Bahrain Introduction
Figure 1. Persian Gulf States: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the
United Arab Emirates, 1993
THE COUNTRIES OF THE PERSIAN GULF covered in this
volume--
Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab
Emirates--have
assumed added prominence as a result of Operation Desert
Shield
in 1990 and the Persian Gulf War in 1991. These states
share
certain characteristics while simultaneously differing
from one
another in various respects. Islam has played a major role
in
each of the Persian Gulf states, although Kuwait and
Bahrain
reflect a greater secular influence than the other three.
Moreover, the puritanical
Wahhabi (see Glossary)
Sunni (see Glossary)
sect prevails in Qatar; Bahrain has a majority
population of
Shia (see Glossary),
a denomination of the
faith
that constitutes a minority in Islam as a whole; and the
people
of Oman represent primarily a minor sect within Shia
Islam, the
Ibadi.
The beduin heritage also exerts a significant influence
in
all of the Persian Gulf states. In the latter half of the
twentieth century, however, a sense of national identity
increasingly has superseded tribal allegiance. The ruling
families in the Persian Gulf states represent
shaykhs (see Glossary) of
tribes that originally settled particular
areas;
however, governmental institutions steadily have taken
over
spheres that previously fell under the purview of tribal
councils.
Historically, Britain exercised a protectorate at least
briefly over each of the Persian Gulf states. This
connection has
resulted in the presence of governmental institutions
established
by Britain as well as strong commercial and military ties
with
it. Sources of military matériel and training in the late
1980s
and early 1990s, however, were being provided by other
countries
in addition to Britain.
Because of the extensive coastlines of the Persian Gulf
states, trade, fishing, shipbuilding, and, in the past,
pearling
have represented substantial sources of income. In the
early
1990s, trade and, to a lesser extent, fishing, continued
to
contribute major amounts to the gross domestic product
(GDP--see Glossary)
of these states.
Of the five states, Oman has the least coastal area on
the
Persian Gulf because its access to that waterway occurs
only at
the western tip of the Musandam Peninsula, separated from
the
remainder of Oman by the United Arab Emirates (UAE).
Partly as a
result of this limited contact with the gulf and partly
because
of the mountains that cut off the interior from the coast,
Oman
has the most distinctive culture of the five states.
In general, the gulf has served as a major facilitator
of
trade and culture. The ancient civilization of Dilmun, for
example, in present-day Bahrain existed as early as the
fourth
millennium B.C.
The Persian Gulf, however, also constitutes a ready
channel
for foreign conquerors. In addition to Britain, over the
centuries the gulf states have known such rulers as the
Greeks,
Parthians, Sassanians, Iranians, and Portuguese. When
England's
influence first came to the area in 1622, the Safavid shah
of
Iran sought England's aid in driving the Portuguese out of
the
gulf.
Britain did not play a major role, however, until the
early
nineteenth century. At that time, attacks on British
shipping by
the Al Qasimi of the present-day UAE became so serious
that
Britain asked the assistance of the ruler of Oman in
ending the
attacks. In consequence, Britain in 1820 initiated
treaties or
truces with the various rulers of the area, giving rise to
the
term Trucial Coast.
The boundaries of the Persian Gulf states were
considered
relatively unimportant until the discovery of oil in
Bahrain in
1932 caused other gulf countries to define their
geographic
limits. Britain's 1968 announcement that in 1971 it would
abandon
its protectorate commitments east of the Suez Canal
accelerated
the independence of the states. Oman had maintained its
independence in principle since 1650. Kuwait, with the
most
advanced institutions--primarily because of its oil
wealth--had
declared its independence in 1961. Bahrain, Qatar, and the
UAE
followed suit in 1971. In the face of the Iranian
Revolution of
1979, all of the Persian Gulf states experienced fears for
their
security. These apprehensions led to their formation,
together
with Saudi Arabia, of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
in May
1981.
Of all the gulf states, Kuwait clearly has the greatest
security concerns. By early 1994, Kuwait largely had
succeeded in
rebuilding its damaged infrastructure and oil industry
facilities
ravaged by Iraq in the course of its August 2, 1990,
invasion and
subsequent scorched-earth policy concerning Kuwait's oil
wells.
By June 1993, Kuwait had increased its oil production to
such an
extent that it refused the Organization of the Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC) quota of 1.8 million barrels
per day
(bpd--see Glossary);
instead, it demanded parity with the
UAE at
2.2 million bpd, which OPEC refused.
The war and the occupation left significant scars on
the
Kuwaiti population. The war caused the departure of more
than
half the population, including two-thirds of the
foreigners, many
of them Palestinians and other Arabs. In the postwar
period, most
citizens returned, but the government apparently decided
not to
allow foreigners to exceed 50 percent of the population,
and the
number of Palestinians permitted to return dropped
sharply.
The war also did away with most of the financial
reserves
from foreign investments that Kuwait had prudently
accumulated in
its Reserve Fund for Future Generations. War costs were
estimated
at a minimum of US$20 billion, a reconstruction figure
less than
originally feared. Economic progress in 1993, however, was
such
that a projected current account surplus of US$3.2 billion
was
predicted, together with GDP growth of 11.5 percent in
1994.
Kuwait's willingness to implement
World Bank (see Glossary)
recommendations concerning the strengthening of its
economy
appeared questionable, however. The bank recommended that
Kuwait
eliminate subsidies, encourage government workers to move
to the
private sector to reduce serious government overstaffing,
liberalize business regulations to promote private-sector
growth,
and privatize a number of state assets. Various of the
recommendations would affect significantly members of the
ruling
family, many of whom engage in the business sector.
Kuwait's life is connected intimately with the Al
Sabah, who
have ruled Kuwait since 1756; the rule has alternated
between the
Jabir and Salim branches, descendants of two sons of the
ruler
Mubarak the Great. In 1963 the ruler took the first step
of any
gulf state to create a popular assembly. The narrow
electorate
and the ruler's right to dissolve the assembly have
limited the
influence of the legislature, and the assembly has been
dissolved
twice, in each case for a number of years. In October
1992, the
National Assembly was reconstituted. However, only 15
percent of
the Kuwaiti population was able to vote. Freedom of the
press,
which had been suspended in 1976, was restored in early
1992.
Despite the existence of several liberal opposition
movements and
some Islamist (also seen as fundamentalist) pressures, the
postwar government represents little change, and the
ruling
family continues to hold all major ministerial posts.
Apart from development of its oil industry, which
dominates
its economy despite attempts at diversification, Kuwait's
main
concern continues to be the threat from Iraq to its
national
security. In late 1993, incidents continued to occur along
the
Kuwait-Iraq border, and Iraqi media persisted in referring
to
Kuwait as the "nineteenth province" of Iraq. As of late
1993,
Iraq was believed to hold more than 800 Kuwaiti prisoners
of war.
Kuwait has taken several steps to counter the ongoing
menace
of Iraq. Although Kuwait sought help from its GCC allies
when
Iraq invaded, it recognized that the GCC states lacked the
military strength to provide effective assistance.
Kuwait's
postwar army was reportedly down to about 8,000 from a
prewar
total of about 16,000 personnel. Kuwait therefore
determined to
build up and indigenize its own armed forces. Accordingly,
a new
military conscription law was enacted in December 1992.
Furthermore, to upgrade matériel, a postwar 1992 decree
authorized the expenditure of US$11.7 billion on military
equipment over twelve years. Immediate orders included 218
M-1A2
United States main battle tanks, forty F/A-18 United
States
Hornet fighter aircraft, five United States Patriot
missile fire
units with missiles, 200 British Warrior armored personnel
carriers, and miscellaneous French matériel. Kuwait also
contracted in January 1993 with the United States Hughes
Aircraft
Company for an early warning system. In 1993, however, the
National Assembly demonstrated its intent to review arms
contracts and, if feasible, to reduce expenditures, in
particular
by eliminating commission payments to members of the royal
family.
Other major steps included the signing of a security
agreement and a Foreign Military Sales agreement with the
United
States in 1991, defense agreements with Britain and France
in
1992--followed by additional matériel purchases in
1993--and an
agreement with Russia in 1993. These agreements, as well
as
participation in the GCC, involve joint training
exercises, thus
strengthening the capabilities of the Kuwaiti armed
forces. In
line with its closer relations with the West, Kuwait took
immediate action against perpetrators of the alleged
Iraqi-
inspired assassination attempt on former United States
president
George H.W. Bush during his attendance at Kuwait's April
1993
celebration of its liberation. In a further defense
measure, with
private donations, Kuwait in 1993 began construction of a
defensive wall along its 240-kilometer border with Iraq.
With regard to regional relations, Kuwait in 1993 made
conciliatory gestures toward some of the Arab countries
that
supported Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Statements by
Minister of
Foreign Affairs Sabah al Ahmad Al Sabah in late June 1993
and by
Crown Prince and Prime Minister Saad al Abd Allah Al Sabah
in
late October 1993 set forth conditions for such states to
mend
relations with Kuwait. The conditions covered support of
United
Nations (UN) resolutions condemning Iraqi aggression and
pressure
on Iraq to comply with UN resolutions, particularly those
concerning border demarcation and release of prisoners.
These
statements, which did not name countries or organizations
concerned, appear directed primarily at Tunisia and Yemen
and to
a lesser degree at the Palestine Liberation Organization.
Relations with Jordan, however, continued to be chilly,
and
Kuwait's relations with Qatar cooled over the latter's
rapprochement with Jordan in August and its restoration of
diplomatic links with Iraq.
Bahrain, the only island state of the five Persian Gulf
states, came under the rule of the Al Khalifa (originally
members
of the Bani Utub, an Arabian tribe) in 1783 after 180
years of
Iranian control. Prior to 1971, Iran intermittently
reasserted
its claim to Bahrain, two-thirds of whose inhabitants are
Shia
Muslims although the ruling family is Sunni Muslim.
Because of
sectarian tensions, the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and its
aftermath had an unsettling effect on the population; the
government believed that a number of Shia plots during the
1980s
received clandestine support from Iran. In 1992 the
island's
predominantly urban population (85 percent) consisted of
34
percent foreigners, who accounted for 55 percent of the
labor
force. The exploitation of oil and natural gas--Bahrain
was the
first of the five Persian Gulf states in which oil was
discovered--is the island's main industry, together with
the
processing of aluminum, provision of drydock facilities
for
ships, and operation of offshore banking units.
The Al Khalifa control the government of Bahrain and
held
eight of eighteen ministerial posts in early 1994. A brief
experiment in limited democracy occurred with the December
1972
elections for a Constituent Assembly. The resulting
constitution
that took effect in December 1973 provided for an advisory
legislative body, the National Assembly, voted for by male
citizens. The ruler dissolved the assembly in August 1975.
The
new Consultative Council, which began debating labor
matters in
January 1993, is believed to have had an impact on the
provisions
of the new Labor Law enacted in September 1993.
Bahrain's historical concern over the threat from Iran
as
well as its domestic unrest prompted it to join the GCC at
the
organization's founding in 1981. Even within the GCC,
however,
from time to time Bahrain has had tense relations with
Qatar over
their mutual claim to the island of Hawar and the adjacent
islands located between the two countries; this dispute
was under
review by the International Court of Justice at The Hague
in
early 1994. Bahrain traditionally has had good relations
with the
West, particularly Britain and the United States.
Bahrain's
cordial association with the United States is reflected in
its
serving as homeport for the commander, Middle East Force,
since
1949 and as the site of a United States naval support unit
since
1972. In October 1991, following participation in the 1991
Persian Gulf War, Bahrain signed a defense cooperation
agreement
with the United States.
Bahrain's relationship with Qatar is long-standing.
After the
Al Khalifa conquered Bahrain in 1783 from their base in
Qatar,
Bahrain became the Al Khalifa seat. Subsequently, tribal
elements
remaining in Qatar sought to assert their autonomy from
the Al
Khalifa. Thus, in the early nineteenth century, Qatar was
the
scene of several conflicts involving the Al Khalifa and
their
rivals, the Al Thani, as well as various outsiders,
including
Iranians, Omanis, Wahhabis, and Ottomans. When the British
East
India Company in 1820 signed the General Treaty of Peace
with the
shaykhs of the area designed to end piracy, the treaty
considered
Qatar a dependency of Bahrain. Not until the signing of a
treaty
with Britain by Abd Allah ibn Qasim Al Thani in 1916 did
Qatar
enter into the Trucial States system as an "independent"
protectorate. Britain's 1971 withdrawal from the Persian
Gulf led
to Qatar's full independence in that year.
In preparation for independence, Qatar enacted a
provisional
constitution in 1970 that created an Advisory Council,
partly
elected. Twenty members are selected by the ruler from
nominees
voted in each of ten electoral districts; fifteen members
are
appointed directly by the ruler. In January 1992, fifty
leading
Qataris petitioned the ruler for an elected council "with
legislative powers" and "a permanent constitution capable
of
guaranteeing democracy and determining political, social,
and
economic structures"; as of early 1994, no action had been
taken
on these requests. Governmental control has clearly
remained in
Al Thani hands; in January 1994, ten of eighteen members
of the
Council of Ministers belonged to the family.
Exploitation of the oil discovered in Qatar in 1939 was
delayed until after World War II. The petroleum industry
has
grown steadily, and in 1991 the North Field natural gas
project
was inaugurated; the North Field, a 6,000-square-kilometer
offshore field considered to be the world's largest,
extends
slightly into Iranian territorial waters. The Qatari
government,
however, has sought to encourage diversification and
investment
in such industries as steel, fertilizers, and
petrochemicals. The
work force is predominantly foreign; in 1992 Qataris were
estimated to represent only 20 percent of the
approximately
484,000 total population.
In part because most Qataris belong to the Wahhabi sect
that
originated in the Arabian Peninsula, Qatar historically
has
enjoyed close relations with Saudi Arabia, with which it
settled
its 1992 border dispute in 1993. Although Qatar supported
Iraq in
the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-88, it subsequently improved its
relations with Iran, undoubtedly in part because of its
shared
gas field. As a GCC member, Qatar sent forces against Iraq
in the
1991 Persian Gulf War but continued to maintain a
diplomatic link
with Iraq. Qatar's relations with the United States
improved
following Operation Desert Storm, and the two countries
signed a
defense cooperation agreement in June 1992 that includes a
provision for the pre-positioning of supplies.
The UAE represents an independent state created by the
joining together in the winter of 1971-72 of the seven
former
Trucial Coast states of Abu Dhabi, Ajman, Al Fujayrah,
Dubayy,
Ras al Khaymah, Sharjah, and Umm al Qaywayn. In early
1993, UAE
citizens constituted about 12 percent of the total
population of
nearly 2.0 million. Oil is the major source of income for
the
federation, but it is found in a significant amount only
in Abu
Dhabi and to a lesser extent in Dubayy, Ras al Khaymah,
and
Sharjah. In principle, each amirate is required to
contribute to
the federation's budget (according to the provisional
constitution, each state's natural resources and wealth
are its
own), but in practice only Abu Dhabi and, to a lesser
degree,
Dubayy have financed the federation. The resulting
disagreement
over budget contributions as well as over the integration
of
defense measures and forces led to the recurring renewal
at five-
year intervals of the 1971 provisional constitution,
rather than
the intended adoption of a permanent constitution. In
fact, the
separation of powers is nominal; UAE organs consist of the
Supreme Council of the Union (SCU) composed of the rulers
of the
seven amirates (Abu Dhabi and Dubayy have a veto right on
proposed measures), the Council of Ministers, and the
presidency.
The chairman of the SCU is the president of the UAE. In
addition,
there is an advisory Federal National Council (FNC) of
forty
members appointed by the rulers of the amirates, based on
proportional representation; members serve two-year terms.
Following a one-year delay in naming members, the FNC met
with
UAE citizens in January 1993, after which it held several
sessions. FNC actions included a call for private firms to
employ
more UAE citizens and the establishment of a federal
housing loan
program for UAE nationals.
Like other gulf states, the UAE has security concerns,
of
which one is its dispute with Iran over the islands of Abu
Musa,
Tunb al Kubra (Greater Tumb), and Tunb as Sughra (Lesser
Tumb).
This dispute flared anew in early 1992, after lying
dormant for
twenty years, when Iran took actions on Abu Musa that
violated a
shared sovereignty agreement. The UAE was concerned that
Iran
intended to extend its control over the entire island.
However,
in November 1992 the two countries agreed to abide by the
provisions of the 1971 memorandum. The UAE would prefer a
final
resolution of this dispute and has expressed a willingness
to
have its sovereignty claims arbitrated by the
International Court
of Justice or the United Nations.
Militarily, the UAE participated in the 1991 Persian
Gulf War
and contributed personnel to the UN peacekeeping force in
Somalia
in 1992. The UAE's experience in the Persian Gulf War led
it to
consider itself inadequately prepared in terms of
matériel;
consequently, in February 1993 it ordered Leclerc main
battle
tanks and other equipment from France.
Oman is the only one of the Persian Gulf states whose
ruler
bears the title of sultan instead of shaykh.
Until
1970 the ruler was known as the sultan of Muscat (the
coastal
area) and Oman (the rugged interior imamate), reflecting
the
diverse parts of the country. To Ibadi Muslims, the
political
ruler is also the
imam (see Glossary); the title
sultan,
taken from Ottoman usage, indicates a Muslim ruling
sovereign
combining religious and political connotations.
The present sultan, Qabus ibn Said Al Said, began his
rule in
1970 and immediately started emphasizing economic
development and
modernization. Such an emphasis was essential because
Oman's oil,
first produced commercially in 1967, had a relatively
limited
production span; 1992 estimates projected seventeen more
years of
output at the 1992 production rate. National development
plans,
therefore, have focused on reducing the dependence on oil
and on
confronting problems occasioned by the dramatic
rural-to-urban
population shift, the accompanying social transformation,
and the
large number of foreign workers, all in the interests of
promoting stability. Oman never has had a census, but in
1992,
for planning purposes, the government estimated the
population at
2 million persons (the actual figure may be closer to 1.5
million), of whom about 500,000 were foreigners. The
latter
constituted approximately 55 percent of the labor force.
Oman faces a number of problems. The government must
attempt
to provide adequate housing and utilities, especially
water;
stimulate agriculture to increase food production; and
discourage
urban migration. Specific development goals include
establishing
new industries and industrial estates; training indigenous
personnel; developing minerals other than oil; encouraging
agriculture, fishing, and tourism; increasing
privatization of
state-controlled enterprises; and diminishing regional
imbalances, particularly in the Dhofar region.
On coming to power, Qabus ibn Said confronted the
rebellion
in the Dhofar region, which had began in 1964. To counter
the
revolt, he concentrated on establishing development
projects in
this neglected area of the country and on improving the
transportation and communications infrastructure. With the
assistance of Iran, Jordan, and several gulf states, he
also took
military action to repress the rebellion. The sultan was
aided in
these efforts by the fact that the bureaucracy and major
posts
were largely in the hands of ruling family members.
Leading
government posts contined to be in the hands of ruling
family
members into the 1990s. For example, in early 1994 the
sultan
also served as prime minister, minister of defense,
minister of
finance, minister of foreign affairs, and chairman of the
central
bank. Other members of the ruling family served as deputy
prime
minister for legal affairs, deputy prime minister for
security
and defense, and minister of national heritage and
culture. Still
other ruling family members served as special advisers and
as
governors of the capital and of the Dhofar region. Close
cooperation occurs between the ruling family and the
merchants;
tribal shaykhs now play a lesser role. Following the
example of
other gulf states, in 1991 Qabus ibn Said created the
Consultative Council, which has representatives from the
forty-
one wilayat, or governorates, but no government
officials,
in contrast to the State Consultative Council, established
in
1981, which the new council replaced.
In the area of foreign relations, Oman has been closely
aligned with Britain and the United States; it first
signed a
military accord with the latter in 1980. This "facilities
access"
agreement was most recently renewed in 1990. In the
region, Oman
has sought to play an independent, nonconfrontational
role. In
late October 1992, Oman ended a twenty-five-year border
dispute
with Yemen by signing a border-delineation agreement; it
also
concluded a border agreement with Saudi Arabia as a result
of
which Oman began demarcating the boundary between the two
countries. Moreover, Oman has acted as mediator between
the
United States and Iran and between Britain and Iran.
Meanwhile,
Oman has been increasing its arms purchases and building
up its
armed forces.
Oman's purchase of military matériel is consonant with
the
general pattern of Persian Gulf states, which have been
spending
heavily on military equipment since at least the early
1980s,
primarily to compensate for their limited manpower. In
most
instances, women are not included in the armed forces.
Lacking
domestic arms production capability, the gulf states
mainly need
aircraft, air defense missile systems, early warning
systems, and
small missile attack craft, as well as main battle tanks
and
armored personnel carriers. The gulf countries recognize
the
potential threats they face, particularly from Iraq and
possibly
from Iran. In addition, they have experienced the need to
counter
domestic insurgencies, protect their ruling families and
oil
installations, and possibly use military force in pursuing
claims
to disputed territory. A partial solution to their defense
needs
lay in the formation of the GCC in 1981.
The Persian Gulf War brought with it, however, the
realization that the GCC was inadequate to provide the
gulf
states with the defense they required. As a result, most
of the
states sought defense agreements with the United States,
Britain,
France, and Russia, more or less in that order.
Concurrently, the
gulf countries have endeavored to improve the caliber and
training of their armed forces and the interoperability of
military equipment through joint military exercises both
within
the GCC framework and with Western powers. The United
States has
sought to complement GCC collective security efforts and
has
stated that it does not intend to station forces
permanently in
the region.
At a November 1993 meeting, GCC defense ministers made
plans
to expand the Saudi-based Peninsula Shield forces, a rapid
deployment force, to 25,000. The force is to have units
from each
GCC state, a unified command, and a rotating chairmanship.
The
ministers also agreed to spend up to US$5 billion to
purchase
three or four more AWACS aircraft to supplement the five
the
Saudi air force already has and to create a headquarters
in Saudi
Arabia for GCC defense purposes. The UAE reportedly
considered
the proposed force increase insufficient; furthermore,
Oman
sought a force of 100,000 members.
In addition to these efforts, directed at the military
aspects of national security, declining oil revenues for
many of
the states and internal sectarian divisions also have led
the
gulf countries to institute domestic efforts to strengthen
their
national security. Such efforts entail measures to
increase the
role of citizens in an advisory governmental capacity, to
allow
greater freedom of the press, to promote economic
development
through diversification and incentives for foreign
investment,
and to develop infrastructure projects that will increase
the
standard of living for more sectors of the population,
thereby
eliminating sources of discord. The ruling families hope
that
such steps will promote stability, counter the possible
appeal of
radical Islam, and ultimately strengthen the position of
the
ruling families in some form of limited constitutional
monarchy.
January 26, 1994
Helen Chapin Metz
Data as of January 1993
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