|
Bahrain Regional and National Security Considerations
Bahrain - Unavailable
Crossed scimitars
ANY THREAT TO THE STABILITY of the Persian Gulf
endangering
the region's oil flow greatly concerns the rest of the
world. The
Iranian Revolution of 1979 was the opening stage in more
than a
decade of upheaval. The outbreak of war between Iran and
Iraq in
1980, the expansion of the war to nonbelligerent shipping,
and
the presence of foreign naval flotillas in the gulf
followed.
When general hostilities eventually broke out, they arose
from an
unexpected quarter--Iraq's sweep into Kuwait in August
1990 and
the possibility of Iraqi forces continuing down the gulf
coast to
seize other oil-rich Arab states. The smaller Arab regimes
volunteered use of their ports and airfields as bases for
the
coalition of forces in Operation Desert Storm to defeat
Iraq.
The overwhelming concentration of military power that
enabled
Iraq to swallow up Kuwait underscored the vulnerability of
the
territory and oil facilities of the other gulf states. To
the
extent that their military resources permitted, each of
the Arab
states participated in the coalition that defeated Iraq
and drove
it out of Kuwait. It was clear, nonetheless, that they
played a
subordinate role in the vast operation in which the United
States, Britain, and France predominated, accompanied by
Egypt
and Syria.
After its sharp setback, Iraq in early 1993 remained a
major
regional power and a littoral state of the Persian Gulf,
along
with Iran and Saudi Arabia. None of the five other Persian
Gulf
littoral states--Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab
Emirates, or Oman--is in a position to defend its borders
or
territorial waters alone. In the face of their fragility,
these
Persian Gulf states continue to take measures to reinforce
their
individual and collective security. Relative to size and
population, they have been among the world's most lavish
spenders
on the needs of their armed forces. Nevertheless, their
military
potential is limited by small manpower pools, ethnic
divisions,
limited area, and little experience in the effective use
of
modern weaponry.
A few months after the start of the Iran-Iraq War in
1980,
the six nonbelligerents--the five gulf states and Saudi
Arabia--
in 1981 banded together in the Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC).
Although the GCC had economic, social, and political aims,
its
main purpose was the creation of a defensive military
alliance.
The GCC leaders feared that a decisive Iranian military
victory
would fuel the drive of the radical
Shia (see Glossary)
Muslims of Iran to spread their form of Islam. Concurrently, the
GCC states accelerated their individual military efforts by
purchasing modern aircraft, armored vehicles, air defense
systems, and missile-armed naval vessels.
The GCC members are determined to construct a
collective
self-defense system without the direct involvement of
foreign
powers. For both political and practical reasons, however,
the
military goals of the GCC--standardization of equipment,
coordination of training, integration of forces, and joint
planning--have been achieved only to a limited degree. The
gulf
states have also been forced to restrain their military
purchases
as a result of declining oil revenues.
In the immediate aftermath of the Persian Gulf War,
agreement
was reached with the GCC to station Egyptian and Syrian
troops in
Kuwait to ensure the military stability of the northern
gulf. By
1993, however, this plan seemed to have been abandoned.
Instead,
Kuwait and most other gulf states turned to cooperation
with the
West to develop a new security framework. The United
States
concluded agreements to permit pre-positioning of United
States
equipment for combat units, port access, and joint
exercises and
training. Britain and France also negotiated military
cooperation
arrangements. The effect was to spread a Western strategic
umbrella over the region without the permanent stationing
of
foreign forces, although a United States and British naval
presence is expected to continue.
In early 1993, more than a year after the gulf war
ended, the
danger of renewed violence in the region had receded,
although no
reconciliation among the antagonists had occurred. Iraq
had not
fully recovered from its humiliating defeat; nevertheless,
its
reduced army and air force still overshadow the combined
forces
of the GCC. Iran's military strength was depleted during
its
eight-year struggle with Iraq, and recovery is proceeding
slowly.
Although it appears to have shifted to more moderate
policies,
Iran's ambition to be a factor in regional gulf security
has been
treated with suspicion.
Traditional rivalries and territorial disputes among
the
smaller gulf states still linger but have steadily
diminished as
sources of tension. Subversion and terrorist incidents,
often
linked to Iran, have abated, as has the potential for
disruption
by foreign workers manipulated by external forces. The
police
vigilantly control internal dissent that can threaten the
stability of the existing regimes. Nevertheless,
resistance to
democratic reforms by some members of the conservative
ruling
families of the gulf increases the likelihood of future
destabilization and upheaval.
Data as of January 1993
|
