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Soviet Union [USSR] Doctrine and Weapons Programs
The relation between the political and military-technical
aspects of Soviet doctrine and weapons programs was direct and
unmistakable. A direct link existed between the military-political
component of doctrine, operational requirements, weapons programs,
and force deployments. Doctrinal requirements could remain
unfulfilled for years, but they usually were met as technologies
became available. Hence, a knowledge of the military-political
component of Soviet doctrine was helpful for forecasting the
direction of Soviet military technology.
The doctrine developed by the Soviet Union in the early 1960s
bore little relation to actual conditions, and the Soviet Union
needed fifteen years to develop the weapons described in the l962
edition of Sokolovskii's Military Strategy. In October 1986,
Ogarkov wrote that the Soviet Union required an industry capable of
solving the most difficult defense-equipment problems and producing
the sophisticated weapons needed to win a war without using nuclear
weapons. He projected a future requirement to develop new equipment
and weapons, a requirement that Soviet industry might not be able
to fulfill for many years. And, should the party's doctrinal view
of a future war differ from Ogarkov's, this requirement might never
be translated into actual weapons programs.
When formulating their goals for new, important weapons
systems, Soviet leaders considered both doctrinal pronouncements on
the nature of future wars and estimates of the external military
threat supplied by the General Staff
(see Soviet Union USSR - General Staff
, ch. 18).
The services of the armed forces reviewed their missions and drew
up weapons acquisition plans in cooperation with research
institutes and design bureaus
(see Soviet Union USSR - Research, Development, and Production Organizations
, ch. 16). The General Staff prepared a
consolidated plan, which it forwarded to the Defense Council to be
recommended for the Politburo's approval
(see Soviet Union USSR - Defense Council
, ch.
18). Although the professional expertise of the military influenced
the weapons request that filled a doctrinal requirement, the party
made the final decision on the weapons to be produced.
Data as of May 1989
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