Algeria
Philippeville
Martyrs' monument, Algiers, dedicated to the dead in the
War of Independence, 1954-62
Courtesy Anthony Toth and Middle East Report
An important watershed in the War of Independence was the massacre
of civilians by the FLN near the town of Philippeville in August
1955. Before this operation, FLN policy was to attack only military
and government-related targets. The wilaya commander
for the Constantine region, however, decided a drastic escalation
was needed. The killing by the FLN and its supporters of 123 people,
including old women and babies, shocked Soustelle into calling
for more repressive measures against the rebels. The government
claimed it killed 1,273 guerrillas in retaliation; according to
the FLN, 12,000 Muslims perished in an orgy of bloodletting by
the armed forces and police, as well as colon gangs. After Philippeville,
all-out war began in Algeria.
Soustelle's successor, Governor General Robert Lacoste, a socialist,
abolished the Algerian Assembly. Lacoste saw the assembly, which
was dominated by colons, as hindering the work of his administration,
and he undertook to rule Algeria by decreelaw . He favored stepping
up French military operations and granted the army exceptional
police powers--a concession of dubious legality under French law--to
deal with the mounting terrorism. At the same time, Lacoste proposed
a new administrative structure that would give Algeria a degree
of autonomy and a decentralized government. Although remaining
an integral part of France, Algeria was to be divided into five
districts, each of which would have a territorial assembly elected
from a single slate of candidates. Colon deputies were able to
delay until 1958 passage of the measure by the National Assembly.
In August-September 1956, the internal leadership of the FLN
met to organize a formal policy-making body to synchronize the
movement's political and military activities. The highest authority
of the FLN was vested in the thirty-four-member National Council
of the Algerian Revolution (Conseil National de la Révolution
Algérienne--CNRA), within which the five-man Committee of Coordination
and Enforcement (Comité de Coordination et d'Exécution--CCE) formed
the executive. The externals, including Ben Bella, knew the conference
was taking place but by chance or design on the part of the internals
were unable to attend.
Meanwhile, in October 1956 Lacoste had the FLN external political
leaders who were in Algeria at the time arrested and imprisoned
for the duration of the war. This action caused the remaining
rebel leaders to harden their stance.
France took a more openly hostile view of President Nasser's
material and political assistance to the FLN, which some French
analysts believed was the most important element in sustaining
continued rebel activity in Algeria. This attitude was a factor
in persuading France to participate in the November 1956 AngloSuez
Campaign, meant to topple Nasser from power.
During 1957 support for the FLN weakened as the breach between
the internals and externals widened. To halt the drift, the FLN
expanded its executive committee to include Abbas, as well as
imprisoned political leaders such as Ben Bella. It also convinced
communist and Arab members of the United Nations (UN) to apply
diplomatic pressure on the French government to negotiate a cease-fire.
Data as of December 1993
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