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Soviet Union [USSR] Policy
The intensity of KGB campaigns against political crime varied
considerably over the years. The Khrushchev period was marked by
relative tolerance toward dissent, whereas Brezhnev reinstituted a
harsh policy. The level of political arrests rose markedly from
1965 to 1973. In 1972 Brezhnev began to pursue détente, and the
regime apparently tried to appease Western critics by moderating
KGB operations against dissent. There was a sharp reversal after
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, and arrests
again became more numerous. In 1986, Gorbachev's second year in
power, restraint was reintroduced, and the KGB curtailed its
arrests.
The forcible confinement of dissidents in psychiatric
hospitals, where debilitating drugs were administered, was an
alternative to straightforward arrests. This procedure avoided the
unfavorable publicity that often arose with criminal trials of
dissenters. Also, by labeling dissenters madmen, authorities hoped
to discredit their actions and deprive them of support. The KGB
often arranged for such commitments and maintained an active
presence in psychiatric hospitals, despite the fact that these
institutions were not under its formal authority. The Gorbachev
leadership, as part of its general program of reform, introduced
some reforms that were designed to prevent the abuse of psychiatric
commitment by Soviet authorities, but the practical effects of
these changes remained unclear in 1989.
In addition to arrests, psychiatric commitment, and other forms
of coercion, the KGB also exercised a preventive function, designed
to prevent political crimes and suppress deviant political
attitudes. The KGB carried out this function in a variety of ways.
For example, when the KGB learned that a Soviet citizen was having
contact with foreigners or speaking in a negative fashion about the
Soviet regime, it made efforts to set him or her straight by means
of a "chat." The KGB also devoted great efforts to political
indoctrination and propaganda. At local and regional levels, KGB
officials regularly visited factories, schools,
collective farms (see Glossary), and Komsomol
organizations to deliver talks on
political vigilance. National and republic-level KGB officials
wrote articles and gave speeches on this theme. Their main message
was that the Soviet Union was threatened by the large-scale efforts
of Western intelligence agencies to penetrate the country by using
cultural, scientific, and tourist exchanges to send in spies. In
addition, the KGB claimed that Soviet citizens were barraged by
hostile propaganda from the West as part of an effort to undermine
the Soviet system.
Another important facet of KGB preventive work was censorship
of literature and other media, which it exercised at both an
informal and a formal level. The KGB censored informally by
harassing writers and artists, arranging for their expulsion from
professional organizations or from their jobs, and threatening them
with prosecution for their unorthodox views. Such forms of
intimidation forced many writers and artists to exercise selfcensorship by producing only what they thought would be acceptable.
The KGB maintained strong surveillance over the Union of Writers,
as well as over the journalists' and artists' unions, where KGB
representatives occupied top administrative posts.
The KGB played an important role in the system of formal
censorship by taking part in the work of the Main Administration
for Safeguarding State Secrets in the Press (Glavnoe upravlenie po
okhrane gosudarstvennykh tain v pechati--Glavlit; see
Soviet Union USSR - Administration of the Mass Media and the Arts
, ch. 9). Some Western
specialists believe that at least one of Glavlit's deputy chiefs
was a KGB official and that the KGB assisted in Glavlit's
compilation of its Censor's Index, a thick volume, updated
frequently, listing all military, technical, statistical, and other
subjects that could not be publicized without special permission
from the Central Committee.
Another important internal security task of the KGB was to
provide the leadership with information about the dissident
movement and the political attitudes and opinions of the public as
a whole. This task by its very nature gave the KGB influence over
policy, particularly because Soviet leaders had no direct contact
with dissidents and nonconformists and thus relied on KGB
information about motives and foreign connections and on its
estimates of numbers and support for various groups. The situation
probably changed somewhat after Gorbachev introduced the policy of
glasnost' in early 1987. After that the KGB no longer had a
monopoly on information about the country's political mood because
Soviet citizens expressed their views more freely in the press.
Nevertheless, the KGB's information gathering continued to be
important because direct criticism of the political system was
suppressed. Computers no doubt improved KGB methods of processing
information and conducting research.
The KGB was given considerable latitude in carrying out the
party leadership's policy toward dissent. In other words, the
Politburo decided on broad policy guidelines, but the KGB made the
day-to-day decisions. Many dissidents, for example, viewed the KGB
as extremely powerful and as enjoying considerable autonomy in
implementing regime policy. Although the party leadership clearly
determined the general policy toward dissent, it had an interest in
promoting the idea that the KGB was responsible because the KGB
could then be blamed for the injustices suffered by citizens.
Furthermore, the image of the KGB's omnipotence has no doubt helped
to prevent anti-Soviet behavior. As Seweryn Bialer, a Western
Sovietologist, observed of the Soviet system, "Without doubt the
key to stability has been the high visibility of the coercive
apparatus and policies."
Data as of May 1989
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