|
Soviet Union [USSR] MILITARY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
Science and technology in defense and civilian sectors differed
markedly in both organization and performance. Military research
and development generally functioned more efficiently and produced
more advanced technologies.
The principal organizations involved in Soviet military science
and technology were subordinate to the defense industrial
ministries. The ministries responsible for research, design, and
production of military equipment and weapons or their components
consisted of the Ministry of the Aviation Industry, the Ministry of
the Communications Equipment Industry, the Ministry of the Defense
Industry, the Ministry of the Electronics Industry, the Ministry of
General Machine Building, the Ministry of Machine Tool and ToolBuilding Industry, the Ministry of Medium Machine Building, the
Ministry of the Radio Industry, and the Ministry of the
Shipbuilding Industry. These nine ministries were among the
eighteen ministries of the machine-building and metal-working
complex (MBMW) under the control of the Defense Council
(see Soviet Union USSR - Machine Building and Metal Working
, ch. 12). Each of the nine
ministries incorporated institutes engaged in applied research and
a network of bureaus responsible for designing and developing new
military equipment and processes. In 1989 these ministries directed
the work of thousands of plants making weapons and weapons
component plants, at least 450 military research and development
organizations, and approximately fifty major design bureaus. (Other
industrial ministries contributed to military research,
development, and production. For example, some military vehicles
were produced by the Ministry of Automotive and Agricultural
Machine Building, and fuel and chemical warfare agents were
produced by the Ministry of the Chemical Industry.)
The second category consisted of the Ministry of Defense and
its subordinate research facilities. Little information on these
institutes has been published, but their work undoubtedly has been
concentrated on those areas most relevant to military requirements.
These institutes maintained close contact with the industrial
research institutes and the design bureaus. Their main function
appeared to be to evaluate the latest scientific achievements and
to forecast the development of the Soviet armed forces.
The third category comprised the facilities considered part of
civilian science. These primarily were the 300 research institutes
affiliated with the Academy of Sciences. Some of the country's most
important military research programs were conducted by the Academy
of Sciences. Other institutes in this category included university
facilities and research establishments subordinate to the civilian
production ministries.
The final category consisted of the coordinating agencies. The
most powerful organization was the Military Industrial Commission
(Voenno-promyshlennaia komissiia--VPK), which included
representatives from the defense industry ministries, the Ministry
of Defense, Gosplan, and probably the CPSU Secretariat. VPK
monitored and coordinated all military research and development and
production. It reviewed new weapons proposals for their technical
feasibility and for production requirements, approved research-to-
production timetables submitted by lead organizations, and
participated in planning and supervising major technological
programs, apparently including those conducted by Academy of
Sciences institutes.
The second important coordinating agency was GKNT. Although
mandated to plan, oversee, and regulate scientific research and
development, evidence on its operation suggested that it had little
direct influence over the defense sector. Nevertheless, GKNT
exerted some general influence over military research and
development in that it formulated the basic scientific and
technical problems of the country and worked out the programs
needed to address them.
The various institutional components of military research and
development interacted in a way that generally was far more
productive than that of the civilian sector. The defense sector
more often succeeded in seeing a scientific idea through the
various development stages into production. Many of those ideas may
not have represented a leading-edge technology (Soviet military
research and development were thought to be more evolutionary than
revolutionary), but at least they were carried through into
production.
One of the reasons Soviet military research and development
fared better has been the high priority given to it by the regime.
The defense sector received not only more funds but also better
resources and the best personnel. Perhaps most important in terms
of priority was the level of political commitment. Maintaining a
strong military capable of matching United States military strength
has been a high priority for Soviet political leaders. This
translated into a strong commitment to ensure that military science
and technology developed and functioned to support the Soviet
military. High priority was not the only factor explaining the
military sector's superior performance. Another factor was that the
defense sector had better access to development facilities.
Research projects in the military tended not to "die" because of
lack of research facilities' access to development facilities.
Another factor affecting military research and development was
that the defense sector was not so heavily attuned to production
quantity rather than quality. Civilian production enterprises often
were reluctant to innovate because of the time needed to adjust a
plant's operations to the production of the new item or use of the
new process. Such adjustments have been viewed in the civilian
sector as interruptions because they cut into the time needed to
meet a plant's production quotas. Military production facilities,
which had rigorous quality-control measures, faced less pressure to
meet a specified production goal.
Finally, coordination among military research and development
establishments was more effective than that in the civilian sector.
Facilities involved in the various phases of the military researchto -production cycle were more inclined to interact with one
another. Furthermore, design facilities in the defense
establishment tended to be larger and more capable of developing a
research idea further through the research-to-production cycle.
Design organizations in the military also tended to generate better
design documentation for production plants to implement. Some of
the administrative barriers encountered in the civilian sector were
overcome in the military sector, in part by giving lead institutes
the power to coordinate efforts for specific programs.
The success of the defense industry has been something Soviet
leaders wanted to replicate across the spectrum of scientific and
technological sectors. Gorbachev patterned many of the reforms
instituted during the mid-1980s after organizational arrangements
and policies in the defense sector. For example, the decision to
switch financing of research and development work from funding of
institutes to funding of specific projects, as well as emphasizing
contract work, was adapted from the military sector. Improving the
long-range planning process and the quality-control process were
other examples. To facilitate the reforms, Gorbachev moved several
defense managers into key civilian positions. The idea was that
these individuals would use skills learned in the defense sector to
strive for improvements in the civilian sector.
Data as of May 1989
|
