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El Salvador Nationalist Republican Alliance
The nature of the Nationalist Republican Alliance (Alianza
Republicana Nacionalista--Arena) as a political force in El
Salvador was the object of some debate as it moved toward
becoming a ruling party with its 1988 electoral victory. Some
observers characterized Arena as the institutional representative
of the "disloyal right," meaning those conservative forces that
played the game of democracy while privately harboring
preferences for authoritarian or even dictatorial rule and a
restoration of the absolute political preeminence of the elite.
Others felt that after a rocky beginning, Arena had moderated and
extended its ideology beyond simplistic, reflexive anticommunism
and was ready to assume the role of a conservative party that
would support private enterprise and be willing to accept some
economic reforms in response to popular demands.
The fortunes of Arena, like those of the PDC, were cyclical
in nature. Although the 1982 Constituent Assembly elections
yielded the party a leading role in that body, subsequent
elections appeared to reflect a growing public rejection of the
extremist image of Arena and its leader, D'Aubuisson. The nadir
of the party's influence was reached after the 1985 elections and
the unsuccessful coalition with the PCN. Much of the blame for
the party's electoral defeats fell on the shoulders of
D'Aubuisson. In an effort to moderate the party's image,
D'Aubuisson was persuaded to step down as party president in
October 1985. He was replaced by Alfredo Cristiani Buckhard, a
member of a prominent coffee-growing family. Although Cristiani,
who in May 1988 was designated the party's 1989 presidential
nominee, subsequently went on to project a less hyperbolic public
image for the party, D'Aubuisson was nevertheless retained as an
"honorary president for life," and he continued to serve as a
charismatic drawing card at public rallies and as a party
spokesman in the media. San Salvador mayor Calderon Sol also
emerged from the 1988 elections as a leading figure in the party.
Arena's journey from obstructionist opposition to apparent
majority status was attributable to a number of factors. With its
support from private enterprise and large agricultural interests,
Arena enjoyed a distinct advantage in funding over its rivals.
Along with superior liquidity came superior organizational and
propaganda capabilities. Although its elitist supporters were the
most influential, Arena's base of support also incorporated
significant numbers of rural peasants and, particularly in the
March 1988 elections, the urban poor. The party consistently drew
some 40 percent of the peasant vote, reflecting the basic
conservatism of this voting bloc as well as the ingrained appeal
of strong caudillo leadership and a visceral response to the
party's promises to prosecute more forcefully the war against the
guerrillas. Arena also benefited from the intractable nature of
the country's problems and the PDC's apparent inability to cope
successfully with the challenge of governing a country torn by
violence and instability.
Arena also reportedly counted a significant percentage of the
military officer corps as sympathizers with its views,
particularly the party's call for a more vigorous prosecution of
the counterinsurgent war. D'Aubuisson, a 1963 graduate of the
Captain General Gerardo Barrios Military Academy, apparently
maintained contacts not only with members of his graduating class
(tanda) but also with conservative junior officers. It was
reported by some observers that D'Aubuisson's behind-the-scenes
appeals from 1984 to 1988 were intended to foment a rightist coup
d'etat against the PDC government. After the party's March 1988
electoral victory, such a drastic method of taking power appeared
to be ruled out by Arena's seemingly bright prospects in the 1989
presidential race.
Although Arena's surprisingly strong showing in the 1988
elections was to a great extent a rejection of the PDC, it also
seemed to reflect a hardening of public attitudes, particularly
with regard to the conflict between the government and the
leftist guerrillas. Whereas Duarte and his party had drawn
support among the electorate at least in part by promising to end
the fighting through negotiations, Arena suggested that the more
effective approach was to step up military efforts in the field.
This approach seemed to have the greatest appeal among the
residents of conflict zones in the north and east of the country,
where resentment of the protracted fighting ran high. Some urban
middle-class voters, once strong supporters of the PDC, also
reportedly responded favorably to this hard-line position.
Another aspect of Arena's appeal revolved around nationalism
and rejection of foreign interference in Salvadoran affairs. Some
areneros bitterly resented the perceived favoritism shown
the PDC by the United States and blamed much of their party's
misfortune from 1984 through 1988 on manipulation by the
norteamericanos. Some party spokesmen such as Sigifredo
Ochoa Perez, a flamboyant retired army colonel elected to the
Legislative Assembly in 1988, extended their criticism beyond the
political sphere into the arena of military tactics, publicly
criticizing the role of United States military advisers in
formulating counterinsurgent strategy. Cristiani also spoke out
against such United States-backed innovations as the switch to
small-unit tactics and suggested that an Arena government would
move to abandon them
(see Left-Wing Extremism
, ch. 5). The
seeming inability of the armed forces to resolve the insurgency
by military means appeared to sharpen the public's receptiveness
to these criticisms.
The most immediate advantage gained by Arena through its
control of the Legislative Assembly was its ability to dictate
the appointment of candidates to important government posts, such
as magistrates of the Supreme Court and the attorney general of
the republic. The party's legislative agenda was uncertain in
mid-1988, but it seemed to entail some tinkering with land reform
provisions, such as changing the titling procedure for
cooperatives; easing the tax and regulatory burden on the private
sector, especially the coffee industry; restoring private
banking; and, perhaps, reprivatizing the foreign trade
procedures.
Data as of November 1988
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