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Algeria
The Military and Boumediene
The failure of the GPRA to assert its supremacy over the external
army's general staff constituted a turning point in Algerian military
development. Thereafter, the political power of the ANP was firmly
established. Several groups--mostly former internal leaders and
politically motivated enemies of Boumediene- -sought to preserve
the Algerian armed forces' guerrilla traditions; they strongly
opposed the creation of a strong, centralized military power under
Boumediene's control. By contrast, according to Boumediene's philosophy,
the security of a modern state required a well-equipped armed
force trained and organized along conventional lines. The brief
border war with Morocco in 1976, in which the conventional Moroccan
army proved to be superior to the ANP, underscored the need to
convert the ANP into a unified modern army.
The external forces were better organized, equipped, and trained
and were not fractured by local wilaya loyalties as were
the internal forces in the War of Independence. The internal guerrillas,
who may have numbered no more than 25,000 at any one time, had,
however, borne the brunt of the warfare. In addition, about 75,000
part-time irregulars carried out sabotage, acted as guides, supplied
intelligence, and often took part in engagements near their own
homes.
Boumediene vigorously undertook to reduce, consolidate, reorganize,
and train the ANP's various elements. He purged most of the headstrong
former guerrilla commanders. He retained professionals of the
external army, as well as about 250 officers and noncommissioned
officers (NCOs) with experience in the French army. The new ANP
absorbed about 10,000 members of the internal guerrilla units;
Boumediene discharged the rest, mostly Berbers. (OT 313; World
Armies 10))
In spite of his association with Boumediene, Ben Bella moved
to gain control of the army in a series of efforts aimed at reducing
the power of the defense minister. The new constitution of 1963
assigned the powers of commander in chief to Ben Bella as head
of state. Three weeks later, while Boumediene was in Moscow seeking
arms, Ben Bella designated former wilaya leader Colonel
Taher Zbiri as military chief of staff, further weakening the
position of the minister of defense and the ANP. Boumediene met
these threats by forging alliances with FLN leaders previously
identified as his rivals. The coup d'état of June 19, 1965, which
brought Boumediene to power, demonstrated his success in that
Zbiri personally arrested Ben Bella. )
Closely identified with the Boumediene government after the 1965
coup, the ANP exercised its influence through the country's supreme
governing body, the Council of the Revolution. Of the council's
twenty-six original members, twenty-two were military men with
wartime or postwar service; twelve served at the time on the ANP
general staff or as commanders of military regions.
In response to a failed coup attempt by chief of staff Zbiri
at the end of 1967, Boumediene dissolved the general staff and
solidified his control over the ANP by assuming personally many
staff responsibilities. He excluded ANP leadership from day-to-
day policy making but remained close to the army commanders whose
support he needed to maintain political control.
Boumediene never considered himself a military professional,
and he and his top aides never appeared publicly in uniform. He
asserted that as a socialist state Algeria was not the instrument
of a military regime or an officer caste. Nonetheless, the ANP
was the best-organized and best-managed institution in the country,
and many technically competent and experienced military personnel
entered ministries and parastatal (partly governmentowned and
partly privately owned) corporations as part of the national economic
elite.
Military management also undertook local civic-action and economic
development projects. This role gave regional military commanders
powers of patronage that further boosted their political influence.
The regional commanders became more influential in local affairs
than the governors of wilayat, who served under the Ministry
of Interior, Local Communities, and Tourism (hereafter Ministry
of Interior). The wilayat governors also frequently had
military backgrounds.
After Boumediene was incapacitated by a fatal illness in late
1978, the Council of the Revolution assumed day-to-day political
power on an interim basis. Only eight members of the council remained
from the original twenty-six. Five were colonels; they included
Chadli Benjedid, who assumed responsibility for national defense
matters. The nation's senior military officer, Benjedid was viewed
as the ANP's candidate to replace Boumediene. He became president
when the FLN Party Congress became deadlocked over two more prominent
candidates.
Benjedid's Council of Ministers included strong ANP representation.
Military men consistently made up half the membership of the FLN
Political Bureau. Indeed, one observer described the FLN as a
"screen" behind which the military exercised its influence as
the real foundation of the regime. Many officers served in civilian
posts; many observers believed, however, that their involvement
in national decision making reflected Benjedid's confidence in
their abilities and loyalty rather than an effort to impose direct
military control.
The ANP's favorable image, based on its role in the War of Independence
and in the creation of the postwar Algerian state, was badly tarnished
by the ruthless way in which it suppressed the strikes and riots
of "Black October" 1988. Troops deployed in the center of Algiers
and other cities fired indiscriminately, with little regard for
civilian casualties. Reacting to criticisms by human rights activists
at home and abroad, Benjedid purged a number of military commanders
and appointed younger, more professional officers with personal
loyalty to him. Soon thereafter, all senior army officers resigned
from the FLN Central Committee so as formally, if not actually,
to distance themselves from civilian politics.
As the threat of Islamic militancy became more acute, the power
of the army reemerged as the primary bulwark against religiously
inspired violence. The role of the armed forces was legitimated
by a four-month state of emergency declared after the May-June
1991 rioting. The military high command felt that the government's
political liberalization measures and its lax attitude toward
the Islamic threat were mistaken. When the first round of national
election results of December 26, 1991, resulted in an overwhelming
FIS victory, Benjedid was forced to resign as president. A five-member
High Council of State soon assumed presidential powers. The council's
only military representative was the minister of defense, Major
General Khaled Nezzar, but the military exerted strong influence
on the interim government. Troops and armored vehicles were deployed
in the cities, military checkpoints were set up, and gatherings
at mosques for political purposes were prohibited. The regime
declared a one-year state of emergency, banned the FIS, and arrested
thousands of its supporters. Convinced that the stability of the
nation was at stake, the army clearly intended to crush the FIS.
The militants' resort to terrorist attacks and the June 1992 assassination
of Boudiaf, one of the original founders of the group that became
the FLN, hardened the attitude of the military. Nezzar declared
that the army would "conduct an implacable war until the total
eradication of armed Islamic extremists who have soiled their
hands with the blood of the defenders of order [is achieved]."
As 1992 drew to a close, the suppression of the Islamic political
movement by the ANP and police appeared to be outwardly effective,
although individual acts of violence continued. In spite of some
desertions and arms thefts by sympathizers in the military, senior
commanders asserted that the cohesion of the army was unaffected.
The military leaders maintained that they had deemed it necessary
to intervene only to head off an anarchic situation. Although
the armed forces could have assumed power directly during the
turmoil of 1992, they refrained from doing so. They continued
to profess their intention of returning to their basic mission
of providing for the defense and territorial integrity of the
nation.
Data as of December 1993
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