China The Ninth National Party Congress to the Demise of Lin Biao, 1969-71
The activist phase of the Cultural Revolution--considered to be
the first in a series of cultural revolutions--was brought to an
end in April 1969. This end was formally signaled at the CCP's
Ninth National Party Congress, which convened under the dominance
of the Maoist group. Mao was confirmed as the supreme leader. Lin
Biao was promoted to the post of CCP vice chairman and was named as
Mao's successor. Others who had risen to power by means of Cultural
Revolution machinations were rewarded with positions on the
Political Bureau; a significant number of military commanders were
appointed to the Central Committee. The party congress also marked
the rising influence of two opposing forces, Mao's wife, Jiang
Qing, and Premier Zhou Enlai.
The general emphasis after 1969 was on reconstruction through
rebuilding of the party, economic stabilization, and greater
sensitivity to foreign affairs. Pragmatism gained momentum as a
central theme of the years following the Ninth National Party
Congress, but this tendency was paralleled by efforts of the
radical group to reassert itself. The radical group--Kang Sheng,
Xie Fuzhi, Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, and Wang
Hongwen--no longer had Mao's unqualified support. By 1970 Mao
viewed his role more as that of the supreme elder statesman than of
an activist in the policy-making process. This was probably the
result as much of his declining health as of his view that a
stabilizing influence should be brought to bear on a divided
nation. As Mao saw it, China needed both pragmatism and
revolutionary enthusiasm, each acting as a check on the other.
Factional infighting would continue unabated through the mid-1970s,
although an uneasy coexistence was maintained while Mao was alive.
The rebuilding of the CCP got under way in 1969. The process
was difficult, however, given the pervasiveness of factional
tensions and the discord carried over from the Cultural Revolution
years. Differences persisted among the military, the party, and
left-dominated mass organizations over a wide range of policy
issues, to say nothing of the radical-moderate rivalry. It was not
until December 1970 that a party committee could be reestablished
at the provincial level. In political reconstruction two
developments were noteworthy. As the only institution of power for
the most part left unscathed by the Cultural Revolution, the PLA
was particularly important in the politics of transition and
reconstruction. The PLA was, however, not a homogeneous body. In
1970-71 Zhou Enlai was able to forge a centrist-rightist alliance
with a group of PLA regional military commanders who had taken
exception to certain of Lin Biao's policies. This coalition paved
the way for a more moderate party and government leadership in the
late 1970s and 1980s
(see The First Wave of Reform, 1979-84
, ch.
11).
The PLA was divided largely on policy issues. On one side of
the infighting was the Lin Biao faction, which continued to exhort
the need for "politics in command" and for an unremitting struggle
against both the Soviet Union and the United States. On the other
side was a majority of the regional military commanders, who had
become concerned about the effect Lin Biao's political ambitions
would have on military modernization and economic development.
These commanders' views generally were in tune with the positions
taken by Zhou Enlai and his moderate associates. Specifically, the
moderate groups within the civilian bureaucracy and the armed
forces spoke for more material incentives for the peasantry,
efficient economic planning, and a thorough reassessment of the
Cultural Revolution. They also advocated improved relations with
the West in general and the United States in particular--if for no
other reason than to counter the perceived expansionist aims of the
Soviet Union. Generally, the radicals' objection notwithstanding,
the Chinese political tide shifted steadily toward the right of
center. Among the notable achievements of the early 1970s was
China's decision to seek rapprochement with the United States, as
dramatized by President Richard M. Nixon's visit in February 1972.
In September 1972 diplomatic relations were established with Japan.
Without question, the turning point in the decade of the
Cultural Revolution was Lin Biao's abortive coup attempt and his
subsequent death in a plane crash as he fled China in September
1971. The immediate consequence was a steady erosion of the
fundamentalist influence of the left-wing radicals. Lin Biao's
closest supporters were purged systematically. Efforts to
depoliticize and promote professionalism were intensified within
the PLA. These were also accompanied by the
rehabilitation (see Glossary) of
those persons who had been persecuted or fallen into
disgrace in 1966-68.
Data as of July 1987
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