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Ecuador Direct Military Rule, 1972-79
The military regime called itself "nationalist and
revolutionary," but the well-known connections of Rodríguez Lara to
the Guayaquil business community signaled disappointment for those
who anticipated that he would head a progressive military regime
such as was ruling in Peru at the time. It shortly became apparent
that, ideologically, the Rodríguez Lara regime was a hybrid,
reflecting a tenuous equilibrium among the widely divergent
political tendencies within the Ecuadorian armed forces.
Nevertheless, like the contemporary Peruvian and Brazilian regimes,
the regime of Rodríguez Lara, he promised, would not be an interim
government, but rather a long-term venture dedicated to introducing
structural changes thought necessary to unfreeze the development
process.
Rodríguez Lara's regime gave early emphasis to a campaign
designed in part to exert firm control over the nation's petroleum
resources and in part to consolidate the government's political
authority. Several former political leaders, including ex-President
Otto Arosemena, were tried for corruption in connection with oil
concessions granted during the 1960s. In addition, a large number
of functionaries of the Velasco government, supporters of Bucaram,
as well as drug traffickers, legitimate importers, and customs
officials were charged with corruption and "illegal enrichment."
Although it thus assailed its major opponents from the start the
military regime, however, failed to build its own civilian base of
political support.
Promises of a "meaningful agrarian reform" under the auspices
of Minister of Agriculture Guillermo Maldonado, a dedicated
reformer, were frustrated by intense opposition from traditional
elites. Maldonado was eventually forced out, and by the end of
Rodríguez Lara's four years in office less than 1 percent of
Ecuador's cultivable land had changed hands under the reform. More
notable achievements came in the areas of building infrastructure
projects, such as the major oil refinery and petrochemical complex
in Esmeraldas; various highway and electrification projects; and
state capitalist enterprises, particularly the Ecuadorian State
Petroleum Corporation (Corporación Estatal Petrolera Ecuatoriana--
CEPE). The lateter corporation was founded in 1972 and grew to
become the major actor in Ecuador's exploitation of its oil
reserves
(see Petroleum and Natural Gas
, ch. 3).
Oil policy was the regime's vehicle for its most forceful
expression of nationalism. Minister of Natural Resources Gustavo
Jarrín Ampudia presided over Ecuador's 1973 entry into the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), with all its
attendant prestige and economic benefits. He was also responsible
for Ecuador's renegotiation of a number of oil concessions,
including the key Texaco-Gulf concession in the Oriente, on terms
much more favorable to the state, such as substantial increases in
both the royalties paid by foreign firms and the tax rate they paid
on petroleum exports. These efforts were initially successful in
allowing the government to retain a larger share of Ecuador's
petroleum earnings.
The oil companies became increasingly disconcerted, however,
when Jarrín proposed in late 1974 that the share of stock in the
Texaco-Gulf subsidiary held by CEPE be increased from 25 to 51
percent. Claiming that the terms of their concessions negotiated
with Jarrín had priced Ecuadorian oil beyond the world market
price, the oil companies cut back drastically on their exports, at
a cost to the government of hundreds of millions of dollars over
the following nine months. This intense financial pressure finally
led to a July 1975 announcement that taxes on the oil companies'
exports were being reduced. It was thus clear that the military
regime had overplayed its nationalistic oil policy, having failed
to keep in mind that Ecuador was, after all, a relatively small oil
producer and thus not a powerful player within OPEC.
The moderation of the regime's oil policy, however, did not
result in the anticipated resolution of mounting economic problems.
Oil exports rose only slightly, while imports, particularly of
luxury items, continued to soar, aided by a low-tariff policy that
had been designed to soak up petroleum earnings, and thus control
inflation. In excess of 22 percent during 1974, inflation was
rapidly eroding the real value of wages within the middle class.
In August, in an effort to resolve its balance-of-payments
difficulties, the regime decreed a 60 percent duty on imported
luxury items. The measure was condemned by the Chambers of Commerce
in Quito and Guayaquil, whose constituents had grown dependent on
the sale of imports, and caused, a week later, a bloody attempt led
by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Raúl González
Alvear, to overthrow Rodríguez Lara. Although this coup attempt
failed, at a cost of twenty-two lives, on January 11, 1976, a
second, bloodless coup was successful in removing Rodríguez Lara.
He was replaced by a Supreme Council of Government consisting of
the commanders of the three armed services.
Virtually the only item on the agenda of the new military
triumvirate was to preside over a return of the government to
constitutional, civilian rule. The bloody September 1975 coup
attempt had revealed the depth of the breach in the institutional
unity of the armed forces. Handing the government back to
civilians, it was hoped, might remove the causes of divisions
within the military, or at least make it easier to hide them from
public view.
The original timetable, announced in June 1976, called for a
transition that was to culminate in presidential elections in
February 1978. First, new government charters and electoral laws
were to be drafted by appointed commissions, and then a public
referendum would choose between two proposed constitutions. The
transition was repeatedly slowed down, however, and in the end,
instead of the less than two years originally scheduled, three
years and eight months elapsed between the 1976 coup and the
inauguration of a civilian president.
Two reasons are commonly cited for the delay: the slowness of
decision making within the Supreme Council of Government because of
ongoing disagreement within the military high command and repeated
maneuverings by the military government to manipulate the electoral
process, thereby controlling its outcome. Like the Rodríguez Lara
government, the Council was particularly interested in seeing a
poor electoral performance by the CFP and, especially, preventing
Bucaram from winning the presidency.
The national referendum to choose the constitution was finally
held on January 15, 1978. The results saw 23 percent of the voting
population nullify their ballots, an action that had been advocated
by the traditional right; 31 percent of the population voted in
favor of a revised version of the 1945 constitution, and a
plurality of 44 percent voted in favor of the newly drafted
national charter. The charter was the more progressive of the two
constitutions, its major reforms being the acknowledgement of a
role for the state in socioeconomic development, the legalization
of a worker self-managed (autogestional) sector in the
economy, a unicameral legislature, no presidential reelection, and,
for the first time in Ecuador, electoral suffrage for illiterates
(see Constitutional Background
, ch. 4).
Five candidates then campaigned for the presidency. The
consistent favorite in polls was Rodrigo Borja of the social
democratic Democratic Left (Izquierda Democrática--ID). Because the
Supreme Council of Government made sure that Bucaram was barred
from running, the CFP strongman named his second in command, Jaime
Roldós, to be the party's candidate. In order to broaden the appeal
of the ticket, Osvaldo Hurtado, the leader of the Christian
Democratic Party (Partido Demócrata Cristiano--PDC), was tapped to
be Roldós's vice presidential running mate. The traditional
rightist vote was split between two candidates, and the various
parties of the Marxist left coalesced to name one candidate. After
a lengthy recount, the final results of the July 16 election
confirmed the initial tally of a surprise victory by Roldós, with
27 percent of the national vote. Sixto Durán Ballén, candidate of
a coalition of rightist parties, finished second with 24 percent.
The electoral law mandated that when no candidate achieved a
majority vote, a run-off election between the two top finishers be
held.
It was more than nine months before the second-round election
took place, however. They were months of considerable political
tension and doubt as to whether the transition would proceed as
planned. First, widespread problems in organizing the election and
in the vote count during the first round left serious doubts as to
the competence and honesty of the electoral authorities. The
Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Superior Electoral--TSE) was,
as a result, completely reorganized. Second, the government--
remembering a campaign slogan calling "Roldós to the government,
Bucaram to power"--was understandably dismayed with results of the
first-round election. By delaying the second round, the government
sought to give rightists the time to build an anti-Roldós coalition
under which Durán could emerge as the second-round victor. To
complicate matters further, Abdón Calderón Múñoz, a populist
candidate who had won 9 percent of the vote in the first round, was
murdered under circumstances implicating the government. Finally,
as a further distraction during this difficult period, Velasco
returned from exile to bury his wife and died in March 1979 at age
eighty-six.
The second round was finally held on April 29, 1979, with the
Roldós-Hurtado ticket sweeping to an overwhelming 68.5 percent
victory against a weak performance by Durán. Doubts persisted,
however, up to the moment that the winners took office three months
later, that the military would allow them to assume their duly
elected offices. The size of their popular mandate and, according
to political scientist John D. Martz, pressure from the
administration of President Jimmy Carter in Washington made it
difficult for the military to stop the "democratization" process at
this late date. The military did extract as a price, in any case,
unprecedented powers to name representatives to the boards of
directors of major state corporations and to participate directly
in the naming of the minister of defense. The outgoing government
also made it clear to Roldós (who had an early campaign slogan of
"we will not forgive, we will not forget") that it would not
tolerate any investigation into the behavior of the military with
respect to human rights. With his autonomy thus diminished, Roldós
finally assumed the presidency on August 10, and thus Ecuador
returned to constitutional, civilian rule after almost a decade of
dictatorship.
Data as of 1989
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