|
Soviet Union [USSR] Military Presence in the Third World
The Soviet Union has sought to restructure international
relations and to achieve a world socialist system largely through
political influence; however, it has not reneged on the promise of
military aid for revolutionary movements in the Third World under
the principle of
"proletarian internationalism" (see Glossary).
Soviet leaders reaffirmed this principle in the l986
party program (see Glossary) of the CPSU. Yet the Soviet Union
has also sought to
advance Soviet state interests by gaining a military foothold in
strategically important areas of the Third World.
Because of the dual and often contradictory nature of Soviet
objectives in the Third World, the Soviet military has had
successes and failures in its dealings with it. Two large-scale,
successful Soviet-supported interventions took place, in Angola in
l975 and in Ethiopia in l977. In both places the Soviet Union
provided arms and military advisers and used Cuban troops to help
pro-Soviet elements consolidate power. By contrast, in 1976 the
Soviet Union suffered a reversal in Egypt where, after years of
massive military assistance, the Egyptian government asked Soviet
advisers to leave, canceled access for the Soviet Naval Forces, and
abrogated the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet
Union. Similarly, Somalia, once the most important Soviet client in
sub-Saharan Africa, abrogated its friendship treaty in l977 because
of the Soviet tilt toward Ethiopia and denied use of naval
facilities at Berbera to the Soviet Naval Forces. In the 1980s,
combating "counterrevolution" in the Third World was not an
unqualified success for the Soviet military, which, for political
reasons, had shunned direct intervention in countries far from
Soviet borders. In the 1980s, Soviet military aid to allied regimes
in Nicaragua, Angola, Mozambique, and Cambodia was unable to rid
these beleaguered Marxist regimes of "counterrevolutionary"
resistance forces.
The Soviet Union has long been the world's major supplier of
military advisory assistance. According to the United States
government, in 1986 about 21,000 Soviet and East European military
advisers (most of whom were Soviet advisers) were stationed in
Third World countries, including about 8,000 in Africa, almost
6,000 in the Middle East, and about 3,000 in Afghanistan. The
Soviet Union has also used military "proxies," or allied forces, to
substitute for or buttress Soviet military advisers serving in
Third World countries. Advisers and combatants from Cuba, Vietnam,
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea), the
People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen), and Eastern
Europe--particularly the German Democratic Republic (East Germany)
and Bulgaria--have been used in various Third World countries, such
as Ethiopia, Angola, and Mozambique.
Despite ideological setbacks, the Soviet Union has derived
considerable military-strategic advantage by establishing bases and
naval access in the Third World. In the l980s, facilities were
available to the Soviet Union at Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam, Aden and
the island of Socotra in South Yemen, Massawa and the island of
Dahlak in Ethiopia, Luanda in Angola, and Maputo in Mozambique.
Part of a worldwide Soviet military support structure, such
installations increased Soviet influence in the Third World.
American analyst Alex Alexiev has argued that Soviet arms
deliveries to certain countries have actually been attempts to preposition war matériel in case of global war. Alexiev believed such
pre-positioning to have taken place in Libya, where Soviet
deliveries increased the number of tanks and armored personnel
carriers from 175 in 1971 to 4,400 in l983. Similarly, South Yemen
had 50 tanks and no armored personnel carriers in l975, while in
1982, after Soviet shipments, it had 450 modern tanks and 300
armored personnel carriers.
In l989 Soviet global military initiative appeared to be on
hold. On the one hand, Gorbachev declared his "solidarity with the
forces of national liberation and social emancipation" throughout
the globe. On the other hand, his "new thinking" in foreign and
military policy deemphasized "military-technical solutions" to the
world's problems and seemed to promise fewer Soviet military forays
into the Third World and less interference in the internal affairs
of socialist allies. Many Western observers believed that Gorbachev
wanted to replace emphasis on Soviet military power with an
approach that combined economic, political, and military
instruments of power.
Data as of May 1989
|
