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Finland POLITICAL DYNAMICS
Consensus has been the dominant mode of Finnish
politics
since the formation of a broadly based coalition
government in
1966 and the establishment of the comprehensive incomes
policy
system in the late 1960s. The government, made up of
parties
fundamentally opposed to each other, was formed at the
insistence
of President Kekkonen. He had long wished to heal the deep
and
bitter rifts that had marred Finnish public life since the
country had gained independence in 1917.
The dozen or so political parties that made up the
country's
party system in 1966 reflected the divisions that ran
through
Finnish society. The socialist end of the spectrum was
broken
into two mutually hostile, roughly equal segments,
communist and
social democratic, often accompanied by leftist splinter
groups.
The political middle was filled, first, by the agrarian
Center
Party, the country's most important party, with a rural
base in a
society that was rapidly becoming urbanized; second, by
the
Swedish People's Party (Svenska Folkpartiet--SFP),
representing a
minority worried about its future and divided along class
lines;
and third, by a classic liberal party that was in decline.
The
right consisted of a highly conservative party tied to big
business and to high officials, the KOK; and the radical
Finnish
Rural Party (Suomen Maaseudun Puolue--SMP), the populist
impulses
of which linked it to the "forgotten" little man often
also
resident in urban areas. Kekkonen's presidential power and
personal prestige enabled him to form in 1966 the popular
front
government that pulled together sizable social groups to
realize
important welfare legislation in the late 1960s.
The mending of rifts in the labor movement and a
fortuitous
agreement in 1968 by leading actors in the market sector
led to
the first of a number of comprehensive incomes agreements.
These
agreements, reached by organizations representing most
economically active Finns, usually ran for several years
and
often required enabling legislation
(see Industrial Relations
, ch. 3).
Critics of the agreements, which have brought much
prosperity
to Finland and therefore enjoy widespread support, charge
that
their monolithic quality has meant not consensus but a
"time of
no alternatives." According to this view, the agreements
have
reduced state institutions to mere ratifying agents rather
than
governing bodies. It is claimed that labor and business
negotiate
while government approves after the fact.
Most of the country's political parties, so fractious
and
distinct until the 1960s, then drifted toward the
political
center; remaining disagreements among the principal
parties
focused less on what policies were to be than on how they
were to
be implemented. Because most economic legislation required
the
set majorities stipulated by laws of constitutional
status,
parties were obliged to work closely together. Even
parties not
in government have had their say about the content of
economic
legislation, for without their approval many government
bills
would have failed.
Another characteristic of Finnish politics and public
life
was the common practice of reaching agreements on key
questions
through informal backstairs elite consultation. Often
disputes
were settled through private discussions by the concerned
parties
before they were handled in the formal bargaining sites
established for their public resolution. This was true for
wage
package settlements, as well as for legislative proposals
scheduled for debate in the Eduskunta, and for other
issues that
required negotiation and compromise. An institutionalized
version
of behind-the-scenes negotiations was the Evening School
of the
Council of State, where leading figures of various groups
could
freely discuss issues on the government's agenda. The
Finnish
tradition of informal sauna discussions was an extreme
example of
informal inter-elite consultations. Some observers claimed
that
important national decisions were made there in an
atmosphere
where frank bargaining could be most easily practiced.
Advocates
of these informal means of uniting elite representatives
of
diverse interests held that they were quick and to the
point.
Opponents countered that they encouraged secrecy, bypassed
government institutions, and ultimately subverted
democracy.
Since the second half of the 1960s, there has been an
increasing formalization of the role played by political
parties
in the country's public life. In 1967 the government began
paying
subsidies to political parties, and the passage of the Act
of
Political Parties in 1969 gave the practice a legal basis.
According to the law, parties were to receive subsidies
according
to the number of delegates they had in the Eduskunta.
Several
other eligibility requirements for state funds that also
had to
be met were nationwide--rather than local--activity for
political
purposes, determination of internal party affairs by
democratic
means, voting membership of at least 5,000, and a
published
general political program.
The Act of Political Parties provided the first mention
of
parties in Finnish legislation, despite their central
position in
the country's political life. State subsidies were a
recognition
of the role parties played, and the subsidies have further
increased that role. Consequently, the number of party
officials
has increased, as has the number of parties, an effect
opposite
to that intended by the large parties that pressed for
subsidies.
The large parties funneled a good part of their funds to
their
local and their ancillary organizations, while the small
parties,
with their existence at stake, used their resources on the
national level.
Data as of December 1988
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