Colombia ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT IN THE ECONOMY
Water diversion project at Chingaza, Meta Department
Courtesy Embassy of Colombia, Washington
The economy in the late 1980s was predominantly a
capitalistoriented free-market system, requiring a minimum of state
interference in its overall operation. Nonetheless, the
president
had the authority to take corrective action on a number of
levels,
as well as the constitutionally guaranteed right to
determine the
general direction of economic and social development.
Historically, government intervention in the economy
took the
form of preferential treatment for a particular sector,
such as the
creation of protective barriers to promote import
substitution
industrialization, and cooperative ventures undertaken
with the
private sector, chiefly to develop energy resources. The
government
also supported the promotion of exports through financial
guarantees and the management of exchange rates, price
supports,
and fiscal and monetary policies. The government generally
did not
subscribe to a heavy regulatory policy but did manage some
enterprises either directly or as joint ventures with
private
firms. Since 1950 one of the most visible examples of
government
intervention had been the sector-specific economic
development
planning advocated by particular administrations.
The Constitution of 1886 and its subsequent amendments
provide
the legal justification for strong executive authority
(see Constitutional Development
, ch. 4). Although Congress is
granted
powers to establish guidelines for economic development,
legislative control of economic policy faded during the
dictatorship of Gustavo Rojas Pinilla (1953-57)
(see The Rojas Pinilla Dictatorship
, ch. 1). The National Front
governments that
followed further consolidated economic planning within the
executive office, an effort that culminated in the Social
Development Plan of 1961-70.
Executive dominance of economic policy making was
further
reinforced by the 1968 amendments to the Constitution,
which limit
congressional authority to various checks on executive
programs.
These amendments charge the president with general control
over
economic policy, which may be altered only with a
two-thirds vote
of Congress. This power extends to public and private
investment
initiatives, the allocation of public resources, and tax
policy.
Any congressional changes in budgetary matters are
referred to the
finance minister for final arbitration. Congress retains
authority
to approve the president's development plan, however. In
the event
that Congress does not act on this plan, the president may
proceed
by decree. Nonetheless, congressional efforts to control
economic
policy have, at times, impeded implementation of economic
plans. In
1974, for example, Congress refused to act on the "Four
Strategies"
plan of President Misael Pastrana Borrero (1970-74),
forcing the
executive branch to act by decree to implement what were
technically illegal policies. Congress immediately
challenged the
president on legal grounds, with subsequent rulings by the
Supreme
Court again favoring executive supremacy. This allowed
carefully
structured programs to be planned, funded, and implemented
virtually without congressional approval. Congress,
however,
continued to find ways to frustrate executive policy.
Congressional authority to influence executive economic
policy
making carried over to the administration of Alfonso López
Michelsen (1974-78), as legislators attempted to loosen
the grip of
the executive branch's strong hand. López Michelsen's
plan, dubbed
"To Close the Gap," was designed to increase funding for
more
equitable social development by altering the tax code
(see The Liberal Tenure
, ch. 1). Congress again refused to act,
which
contributed to the plan's eventual failure. Although López
Michelsen went so far as to declare a state of economic
emergency,
he never succeeded in implementing a comprehensive
economic reform
package.
The constitutional Reform of 1979 slightly reduced
executive
control of the economy. President Julio César Turbay Ayala
(1978-
82) had only recently been inaugurated, and his long
career in the
legislature convinced him of the need to curb executive
authority
over the economy. Furthermore, efforts to regain any
control of
economic policy would receive the support of both Liberal
and
Conservative legislators.
The 1979 reform authorized congressional intervention
under
specified circumstances and called for the president to
submit a
national development plan to Congress for its approval. If
Congress
failed to act on the plan within 100 days, however, the
president
could proceed without further delay. Although the
executive branch
basically retained power over economic planning, the
mechanisms for
a coordinated legislative response were in place.
Executive goals for national economic development were
clearly
defined in the next three administrations. The Turbay and
Betancur
administrations chose to emphasize development of energy
resources
and transportation networks, as well as overall economic
stability.
This trend, however, was altered in 1986 when a new
president,
Virgilio Barco Vargas, stressed economic reform.
Barco outlined his major economic development goals in
the
Social Economic Plan, 1987-90. The administration turned
its
attention to the social needs of the poor, embarking on a
program
designed to direct public funds to the basic health,
education, and
welfare needs of the lower class. The overall strategy
consisted of
three plans to manage broad social issues. The Plan for
the
Eradication of Absolute Poverty concentrated on social and
health
improvements, including the upgrading or installation of
sewage,
water, power, health, and education facilities. The plan
also
outlined a strategy to reduce the vast housing shortage
affecting
every Colombian city. The National Rehabilitation Plan
focused on
development of smaller regional urban centers, and the
Plan for
Comprehensive Peasant Development concentrated on
improving market
and production capabilities for some 4 million smallholder
farmers.
Planners counted on continued annual economic growth of
5
percent to provide the revenue necessary for the overall
plan's
implementation. Given sufficient resources, they assumed
that
prudent management of macroeconomic policy would allow the
goals to
be met. Two years into his administration, economic
indicators
pointed to the success of Barco's plan. Despite some
partisan
resistance in Congress, coordinated fiscal and monetary
policies
were implemented that directed economic and financial
resources
toward desired ends. The combined objectives of
macroeconomic
policy and the development plan seemed closely linked, so
that
success of the first implied completion of the second.
Data as of December 1988
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