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Finland CONCEPTS OF NATIONAL SECURITY
An essential ingredient in Finnish strategic planning
was to
establish the perception that the nation had the will and
the
capability to defend its territorial integrity if conflict
broke
out. To avoid giving the Soviet Union a pretext for
intervention,
Finland considered it vital to demonstrate to Moscow that
it
could fully meet its obligations under the FCMA treaty.
Similarly, Finland needed to convince Norway, together
with its
NATO partners and Sweden, that Finnish territory would not
be
used as a base for threatening them militarily. The
primary task,
therefore, was to maintain a credible force for repelling
a
limited conventional attack upon the country during the
course of
a wider conflict.
Finland's traditional policy was to defend the entire
country. It believed that its level of military
preparedness
rendered unlikely the success of an airborne surprise
attack
against administrative centers and other key areas. It
planned to
take advantage of its relatively large underpopulated
expanses
and of the special terrain conditions to pursue a strategy
of
defense in depth in order to frustrate an invader. Total
defeat
of an enemy was not expected. The Finns hoped to
demonstrate that
any effort to secure their territory as a base for
military
operations elsewhere would not be profitable compared to
the time
and sacrifices involved. Despite Finland's small
population,
military planners assumed an enemy would have most of its
forces
employed elsewhere and would be able to use only some of
its
military assets against Finland; hence, the country's
limited
aims could be achieved. The primary burden for thwarting
an
attack directed through Finnish territory would fall upon
the
army.
The heightened strategic significance of the far
northern
regions of Europe since the 1960s has accentuated the
importance
of Lapland's defenses. In the late 1980s, first-line
Finnish
troops were being specially equipped to take advantage of
the
harsh conditions of terrain, climate, and winter darkness
encountered there. Peacetime force deployment in Lapland
had been
reinforced during the 1980s with the goal of stationing
half of
Finland's interceptor aircraft and nearly one-third of its
ground
forces there. This deployment was considered compatible
with the
force strengths in northern Sweden and in northern Norway.
Reacting to hints by the Soviets that the threat of
cruise
missiles fired from United States submarines or from West
European bases justified joint defensive measures, Finnish
leaders have strongly underscored their determination to
act on
their own to resist intrusion of Finnish air space in any
form.
Although advanced radar, fire control, and surface-to-air
missile
systems were being acquired, the Soviet embassy in
Helsinki
asserted in mid-1988 that Finland and Sweden must do still
more
to improve their air defenses.
Finland's mobilization system was characterized by a
flexibility that enabled the degree of preparedness to be
stepped
up as required to meet a particular crisis situation or
threat.
The first forces called up for mobilization would be the
Fast
Deployment Forces, consisting of the most mobile and
powerful
army elements, together with almost all navy, air force,
Frontier
Guard (Rajavartiolaitos--RVL) units, and assorted local
forces.
The Fast Deployment Forces would be able to reach peak
strength--
about 250,000 men, 130,000 of whom would be ground
forces--in two
to three days. The Fast Deployment Forces (also called
Protective
Forces) would have as their chief duty a protecting or
covering
mission that would allow the total mobilization in seven
days of
700,000 men, including 500,000 ground forces.
Finnish military doctrine divided forces into general
forces,
local forces, and support forces once full mobilization
was
achieved. General forces were the best and most powerfully
equipped units of all the services, and the elements most
suited
for decisive massed attacks. In the late 1980s, these
forces were
estimated at about 250,000 men. In addition to the
professional
cadre, local forces consisted of older reservists. It was
projected that they, being less heavily armed, would be
used in
guerrilla operations, often behind the lines in areas
overrun by
the enemy. When needed, local forces could combine with
general
forces for intense battles against a weakened and
encircled
enemy. Support forces assisted the other forces with
logistics,
supplies, and other requirements.
During peacetime, standing ground, sea, and air forces,
in
keeping with Finland's neutral posture, were not
concentrated
against any single potential threat but were deployed to
deal
with invasion from any direction. Defense was predicated
on rapid
mobilization of the country's general forces and on their
rapid
deployment to active fronts. Rather than a static defense,
for
which resources were insufficient, a strategy of maneuver
was
contemplated. A powerful frontal attack would be met by a
"deep
zone" defense, taking fullest advantage of geographical
features
and climatic conditions. Tactics of delay and attrition
would be
employed to prevent an aggressor from reaching vital
areas. As
the attacker's lines of communication lengthened,
concentrated
counterattacks would be launched under conditions favoring
the
more lightly armed Finnish units. In areas seized by the
invader,
local forces would continue to conduct guerrilla-type
operations,
such as ambushes, limited raids on the enemy's supply
lines,
mining of roads, and strikes against logistics centers. In
the
1980s, military planners modified this flexible defense
somewhat,
concluding that certain areas were so vital to the
country's
survival that they were to be held at all costs. Defense
of
southern Finland and Helsinki, the Aland Islands, and
Lapland was
to be so intense that they would never be ceded in their
entirety
to enemy control.
The local defense forces and the RVL would be expected
to
operate as self-contained units carrying out peripheral
attacks
in relative isolation. The object would be to sap the
strength of
the aggressor as he moved deeper into the country, denying
the
use of roads, and, after combat units were cut off from
supplies
and reinforcements, segmenting the fighting. Local and
general
forces could then be brought to bear in devastating
strikes
against the invader. After suffering costly damage over a
protracted period, the aggressor country would find it
expedient
to abandon its original objectives and to accept a
negotiated
settlement.
Finland recognized that the outbreak of general war in
Europe
might result in the use of nuclear weapons. A considerable
effort
was therefore undertaken to prepare the civilian
population
against the eventuality of nuclear warfare
(see Civil Defense
, this ch.). Finland's limited resources did not permit full
preparation against nuclear warfare, however, and defense
planners based their efforts on the assumption that any
threat to
the country would be of a conventional nature. Political
measures
were also undertaken to minimize the likelihood of
exposure to
nuclear attack. Finland's active promotion of
comprehensive
disarmament measures and of a Nordic Nuclear-Weapons-Free
Zone
(NWFZ) was premised on the belief that, if the Nordic
countries
had no nuclear weapons on their territories, the
superpowers
might refrain from including nuclear arms in their
strategic
plans affecting those terrotories
(see Neutrality
, ch. 4).
The
objection to such a commitment, in the view of Western
defense
planners, was that it would deny NATO the nuclear option
in
defense of Norway and Denmark while placing no
restrictions on
Soviet nuclear forces in the Kola Peninsula or on naval
vessels
in the Baltic Sea.
Data as of December 1988
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