Cyprus THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS
Archbishop Makarios III, first president of the Republic of
Cyprus
Courtesy Embassy of Cyprus, Washington
The general tone of the agreements was one of
compromise. Greek
Cypriots, especially members of organizations such as
EOKA,
expressed disappointment because enosis had not been
attained.
Turkish Cypriots, however, welcomed the agreements and set
aside
their earlier defensive demand for partition. According to
the
Treaty of Establishment, Britain retained sovereignty over
about
256 square kilometers, which became the Dhekelia Sovereign
Base
Area, to the northwest of Larnaca, and the Akrotiri
Sovereign Base
Area to the west of Limassol. Britain also retained
certain access
and communications routes.
According to constitutional arrangements, Cyprus was to
become
an independent republic with a Greek Cypriot president and
a
Turkish Cypriot vice-president; a council of ministers
with a ratio
of seven Greeks to three Turks and a House of
Representatives of
fifty members, also with a seven-to-three ratio, were to
be
separately elected by communal balloting on a universal
suffrage
basis. The judicial system would be headed by a Supreme
Constitutional Court, composed of one Greek Cypriot and
one Turkish
Cypriot and presided over by a contracted judge from a
neutral
country. In addition, separate Greek Cypriot and Turkish
Cypriot
Communal Chambers were provided to exercise control in
matters of
religion, culture, and education. The entire structure of
government was strongly bicommunal in composition and
function, and
thus perpetuated the distinctiveness and separation of the
two
communities.
The aspirations of the Greek Cypriots, for which they
had
fought during the emergency, were not realized. Cyprus
would not be
united with Greece, as most of the population had hoped,
but
neither would it be partitioned, which many had feared.
The
unsatisfactory but acceptable alternative was
independence. The
Turkish Cypriot community, which had fared very well at
the
bargaining table, accepted the agreements willingly. The
provisions
of the constitution and the new republic's territorial
integrity
were ensured by Britain, Greece, and Turkey under the
Treaty of
Guarantee. The Treaty of Alliance gave Greece and Turkey
the rights
to station military forces on the island (950 and 650 men,
respectively). These forces were to be separate from
Cypriot
national forces, numbering 2,000 men in a six-to-four
ratio of
Greek Cypriots to Turkish Cypriots
(see Armed Forces
, ch.
5).
Makarios, accepting independence as the pragmatic
course,
returned to Cyprus on March 1, 1959. Grivas, still an
ardent
supporter of enosis, agreed to return to Greece after
having
obtained amnesty for his followers. The state of emergency
was
declared over on December 4, 1959. Nine days later,
Makarios was
elected president, despite opposition from right-wing
elements who
claimed that he had betrayed enosis and from AKEL members
who
objected to the British bases and the stationing of Greek
and
Turkish troops on the island. On the same day, Fazil
Küçük, leader
of the Turkish Cypriot community, was elected vice
president
without opposition.
The first general election for the House of
Representatives
took place on July 31, 1960. Of the thirty-five seats
allotted to
Greek Cypriots, thirty were won by supporters of Makarios
and five
by AKEL candidates. The fifteen Turkish Cypriot seats were
all won
by Küçük supporters. The constitution became effective
August 16,
1960, on the day Cyprus formally shed its colonial status
and
became a republic. One month later, the new republic
became a
member of the UN, and in the spring of 1961 it was
admitted to
membership in the Commonwealth. In December 1961, Cyprus
became a
member of the International Monetary Fund
(IMF--see Glossary) and
the World Bank (see Glossary).
Independence did not ensure peace. Serious problems
concerning
the working and interpretation of the constitutional
system
appeared immediately. These problems reflected the sharp
bicommunal
division in the constitution and the historical and
continuing
distrust between the two communities. Turkish Cypriots,
after eight
decades of passivity under the British, had become a
political
entity. In the words of political scientist Nancy
Crawshaw,
"Turkish Cypriot nationalism, barely perceptible under
British
rule, came to equal that of the Greeks in fanaticism." One
major
point of contention concerned the composition of units
under the
six-to-four ratio decreed for the Cypriot army. Makarios
wanted
complete integration; Küçük favored segregated companies.
On
October 20, 1961, Küçük used his constitutional veto power
as vicepresident to halt the development of an integrated force.
Makarios
then stated that the country could not afford an army
anyway;
planning and development of the national army ceased.
Other
problems developed in the application of the
seven-to-three ratio
of employment in government agencies.
Underground organizations of both communities revived
during
1961 and 1962. EOKA and the TMT began training again,
smuggling
weapons in from Greece and Turkey, and working closely
with
national military contingents from Greece and Turkey that
were
stationed on the island in accordance with the Treaty of
Alliance.
Friction increased in 1962 regarding the status of
municipalities.
Each side accused the other of constitutional infractions,
and the
Supreme Constitutional Court was asked to rule on
municipalities
and taxes. The court's decisions were unsatisfactory to
both sides,
and an impasse was reached. Government under the terms of
the 1960
constitution had come to appear impossible to many
Cypriots.
Some Greek Cypriots believed the constitutional impasse
could
be ended through bold action. Accordingly, a plan of
action--the
Akritas Plan--was drawn up sometime in 1963 by the Greek
Cypriot
minister of the interior, a close associate of Archbishop
Makarios.
The plan's course of action began with persuading the
international
community that concessions made to the Turkish Cypriots
were too
extensive and that the constitution had to be reformed if
the
island were to have a functioning government. World
opinion had to
be convinced that the smaller community had nothing to
fear from
constitutional amendments that gave Greek Cypriots
political
dominance. Another of the plan's goals was the revocation
of the
Treaty of Guarantee and the Treaty of Alliance. If these
aims were
realized, enosis would become possible. If Turkish
Cypriots refused
to accept these changes and attempted to block them by
force, the
plan foresaw their violent subjugation "in a day or two"
before
foreign powers could intervene.
On November 30, 1963, Makarios advanced a
thirteen-point
proposal designed, in his view, to eliminate impediments
to the
functioning of the government. The thirteen points
involved
constitutional revisions, including the abandonment of the
veto
power by both the president and the vice president, an
idea that
certainly would have been rejected by the Turkish
Cypriots, who
thought of the veto as a form of life insurance for the
minority
community. Küçük asked for time to consider the proposal
and
promised to respond to it by the end of December. Turkey
rejected
it on December 16, declaring the proposal an attempt to
undermine
the constitution.
Data as of January 1991
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