent shortages of
staples, the general unavailability of fresh meats, fruits, and
vegetables in state stores, and a bland, carbohydrate-rich diet
remained a fact of life for Soviet citizens and a perennial
embarrassment to their government.
Although in terms of total value of output the Soviet Union was
the world's second leading agricultural power and ranked first in
the production of numerous commodities, agriculture was a net drain
on the economy. The financial resources directed to this sector
soared throughout the 1970s and by the mid-1980s accounted for
nearly one-third of total investment. The ideologically motivated
policy of maintaining low prices for staples created an enormous
disparity between production costs and retail food prices. By 1983
the per capita food subsidy amounted to nearly 200 rubles, which
the consumer had to pay in higher prices for nonfood products.
Although gross agricultural production rose by more than 50
percent between the 1950s and 1980s, outstripping population growth
by 25 percent, the consumer did not see a proportionate improvement
in the availability of foodstuffs (see
table 34, Appendix A). This
paradox indicated that the Soviet Union's inability to meet demand
for agricultural commodities was only partly the result of
production shortfalls and that much of the blame was attributable
to other factors. Chief among these were the processing,
transportation, storage, and marketing elements of the food
economy, the neglect of which over the years resulted in an average
wastage of about one-fourth of agricultural output. Soviet experts
estimated that if waste in storage and processing were eliminated,
up to 25 percent more grain, 40 percent more fruits and vegetables,
and 15 percent more meat and dairy products could be brought to
market.
The heavily centralized and bureaucratized system of
administration, which has characterized Soviet agriculture ever
since Joseph V. Stalin's campaign of forced
collectivization (see Glossary), was the dominant cause of
the sector's overall poor
performance. Inflexible production directives from central planning
organs that failed to take local growing conditions into account
and bureaucratic interference in the day-to-day management of
individual farms fostered resentment and undermined morale in the
countryside. The result was low labor productivity, the system's
most intractable problem. Despite its systemic flaws, however,
Soviet agriculture enjoyed certain successes. The standard of
living of farm workers improved, illiteracy was reduced, incomes
grew, better housing and health care were provided, and electricity
was brought to virtually all villages. Farming practices were
modernized, and agriculture received more machinery and became less
labor intensive (see
table 35, Appendix A). Ambitious irrigation
and drainage projects brought millions of additional hectares under
cultivation. Large livestock inventories were built up,
particularly during the 1970s and 1980s. And the increased
prominence accorded agriculture, coupled with wiser policies
exploiting the profit motive, appeared to be paying dividends, as
bumper grain harvests were reported in Mikhail S. Gorbachev's first
two years in power.
Data as of May 1989
|
