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Ghana THE TRANSITION FROM MILITARY RULE TO DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT
Political Ferment Under the PNDC
As the country prepared to move toward constitutional rule, the
major concern of Ghanaians was how to ensure a relatively smooth
and peaceful democratic transition. This concern was shared by the
opposition, the activities of which were under constant
surveillance by the national security agencies, and by the ruling
PNDC, under pressure to present a clear, firm timetable and program
for a return to constitutional government.
The transition process had unsavory features that many
Ghanaians believed could lead to an outbreak of violence. Intense
mutual suspicion and antipathy existed between the PNDC leadership
and the opposition going back to the June 4, 1979, uprising and the
draconian measures taken by the AFRC. On one side, Rawlings and the
PNDC saw the opposition leaders not as individuals genuinely
interested in real democracy but as elitist, corrupt, and selfseeking "big men" who had vowed to fight to the bitter end to
reverse the gains of the revolution and to restore the old system
of corruption and exploitation.
On the other, the opposition viewed Rawlings and his Ewe ethnic
henchmen, notably Kojo Tsikata, his chief of security, as a
bloodthirsty group--with the worst human rights record in
postcolonial Ghanaian history--which was determined to retain power
by any means. Many opposition leaders could not forgive Rawlings
for the loss of lives, power, and property, and for the
incarcerations inflicted on friends and relatives, if not on
themselves, by the PNDC regime. The once respectable professional
elite of comfortable lawyers, doctors, university professors,
businessmen, and politicians in exile abroad could not hide their
outrage at Ghana's being ruled by, to them, a young, inexperienced,
half-educated military upstart.
It is against this background of intense mutual hostility and
distrust and vicious political rivalry that the evolution of the
democratic transition between 1988 and the inauguration of the
Fourth Republic in January 1993 should be assessed and understood.
This long transition process was characterized by two related
struggles: the struggle for economic recovery from decades of
economic decline and for better living standards for the average
Ghanaian; and the struggle for "true democracy," the meaning of
which was hotly debated and gradually shifted over time, especially
after 1988. These national struggles led to the reconstitution of
old political alliances and to the emergence of new political
groupings.
That it took the PNDC more than ten years to lift the ban
imposed on political parties at the inception of PNDC rule not only
demonstrated the PNDC's control over the pace and direction of
political change but also confirmed the shallowness of the
political soil in which the party system was rooted. Party activity
had been banned under all the military governments that had
dominated nearly twenty out of the thirty-five years of Ghana's
postcolonial existence. Even during periods of civilian
administration, party organization had been largely urban centered
and rudimentary. It had depended far more on personal alliances and
on ethnic and local ties, not to mention patron-client
relationships, than on nationally institutionalized structures.
Party politics had tended to generate corruption and factionalism.
The party system, therefore, never had any real hold on the
consciousness of the average Ghanaian, especially the rural
Ghanaian.
All the same, three major electoral political traditions have
emerged in Ghana since the 1950s, namely, the Nkrumahist tradition,
the Danquah-Busiaist tradition, and the more recent Rawlingsist
tradition. These traditions are identified with their founders--
each a commanding political figure--and are not necessarily
mutually exclusive. In political terms, the Nkrumahists are
generally considered "leftist" and "progressive," the DanquahBusiaists more "rightist" and more "conservative," and the
Rawlingsists "populist" and "progressive." In practice, however,
the traditions are less distinguishable by ideological orientation
than by dominant personalities and ethnic origins.
Against this background, the opposition call for multiparty
democracy had to overcome great odds, not least of which was the
intense prejudice of the chairman of the PNDC against political
parties. Rawlings strongly believed that party politics had
hitherto produced two forms of abuse of power--the "corrupt
dictatorship" of the Kofi Abrefa Busia regime (1969-72) and the
"arrogant dictatorship" of the Nkrumah (1957-66) and Limann (1979-
81) governments. Nonpartisan, honest, and accountable government
would provide an effective antidote to these abuses, he argued.
Indeed, Rawlings appeared to have an almost fanatical belief that
corruption was at the root of nearly all of Ghana's problems and
that, if only it could be stamped out, the country would return to
its former prosperity.
In reaction to Rawlings's position, opposition groups, such as
the London-based Ghana Democratic Movement and the Campaign for
Democracy in Ghana, and individuals within and outside Ghana
committed to multiparty democracy grew increasingly desperate as
they focused on the single aim of overthrowing the PNDC regime.
Between 1983 and 1986, at least a dozen coup plots were uncovered
by an efficient and much-feared state security system
(see The 1981 Coup and the Second Rawlings Government
, ch. 5). At the same time,
vigorous debates occurred within the PNDC, radical organizations,
and trade unions over the direction of economic policy, the content
and form of true democracy, and the desirability of accepting
International Monetary Fund
(
IMF--see Glossary) support for Ghana's
Economic Recovery Program (ERP)
(see The Economic Recovery Program
, ch. 3).
Urban workers and students especially exhibited growing
frustration at their inability to influence policy or to express
dissent through readily available channels. Many urban workers felt
the CDRs did not effectively represent the opinions of workers in
the way that the PDCs and the WDCs had done before their
reorganization. In general, public criticism of government policy
was discouraged. In the face of repeated coup plots and
destabilization attempts, which lasted throughout the PNDC period,
the regime was eager to retain tight control of the political
situation, and an independent press had difficulty surviving. All
the same, the PNDC was clearly aware of the urgent need for the
government to provide genuine democratic channels and institutions
to enable workers, students, professional bodies, and other
interest groups to express dissent and to provide constructive
criticism of government policy. There was, therefore, a concerted
effort to transform the CDRs and other revolutionary organs into
real instruments of grass-roots democracy. The implementation of
the government decentralization program and the establishment of
district assemblies were likewise aimed at furthering the process
of genuine popular democratization.
Data as of November 1994
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