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Soviet Union [USSR] Strategic Arms Control
Strategic arms control imposes limitations or stipulates
reductions in the numbers of Soviet and United States
intercontinental nuclear weapons that are capable of reaching each
other's homelands. Weapons limited have included ICBMs, SLBMs,
bombers armed with nuclear bombs and cruise missiles, and
antiballistic missile systems. Motivated by its desire to avert a
nuclear war and to be prepared to fight one, the Soviet Union has
sought strategic arms control agreements that would limit United
States nuclear capabilities for intercontinental attack but would
permit the Soviet Union to amass a strategic arsenal for fighting
and winning a nuclear war.
Averting a World War
According to the worst-case scenario, still accepted by Soviet
planners in l989, a world nuclear war could start with a disarming
first strike on the Soviet Union's strategic nuclear weapons and on
its strategic command and control centers
(see Soviet Union USSR - Military Art
, this
ch.). An arms control agreement that is advantageous to the Soviet
Union would help deter such a calamity by constraining the
strategic forces of the United States and denying it the weapons
needed to execute a strategic attack with impunity.
Before agreeing to limit its strategic forces, the Soviet Union
wanted at least numerical equality with the United States. When
arms control was first discussed in the early l960s, under no
circumstances were Soviet leaders willing to settle for a "minimum
deterrent." For example, when President Lyndon B. Johnson proposed
in January 1964 to freeze both Soviet and United States strategic
missiles at existing levels, the Soviet Union refused because the
"freeze" would have codified their strategic inferiority. Yet in
l969, after the Soviet Union began to deploy the third generation
of ICBMs (the SS-9, SS-ll, and SS-l3) and was developing the fourth
generation (the SS-l7, SS-l8, and SS-l9), it agreed to hold the
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
(
SALT--see Glossary) with the
United States. In l972 the negotiations resulted in the signing of
the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty) and of the Interim
Agreement on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms.
Essentially, both agreements froze the deployment of strategic
defensive and offensive armaments.
Because the Soviet Union wanted to continue the buildup of its
strategic offensive forces, it accepted the offensive arms
limitation grudgingly. Its main motive in signing the agreements
resulting from the first series of SALT negotiations, known as SALT
I, was preventing the United States from deploying an effective
defense against ballistic missiles. The Soviet Union clearly
preferred a vulnerable adversary that would be deterred from
striking by the prospect of massive Soviet retaliation on the
adversary's unprotected weapons, economy, and population.
Data as of May 1989
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