|
Soviet Union [USSR] New Strategic Options, l968-89
Beginning in the mid-1960s, the Soviet military leadership
tried to add new, less destructive, strategic options, not only as
a response to NATO's "flexible response" concept but also because
the leaders began to doubt the possibility of a true victory in an
all-out nuclear war. Although most military writings upheld the
obligatory belief in socialism's victory, doubters hinted that not
only imperialism but also socialism could perish in a nuclear
holocaust.
The search for options intensified in the l970s, after the
Soviet Union had achieved rough nuclear parity with the United
States, thereby making a nuclear war with the West less likely. If
escalation had been imminent, the Soviet Union had the capability--
accurate and reliable ICBMs with multiple warheads--to limit its
strikes to the adversary's weapons, thus reducing the level of
violence. Other options examined in the 1970s and 1980s included a
nuclear war limited to Europe, a combined arms offensive with both
nuclear and conventional weapons, and a completely conventional
strategic operation in Europe, where Soviet nuclear weapons would
deter Western use of nuclear weapons.
In l989 two possible future strategic options--space warfare
and ballistic missile defense--had not been officially endorsed but
were available to Soviet planners. Since the l957 launching of
Sputnik (see Glossary), the Soviet Union had been interested in the
military use of space and had conducted research in this field.
Moreover, in late l987 Gorbachev admitted that for years the Soviet
Union had been conducting basic research on a space-based defense
against ballistic missiles, similar to the United States Strategic
Defense Initiative (SDI).
Yet even in l989, the addition of new strategic options did not
alter the basic nuclear war scenario of the l960s. Two monographs
published in 1985 and 1986 by Gareev and Lieutenant General Pavel
A. Zhilin, respectively, reaffirmed the increased importance of
surprise during the initial period of a nuclear war. According to
these specialists, such a "surprise nuclear strike," if successful,
could determine both the course and the outcome of a war. Soviet
belief that the United States was acquiring nuclear missiles
capable of delivering a surprise strike and was developing an
antimissile shield to protect United States territory from Soviet
retaliation contributed to the Soviet military's perception of the
growing role of strategic surprise.
Data as of May 1989
|
