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Caribbean Islands INTRODUCTION
THE COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN is the term applied to the English-
speaking islands in the Carribbean and the mainland nations of
Belize (formerly British Honduras) and Guyana (formerly British
Guiana) that once constituted the Caribbean portion of the British
Empire. This volume examines only the islands of the Commonwealth
Caribbean, which are Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, the Windward
Islands (Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and
Grenada), Barbados, the Leeward Islands (Antigua and Barbuda, St.
Christopher [hereafter, St. Kitts] and Nevis, the British Virgin
Islands, Anguilla, and Montserrat), and the so-called Northern
Islands (the Bahamas, the Cayman Islands, and the Turks and Caicos
Islands).
To the casual observer, these islands might appear to be too
disparate to allow for a common discussion. Consider, for instance,
the differences in population, size, income, ethnic composition,
and political status among the various islands. Anguilla's 7,000
residents live on an island totaling 91 square kilometers, whereas
Jamaica has a population of 2.3 million and a territory of nearly
11,000 square kilometers. The per capita gross domestic product
(GDP--see Glossary) of the Cayman Islands is nearly fourteen times
as large as that of St. Vincent and the Grenadines. Trinidad and
Tobago's population is evenly divided between blacks and East
Indians, a pattern quite different from that on the other islands,
on which blacks constitute an overwhelming majority. Although most
of the islands are independent nations, five (the British Virgin
Islands, Anguilla, Montserrat, the Cayman Islands, and the Turks
and Caicos Islands) remain British dependencies.
These and other differences, however, should not obscure the
extensive ties that bind the islands of the Commonwealth Caribbean.
For instance, the islands' populations clearly regard themselves as
distinct from their Latin American neighbors and identify more
closely with the British Commonwealth of Nations than with Latin
America (see Appendix B). All of the Commonwealth Caribbean islands
except Grenada supported Britain's actions during the 1982 South
Atlantic War in the Falkland/Malvinas Islands, in sharp contrast to
the strong Latin American defense of the Argentine position.
This perceived distinctiveness emerged from the islands' shared
historical experiences. Their transformation during the seventeenth
century from a tobacco- to a sugar-based economy permanently
changed life on the islands, as a plantation society employing
African slave labor replaced the previous society of small
landholders (see The Sugar Revolutions and Slavery, ch. 1). By the
early nineteenth century, blacks constituted at least 80 percent of
the population in all but one of the British Caribbean islands. The
exception was Trinidad, which had begun bringing in large numbers
of slaves only in the 1780s and 1790s. When the British abolished
slavery in the Caribbean in the 1830s, Trinidadian planters
imported indentured labor from India to work the sugarcane fields.
Despite their numerical minority, whites continued to control
political and economic affairs throughout the islands. Indeed, the
all-white House of Assembly in Jamaica abolished itself in 1865
rather than share power with blacks. This abrogation of local
assemblies and establishment of crown colony government (see Glossary) was the norm in the British Caribbean in the late 1800s
and impeded the development of political parties and organizations.
Demands for political reform quickened after World War I with
the appearance of a nascent middle class and the rise of trade
unions. In the mid-1930s, the islands became engulfed by riots
spawned by the region's difficult economic conditions (see Labor
Organizations, ch. 1). The riots demonstrated the bankruptcy of the
old sugar plantation system and sounded the death knell for
colonial government. Beginning in the 1940s, the British allowed
increasing levels of self-government and encouraged the emergence
of moderate black political leaders. As a prelude to political
independence for the region, the British established a federation
in 1958 consisting of ten island groupings. The West Indies
Federation succumbed, however, to the parochial concerns of the two
largest members--Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago--both of which
declared independence in 1962. Between 1966 and 1983, eight
additional independent nations were carved out of the British
Caribbean.
These ten island nations are located in a strategically
significant area. Merchant or naval shipping from United States
ports in the Gulf of Mexico--including resupply of North Atlantic
Treaty Organization forces in wartime--cross narrow Caribbean
passages that constitute "choke points." The Caribbean Basin also
links United States naval forces operating in the North Atlantic
and South Atlantic areas and provides an important source of many
raw materials imported by the United States (see Current Strategic
Considerations, ch. 7).
Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, the United
States asserted its interest in the Caribbean by frequently
intervening in the affairs of the Hispanic islands. It did not
involve itself, however, in the British colonies, a difference that
may explain the relatively harmonious state of relations between
the United States and the Commonwealth Caribbean islands when
compared with the often contentious tone evident in United States-
Latin American interactions. During World War II, and especially
after 1960, the United States began to assume Britain's security
and defense responsibilities for the Commonwealth Caribbean.
Nonetheless, Britain continued to provide police training and
remained an important trading partner with the region.
The political systems of the Commonwealth Caribbean nations
paradoxically are both stable and fragile. All have inherited
strong democratic traditions and parliamentary systems of
government formed on the Westminster model. Political succession
generally has been handled peacefully and democratically. For
example, Barbados' Parliament deftly coped with the deaths in
office of prime ministers J.M.G.M. "Tom" Adams in 1985 and Errol
Barrow in 1987. At the same time, however, the multi-island
character of many of these nations makes them particularly
susceptible to fragmentation. The British had hoped to lessen the
vulnerability of the smaller islands by making them part of larger,
more viable states. This policy often was resented deeply by the
unions' smaller partners, who charged that the larger islands were
neglecting them. The most contentious case involved one of the
former members of the West Indies Federation, St. Kitts-Nevis-
Anguilla. In 1967 Anguillans evicted the Kittitian police force
from the island and shortly thereafter declared independence.
Despite the landing of British troops on the island two years
later, Anguilla continued to resist union with St. Kitts and Nevis.
Ultimately, the British bowed to Anguillan sentiments and
administered the island as a separate dependency. Separatist
attitudes also predominated in Nevis; the situation there was
resolved, however, by granting Nevisians extensive local autonomy
and a guaranteed constitutional right of secession.
The fragility of these systems also has been underscored in the
1980s by a reliance on violence for political ends. Grenada,
Dominica, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines offered the most
dramatic examples (see Regional Security Threats, 1970-81, ch. 7).
Over a four-year span, Grenada experienced the overthrow of a
democratically elected but corrupt administration, the
establishment of the self-styled People's Revolutionary Government
(PRG), the bloody collapse of the PRG and its replacement by the
hard-line Revolutionary Military Council, and the intervention of
United States troops and defense and police forces from six
Commonwealth Caribbean nations (Jamaica, Barbados, Antigua and
Barbuda, Dominica, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines).
In 1981 the Dominican government foiled a coup attempt involving a
former prime minister, the country's defense force, the Ku Klux
Klan, neo-Nazis, mercenaries, and underworld elements from the
United States. Several months later, members of the then-disbanded
defense force attacked Dominica's police headquarters and prison in
an effort to free the coup participants. In 1979 Rastafarians (see Glossary) seized the airport, police station, and revenue office on
Union Island in the Grenadines.
Most of the island governments were quite unprepared to deal
with political violence; indeed, only five--Antigua and Barbuda,
the Bahamas, Barbados, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago--have
defense forces, the largest of which has only a little over 2,000
members. In response, the governments of Antigua and Barbuda,
Barbados, Dominica, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines
signed a regional security accord that allowed for the coordination
of defense efforts and the establishment of paramilitary units
drawn from the islands' police forces. Nonetheless, Commonwealth
Caribbean leaders generally opposed creating a regional army and
contended that such a force might eventually threaten democracy in
the region (see A Regional Security System; Controversial Security
Issues, ch. 7).
Drug trafficking represents an additional threat to the
islands' political systems. The Caribbean has become increasingly
important as a transit point for the transshipment of narcotics
from Latin America to the United States. Narcotics traffickers have
offered payoffs to Caribbean officials to ensure safe passage of
their product through the region. Numerous examples abound of
officials prepared to enter into such arrangements. In 1985 a Miami
jury convicted Chief Minister Norman Saunders of the Turks and
Caicos Islands of traveling to the United States to engage in
narcotics transactions. A year later, a Trinidadian and Tobagonian
government report implicated cabinet members, customs officials,
policemen, and bank executives in a conspiracy to ship cocaine to
the United States. Bahamian prime minister Lynden O. Pindling
frequently has been accused of personally profiting from drug
transactions, charges that he vehemently denies. The most recent
accusation came in January 1988, when a prosecution witness in the
Jacksonville, Florida, trial of Colombian cocaine trafficker Carlos
Lehder Rivas claimed that Lehder paid Pindling US$88,000 per month
to protect the Colombian's drug operations.
Yet the greatest challenges facing the Commonwealth Caribbean
in the 1980s were not political but economic. The once-dominant
sugar industry was beset by inefficient production, falling yields,
a steady erosion of world prices, and a substantial reduction in
United States import quotas. The unemployment level on most of the
islands hovered at around 20 percent, a figure that would have been
much higher were it not for continued Caribbean emigration to
Britain, the United States, and Canada. Ironically, however,
because the islands' education systems failed to train workers for
a technologically complex economy, many skilled and professional
positions went unfilled. In addition, the islands were incapable of
producing most capital goods required for economic growth and
development; imports of such goods helped generate balance of
payments deficits and increasing levels of external indebtedness.
In the early 1980s, regional leaders hoped that President
Ronald Reagan's administration's Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI)
would produce a substantial rise in exports to the United States,
thus alleviating economic problems (see Appendix D). The most
important part of the CBI--the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery
Act (CBERA) of 1983--allowed eligible Caribbean nations duty-free
access to the United States for most exports until 1995. The CBERA,
however, excluded some of the region's most important exports,
including textiles, apparel, footwear, and sugar. Although
nontraditional exports from the Caribbean to the United States
increased during the first five years of the CBI, Caribbean
governments expressed disappointment with the program's overall
results. Legislation introduced in the United States Congress in
1987 called for an extension of the CBI until 2007, an expansion of
products included under the duty-free access provision, and a
restoration of sugar quotas to 1984 levels. Although the status of
the bill remained uncertain in mid-1988, few analysts anticipated
changes in sugar import quotas.
Despite the generally troubling economic picture, the tourist
sector demonstrated considerable vitality in the 1980s.
Commonwealth Caribbean nations successfully marketed the region's
beauty, climate, and beaches to a receptive North American
audience. As a result, many of the nations achieved dramatic
increases in tourist arrivals and net earnings from tourism. For
example, the number of foreign visitors to the Bahamas climbed from
1.7 million in 1982 to 3 million in 1986. The British Virgin
Islands recorded 161,625 visitors in 1984, an increase of 91,338 as
compared with 1976. Jamaica doubled its earnings over the 1980-86
period to stand at US$437 million in 1986. At the same time,
however, the sector became quite susceptible to occasional slumps
in the United States economy. Two months after the October 1987
stock market crash on Wall Street, tourist arrivals in Jamaica
declined by 10 percent compared with the previous year.
In an effort to minimize their overall economic vulnerability,
the independent nations of the Commonwealth Caribbean and the
British crown colony of Montserrat established the Caribbean
Community and Common Market (Caricom--see Appendix C) in 1973.
Caricom had a number of goals, the most important of which were
economic integration through the creation of a regional common
market, diversification and specialization of production, and
functional cooperation.
The organization's greatest success was in the area of
functional cooperation; by the late 1980s, almost two dozen
regional institutions had been created, including the University of
the West Indies, the Caribbean Development Bank, the Caribbean
Meteorological Council, the West Indies Shipping Corporation
(WISCO), and the Caribbean Marketing Enterprise. Not all members of
Caricom felt that they shared equitably in the services provided by
these institutions, however. In 1987, for example, Dominica, St.
Vincent and the Grenadines, and Belize withdrew from WISCO,
claiming that the corporation had provided them with few benefits.
Despite success in functional cooperation, Caricom has an
uneven track record in achieving economic integration and
diversification and specialization. Although members registered
substantial increases in intraregional trade during the 1973-81
period, much duplication of production occurred. Over the next five
years, intraregional trade declined by more than 50 percent, the
result in part of the adoption of protectionist measures by the
region's largest consumer, Trinidad and Tobago. In 1987 the cause
of regional integration was revived somewhat by Trinidad and
Tobago's decision to repeal the provisions in question and by the
Caricom members' joint pledge to remove all barriers to
intraregional trade by the end of the third quarter of 1988. Even
if this commitment is honored, however, depressed demand in the
region will inhibit exports.
The most extensive level of cooperation has occurred among
seven small islands and island groupings of the Eastern Caribbean (see Glossary). The seven--Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada,
Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the
Grenadines--have a long history of integration that includes a
common market, shared currency, and joint supreme court. In 1981
they formed the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS--see Glossary) as a Caricom associate institution to provide for
enhanced economic, foreign policy, and defense cooperation. In May
1987 OECS leaders announced an agreement in principle to form one
nation and called for referenda to be held on each island to
approve or reject the proposed union. The original plan actually
envisaged two separate votes: the first, scheduled for mid-1988, to
determine whether unification was desired, and a subsequent ballot
the following year to specify the kind of government of the new
state. If approved, the union would be established in late 1989 or
early 1990.
The fate of the proposed OECS political union remained
uncertain as of May 1988. Although Antigua and Barbuda's prime
minister Vere Cornwall Bird, Sr., announced his opposition to the
plan in July 1987, the other six heads of government continued to
support unification. Nonetheless, these leaders resisted demands
from ten opposition parties to provide specific details of the
proposed venture prior to the first vote. This resistance perhaps
stemmed from the leaders' perception that most islanders favored
unification in some form; indeed, even the opposition parties--
under the banner of the Standing Committee of Popular Democratic
Parties of the Eastern Caribbean (SCOPE)--felt compelled to endorse
the idea of union. Still, SCOPE and others raised many issues that
needed to be resolved. How much political authority would the six
states retain under an OECS government? Would the states be granted
equal representation in one of the houses of an OECS parliament?
Would civil service employees be subject to transfer anywhere in
the new state? Would a uniform wage structure be enacted for these
employees? Would Nevisians continue to have local autonomy and a
right of secession? Would Montserratians support independence?
Thus, a positive vote in the first referenda might lead to
contentious debates in the Eastern Caribbean in 1989.
Dynamic political activity was also in evidence in early 1988
in the Turks and Caicos Islands and Trinidad and Tobago. In March
1988 the People's Democratic Movement (PDM) crushed the Progressive
National Party (PNP) in parliamentary elections in the Turks and
Caicos, winning eleven of thirteen seats; PDM leader Oswald
Skippings became the islands' chief minister. The elections were
the first held in the Turks and Caicos since the British imposed
direct British rule on the territory in July 1986 (see British
Dependencies: The Cayman Islands and the Turks and Caicos Islands,
Government and Politics, ch. 6). That action was taken after a
Royal Commission of Inquiry found the chief minister and PNP head,
Nathaniel "Bops" Francis, guilty of unconstitutional behavior and
ministerial malpractices. Interestingly, the commission also
determined that then-PDM deputy leader Skippings was unfit for
public office.
The continued decline in 1987 of the economy in Trinidad and
Tobago placed considerable strains on the ruling National Alliance
for Reconstruction (NAR). Against a backdrop of sharp reductions in
the gross domestic product and in public expenditures, Prime
Minister A.N.R. Robinson openly feuded with the former leaders of
the East Indian-based United Labour Front, one of four political
parties that had merged to create the NAR--the others being the
Democratic Action Congress (DAC), the Organization for National
Reconstruction (ONR), and Tapia House (see Political Dynamics, ch.
3). In November 1987 Robinson fired the minister of works, John
Humphrey, for criticizing the government's economic performance. In
response, Humphrey accused the prime minister of failing to consult
with cabinet members. In January 1988 external affairs minister and
NAR deputy leader Basdeo Panday, public utilities minister Kelvin
Ramnath, and junior finance minister Trevor Sudama participated in
a meeting of over 100 NAR dissidents seeking Robinson's ouster; the
prime minister dismissed the three from his cabinet the following
month. Although each side accused the other of trying to divide the
nation between blacks and East Indians, neither called for the
breakup of NAR. All of the sacked ministers remained as NAR members
of the House of Representatives; Panday also resumed his duties as
president of the All Trinidad Sugar Estates and Factory Workers
Trade Union.
Thus, the Commonwealth Caribbean islands offer a study in
contrast, and sometimes conflict, within their individual
boundaries and among themselves. A region gifted by abundant
natural beauty and a pleasant climate, it looks to North America to
generate increasing tourist dollars. Yet the islands also seek to
maintain their independence from North American and West European
dominance. Beset by internal bickering, the region nevertheless has
seen economic interdependency blossom among some of its parts.
Although distinct from Latin America, it suffers from some of the
same ills, including the infiltration of the drug trade into its
politics. It is a region that could be on the brink of true
cooperation or on the path of further disunity.
May 26, 1988
* * *
Significant developments occurred in a number of Commonwealth
Caribbean islands in the months following completion of research
and writing of this book. Jamaica experienced a devastating
hurricane and also held a general election that resulted in a
change in government. Voters also cast their ballots in general
elections in three other island groupings: Anguilla, Antigua and
Barbuda, and St. Kitts and Nevis. Finally, Trinidad and Tobago was
beset by continued economic problems and a fragmentation of its
ruling party.
On September 12, 1988, Hurricane Gilbert roared through Jamaica
with winds gusting at up to 280 kilometers per hour, thus
qualifying it as the strongest storm ever recorded in the Western
Hemisphere. The hurricane, described by Prime Minister Edward Seaga
as the worst disaster in Jamaica's modern history, resulted in the
deaths of over 30 people and the displacement of 20 percent of the
population. Analysts estimated damage to the economy at US$1.3
billion. Agriculture was particularly hard hit; for example, the
hurricane destroyed virtually all of the country's banana
plantations.
As the nation grappled with the impact of Hurricane Gilbert,
Jamaica's most famous politicians--Seaga and Michael Manley--
prepared to face the voters in the first contested general election
since 1980. Both Seaga and Manley carried heavy baggage into the
electoral campaign. Although credited with attracting foreign aid
and investment and strengthening tourism, Seaga was also attacked
for slashing government spending on education, health, and housing.
Many analysts contended that the quality of life for Jamaica's poor
majority had declined during Seaga's eight years in office. In
addition, polls indicated that Jamaicans generally viewed Seaga as
an aloof leader. Manley, in turn, had to defend his own
controversial record of leadership. As prime minister during the
1970s, Manley abrogated agreements with international aluminum
companies, feuded with the International Monetary Fund (IMF--see Glossary), promoted a "new international economic order," and
developed close relations with cuba (see Role of Government;
Foreign Relations, ch. 2). Critics asserted that the election of
Manley would chill Jamaica's strong relations with the United
States.
Responding to these criticisms, Manley sought during the
campaign to present himself as a moderate leader who had learned
much from the celebrated battles of the 1970s. Manley stressed the
importance of close relations with the United States, pledged
community, and promised to continue payments on the nation's
estimated US$4-billion debt. By the close of the campaign, Manley
had assuaged fears that he was too radical to lead Jamaica into the
1990s. On February 9, 1989, Manley's People's National Party scored
a landslide victory, claiming almost 57 percent of the popular vote
and 44 of the 60 seats in the House of Representatives. After
assuming the prime ministership, Manley indicated that he would
give top priority to an expansion of education and social services.
However, with almost half of all foreign exchange earnings
committed to debt servicing, many analysts contended that Jamaica
lacked the resources to fund an ambitious social agenda.
In contrast to Jamaica, incumbents won elections in Anguilla,
Antigua and Barbuda, and St. Kitts and Nevis. Emile Gumbs retained
his post as Anguilla's chief minister, although he needed the
support of an independent candidate. Gumbs's Anguilla National
Alliance captured three of the seven seats in the House of Assembly
elections of February 27, 1989. The Anguilla United Party won two
seats and the Anguilla Democratic Party, one. Gumbs's control of
the government was assured, however, by the election of independent
candidate Osbourne Fleming to the remaining House seat. Fleming,
who served as finance and education minister in the previous
government, again supported Gumbs's bid for the chief ministership.
On March 9, 1989, voters in Antigua and Barbuda gave an
overwhelming victory to Prime Ministers Bird and his Antigua Labour
Party (ALP). The ALP captured fifteen of the sixteen House of
Representatives seats contested in Antigua; the remaining seat went
to the United National Democratic Party. The Barbuda People's
Movement claimed the seventeenth House seat, which is reserved for
the residents of Barbuda. On March 21, 1989, Prime Minister Kennedy
Dennis Simmonds led his People's Action Movement (PAM) to victory
in the St. Kitts and Nevis National Assembly elections. PAM won six
of the eight seats contested in St. Kitts, the remainder going to
the Labour Party. PAM's coalition partner, the Nevis Reformation
Party, claimed two of the three Assembly seats from Nevis. A new
party, Concerned Citizens Movement, won the other Nevis seat.
Although general elections in Trinidad and Tobago were not
expected until late 1991, the nation's economic woes helped erode
support for the Robinson government. In July 1988, the Central Bank
of Trinidad and Tobago announced the exhaustion of its
international reserves--a stunning development for a nation whose
reserves totalled US$3.3 billion in 1981. Faced with the need to
finance an estimated US$1.8-billion foreign debt, Robinson
submitted a request to the IMF in November 1988 for a 14-month
Standby Arrangement totaling US$547 million. In exchange for
assistance, Robinson pledged to reduce public spending form 7
percent to 4 percent of GDP, to trim the size of the public sector
workforce by 15 percent over the next 2 years, to seek a delay in
a court-ordered cost of living allowance (COLA), to enact a total
liberalization of imports by 1990, and to eliminate price controls
on all products except those deemed critical to low-income
residents. One month after the January 1989 IMF approval of the
Standby Arrangement, Robinson received legislative support for a
10-percent pay cut for public employees and a 2-year suspension of
the COLA payments.
The economic crisis proved too large a stumbling block for
continued unity within the NAR. In September 1988, the NAR National
Council expelled Panday, Ramnath, and Sudama from the party after
the three established their own movement--the Caucus of Love,
Unity, and Brotherhood (more commonly known as Club '88)--and
persisted in their criticisms of government policies. Following the
expulsions, Tapia House withdrew from the NAR, leaving the ruling
party with only the former members of the DAC and the ONR. In early
1989, Panday announced that Club '88 supporters would meet on April
30, 1989 to create a new political party, the United National
Congresses. Trinidadians and Tobagonians anticipated a bitter
political struggle over the next two years.
April 10, 1989
Dennis M. Hanratty
Data as of November 1987
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