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Caribbean Islands Foreign Relations
Relations with Latin American and Caribbean Countries
Barbados played a leading role in Caribbean affairs both before
and after independence. Grantley Adams was an advocate of regional
federation and served as the prime minister of the short-lived West
Indies Federation. As noted earlier, his successor, Barrow, labored
during the immediate preindependence period to pull together the
Little Eight islands. This effort did not reach the stage of formal
union, however, mainly because of the protracted nature of the
negotiations. By the time Britain agreed to continue grant-in-aid
monies, the momentum toward federation had been lost in acrimony.
Barrow marched out of the last negotiating session in April 1965,
taking with him the viability of potential union. Barbados declared
its independence from Britain the following year.
Barrow did not abandon his belief in Caribbean integration
after the collapse of the Little Eight negotiations. Instead, he
helped to shift the regional approach to the concept. As the
islands moved toward independence as separate entities, the notion
of political association lost much of its appeal. The attraction of
economic cooperation was strong, however, given the precarious
economic status of these new ministates. Recognizing this, Barrow
lobbied for the establishment of Carifta as a means of promoting
regional economic viability and as a way of keeping the integration
movement alive. The principle of foreign policy coordination among
Commonwealth Caribbean countries, as advocated by Barrow, was
achieved in theory with the advent of Caricom. Barbados also
advocated the creation of such other regional institutions as the
UWI, the CDB, and the West Indies Shipping Corporation (WISCO--see
Appendix C).
By the time the BLP returned to power in 1976 under the
leadership of Tom Adams, economic integration was an ongoing
process, albeit not a particularly smooth or dynamic one. Adams
maintained the Barbadian commitment to this process and made some
limited efforts to expand beyond Caricom and establish new economic
links with Latin America. Indeed, from 1976 until 1982 Barbadian
foreign policy seemed to be driven primarily by economic
imperatives, such as the promotion of trade (including tourism),
the attraction of capital, and the expansion of domestic industry.
By 1982, however, it was clear that Adams's thinking on
regional policy had begun to focus more on security concerns and
less on political and economic issues. The motivation for this
change in emphasis was the establishment in Grenada of the People's
Revolutionary Government (PRG). From Adams's perspective, the PRG
was a regional aberration that threatened to destabilize other
island governments by its example and rhetoric if not by possible
active support for subversive groups. Barbados' concern over
Grenada surfaced pointedly in 1982 at the third Caricom heads of
government meeting in Ocho Rios, Jamaica. It was there that Adams,
supported by a number of like-minded leaders, pushed for the
alteration of the Caricom treaty to commit members to the
maintenance of parliamentary democracy and the defense of human
rights. PRG leader Bishop, the target of this effort, argued for
the incorporation of economic rights, such as employment, health
care, and education, under the human rights rubric; he also gave
private assurances to the prime minister of Trinidad and Tobago
that Grenada would hold elections, although not necessarily under
the Westminster system. Adams's amendment eventually was rejected
in favor of a declaration affirming Caricom's support for
ideological pluralism and the right of each state to select its own
pattern of development. Although it appeared at the time to be a
foreign policy victory for the PRG, the conference revealed the
uneasiness and divisions within the Caribbean community over the
course of events in Grenada; it also furthered an attitudinal split
as to how best to deal with the situation. This drift was thrown
into sharp relief by the events of October 1983.
Adams was a prime mover in the events that led up to the United
States-Caribbean intervention in Grenada (see Current Strategic
Considerations, ch. 7). The regional relationship most seriously
affected by adverse reaction to the intervention was that of
Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago. The flare-up between the two was
marked by charges and countercharges over the issue of whether or
not Adams had informed Port-of-Spain of the operation in advance of
its execution. At the height of the dispute, the Trinidad and
Tobago envoy to Barbados, who contradicted Adams's claim of prior
notification, was expelled. In contrast to the debate provoked in
other parts of the world by the intervention, the issue of
notification seemed to be the real crux of the argument between
these two states; disagreement over the inherent merit of the
action in Grenada appeared to be a secondary consideration for both
parties. The diplomatic dispute exacerbated already existing
tensions based on Trinidad and Tobago trade restrictions. This
rift, although not deep or irremediable, was not healed within
Adams's lifetime and was employed as a campaign issue by Barrow and
the DLP in their successful return to power in 1986.
Upon his return to the country's leadership, Barrow signaled
his reservations over the previous government's approach to
regional security issues. Despite some rhetorical salvos against
the RSS, the United States, and some more conservative regional
leaders such as Dominica's Mary Eugenia Charles, Barrow took no
substantive action before his death to withdraw Barbados from the
existing regional agreements. It is significant to note, however,
that Grenadian prime minister Herbert Blaize did not request
Barbados to send forces to Grenada in December 1986 to prevent
possible unrest growing out of the verdict in the Bishop murder
trial (see Grenada, National Security, this ch.).
Within the wider Caribbean, Barbados continued to maintain
formal and correct relations with Cuba even after the Grenada
intervention. Barbados, along with Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad
and Tobago, had defied both the United States and the Organization
of American States to establish relations with Cuba in 1972 in
keeping with a general commitment to ideological pluralism. The
relationship between Cuba and Barbados since that time, however,
had been decidedly distant, the result perhaps of the competitive
nature of both countries' major export (sugar) and their
incompatible political systems.
Barbadian relations with Latin American countries traditionally
had been limited. Nevertheless, Barbados was one of only two
Commonwealth Caribbean beneficiaries of the 1980 San José Accord
between Mexico and Venezuela (Jamaica being the other), whereby the
two large producers agreed to provide oil at preferential rates to
a number of Caribbean Basin states. Barbados had also benefited
from low-interest loans for infrastructure and housing projects
through another provision of the San José Accord. As of 1986, the
DLP government was reported to be seeking new export markets in
Latin America, particularly in Brazil, Colombia, and Venezuela,
apparently perpetuating the efforts of the BLP government.
Along with the other nations of Caricom, Barbados supported the
territorial integrity of Belize in the face of a long-standing
claim by Guatemala. The Barbadian foreign minister held talks with
Guatemala's ambassador to Venezuela in August 1986, presumably on
the subject of Belize as well as the possibility of BarbadianGuatemalan commercial and diplomatic relations. Progress seemed to
be anticipated by both sides after the 1986 assumption of power by
a civilian government in Guatemala.
Data as of November 1987
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