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Ecuador The Military
Historically, the military establishment alternated between
direct or indirect control over the executive functions in general
and a more limited role of exercising a veto over policies
considered to fall within the area of its corporate interests
(see Involvement in Politics and Government
, ch. 5). In contrast with
the pattern found in the majority of Latin American countries, the
Ecuadorian military, which traditionally was allied with the PLR,
early on became more closely identified with the merchant class
than with the landholding elite. After the decline of the
traditional parties in the early twentieth century and the rise of
ad hoc political coalitions, however, the military acquired greater
autonomy as an institutional political force.
Constitutions between 1945 and 1979 have legitimized the role
of the military in policy making by allotting to the officer corps
an official seat in the Senate. Interventions between 1945 and 1963
arose most often over issues considered basic by the military
leadership. For example, in 1962 the military pressured President
Carlos Julio Arosemena Monroy to sever relations with Cuba and
other socialist countries. When they ousted him in 1963, it was
only after more than a year of encouragement by various political
factions and economic interest groups, all of which were concerned
over the chaotic drift in national affairs and over Arosemena's
personal conduct
(see Instability and Military Dominance, 1960-72
, ch. 1). After assuming power, however, the military became
increasingly confident of its ability to rule better than
civilians. The changing attitude of the officer corps, coupled with
its declining trust in civilian leaders, was attributed in part to
a new emphasis in military training on technical and managerial
skills and to extensive foreign training in general.
Factionalism within the armed forces has helped to account for
the propensity of military plotting against civilian governments,
as well as the difficulties encountered by the military
establishment in its attempts to govern on its own. Civilian
contenders for political power often sought the support of
dissident elements of the military in order to topple an
administration or to forestall an electoral outcome unfavorable to
them. At the same time, factions within the military aligned
themselves with civilian groups in order to strengthen their own
positions vis-à-vis other military factions. For example, when
widespread civilian discontent boded ill for the continuation of
government by junta in 1966, important elements of the armed forces
joined the civilian opposition and contributed to the fall of the
junta.
On numerous occasions, the military applied its influence to
ward off political developments that it opposed or to intervene
indirectly. For example, when the leftist opposition in Congress
undertook to impeach Febres Cordero in January 1987, armed forces
representatives warned the president of Congress that the military
would shut down the legislature if impeachment proceedings were not
halted. Febres Cordero's interference in internal military matters,
however, created resentments, as demonstrated dramatically by the
military rebellions in March 1986. In June 1987, a group of about
a dozen army and naval officers met with the defense minister and
suggested that Febres Cordero resign. The military also reportedly
threatened to intervene if Bucaram won the 1988 presidential
election.
Data as of 1989
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