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Soviet Union [USSR] Party Control in the Armed Forces
The Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy was
responsible for party control over the armed forces. It organized,
conducted, and reported on political and ideological indoctrination
in the armed forces, supervised the military press, and monitored
the ideological content of military publications.
The Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy was
subordinate to the Ministry of Defense, as well as to the CPSU
Central Committee. It had the official status of a Central
Committee department and reported to the Central Committee outside
the military chain of command
(see Soviet Union USSR - Secretariat
, ch. 7). These
reports included information on the political attitudes and
reliability of armed forces personnel and high-ranking officers in
particular. The Central Committee's Party Party Building and Cadre
Work Department used the information on political reliability
supplied by the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and
Navy to approve or deny appointments, assignments, and promotions
of professionally qualified officers at the rank of colonel and
above
(see Soviet Union USSR - Nomenklatura
, ch. 7).
The Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy
supervised a network of political organizations and officers within
the armed forces. Every armed service, territorial command, and
supporting service had a political directorate. Service branches,
divisions, and military education institutions had political
sections, which were smaller than directorates. Each political
section had a small staff that included a chief, a deputy chief,
several senior political instructors, and officers responsible for
agitation and propaganda, party organizational work, and the
Komsomol (see Glossary). A party commission of high-ranking
personnel was attached to each political directorate and section.
A deputy commander for political affairs was assigned to each unit
of company, battery, and squadron size or larger
(see
fig. 32).
Smaller military units had primary party organizations
(
PPOs--see Glossary). Each PPO had a secretary, and
secretaries met in their
regiment's or ship's party committee to elect a party bureau. About
80 percent of all companies in the Ground Forces had party
organizations. They were present in half the company-sized units of
the armed forces as a whole.
A deputy political commander (zampolit) served as a
political commissar of the armed forces. A zampolit
supervised party organizations and conducted "party political work"
within a military unit. He lectured troops on Marxism-Leninism, the
Soviet view of international issues, recent CPSU decisions and
documents, and the party's tasks for the armed forces. For Soviet
military personnel, political training averaged between two and
four hours every week. It was usually squeezed into what might
otherwise be off-duty hours and was therefore widely resented. The
zampolit was also responsible for resolving morale,
disciplinary, and interpersonal problems, which were chronic in
military units. These problems often involved poor living
conditions, conflicts among different nationalities, and poor
attitudes toward training. Like the old political commissars, the
modern zampolit remained responsible for keeping soldiers,
and even entire frontline combat units, from deserting or
defecting.
Since World War II, the zampolit has lost all command
authority, although retaining the power to report to the next
highest political officer or organization on the political
attitudes and performance of the unit's commander. Negative reports
from the zampolit could exert considerable influence on the
course of a commander's career. Yet under the principle of one-man
command, tension between professional and political officers has
decreased. Commanders were fully responsible for the political
state of the troops under them, and this responsibility forced them
to allow adequate time for political training.
In 1989 over 20 percent of all armed forces personnel were CPSU
or Komsomol members. Over 90 percent of all officers in the armed
forces were party or Komsomol members. The figures for party
membership were even higher in such armed services as the Strategic
Rocket Forces or the Border Troops, in which political reliability
has been especially crucial. The Komsomol was important in the
armed forces because most soldiers and young officers were in the
normal age-group for Komsomol membership.
The KGB has been another instrument of party control over the
armed forces. Its Third Chief Directorate had special
counterintelligence sections that operated within regiments. The
"special sections" used networks of informers inside units to
monitor foreign contacts of armed forces personnel and to protect
military secrets. Unknown to a commander or zampolit, a KGB
officer could be reporting on their political attitudes, outside of
military or Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy
channels.
Data as of May 1989
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