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Haiti POLITICS AND THE MILITARY, 1934-57
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Residents of Port-au-Prince celebrate the fall of
President Elie Lescot, January 1946
Courtesy National Archives
The Garde was a new kind of military institution in
Haiti
(see Army Politics in the Twentieth Century
, ch. 10). It
was a
force manned overwhelmingly by blacks, with a United
States-
trained black commander, Colonel Démosthènes Pétrus
Calixte. Most
of the Garde's officers, however, were mulattoes. The
Garde was a
national organization; it departed from the regionalism
that had
characterized most of Haiti's previous armies. In theory,
its
charge was apolitical--to maintain internal order, while
supporting a popularly elected government. The Garde
initially
adhered to this role.
President Vincent took advantage of the comparative
national
stability, which was being maintained by a
professionalized
military, to gain absolute power. A plebiscite permitted
the
transfer of all authority in economic matters from the
legislature to the executive, but Vincent was not content
with
this expansion of his power. In 1935 he forced through the
legislature a new constitution, which was also approved by
plebiscite. The constitution praised Vincent, and it
granted the
executive sweeping powers to dissolve the legislature at
will, to
reorganize the judiciary, to appoint ten of twenty-one
senators
(and to recommend the remaining eleven to the lower
house), and
to rule by decree when the legislature was not in session.
Although Vincent implemented some improvements in
infrastructure
and services, he brutally repressed his opposition,
censored the
press, and governed largely to benefit himself and a
clique of
merchants and corrupt military officers.
Under Calixte the majority of Garde personnel had
adhered to
the doctrine of political nonintervention that their
Marine Corps
trainers had stressed. Over time, however, Vincent and
Dominican
dictator Rafael Leónidas Trujillo Molina sought to buy
adherents
among the ranks. Trujillo, determined to expand his
influence
over all of Hispaniola, in October 1937 ordered the
indiscriminate butchery by the Dominican army of an
estimated
15,000 to 20,000 Haitians on the Dominican side of the
Massacre
River
(see The Era of Trujillo
, ch. 1). Some observers
claim that
Trujillo supported an abortive coup attempt by young Garde
officers in December 1937. Vincent dismissed Calixte as
commander
and sent him abroad, where he eventually accepted a
commission in
the Dominican military as a reward for his efforts while
on
Trujillo's payroll. The attempted coup led Vincent to
purge the
officer corps of all members suspected of disloyalty,
marking the
end of the apolitical military.
In 1941 Vincent showed every intention of standing for
a
third term as president, but after almost a decade of
disengagement, the United States made it known that it
would
oppose such an extension. Vincent accommodated the
Roosevelt
administration and handed power over to Elie Lescot.
Lescot was a mulatto who had served in numerous
government
posts. He was competent and forceful, and many considered
him a
sterling candidate for the presidency, despite his elitist
background. Like the majority of previous Haitian
presidents,
however, he failed to live up to his potential. His tenure
paralleled that of Vincent in many ways. Lescot declared
himself
commander in chief of the military, and power resided in a
clique
that ruled with the tacit support of the Garde. He
repressed his
opponents, censored the press, and compelled the
legislature to
grant him extensive powers. He handled all budget matters
without
legislative sanction and filled legislative vacancies
without
calling elections. Lescot commonly said that Haiti's
declared
state-of-war against the Axis powers during World War II
justified his repressive actions. Haiti, however, played
no role
in the war except for supplying the United States with raw
materials and serving as a base for a United States Coast
Guard
detachment.
Aside from his authoritarian tendencies, Lescot had
another
flaw: his relationship with Trujillo. While serving as
Haitian
ambassador to the Dominican Republic, Lescot fell under
the sway
of Trujillo's influence and wealth. In fact, it was
Trujillo's
money that reportedly bought most of the legislative votes
that
brought Lescot to power. Their clandestine association
persisted
until 1943, when the two leaders parted ways for unknown
reasons.
Trujillo later made public all his correspondence with the
Haitian leader. The move undermined Lescot's already
dubious
popular support.
In January 1946, events came to a head when Lescot
jailed the
Marxist editors of a journal called La Ruche (The
Beehive). This action precipitated student strikes and
protests
by government workers, teachers, and shopkeepers in the
capital
and provincial cities. In addition, Lescot's
mulatto-dominated
rule had alienated the predominantly black Garde. His
position
became untenable, and he resigned on January 11. Radio
announcements declared that the Garde had assumed power,
which it
would administer through a three-member junta.
The Revolution of 1946 was a novel development in
Haiti's
history, insofar as the Garde assumed power as an
institution,
not as the instrument of a particular commander. The
members of
the junta, known as the Military Executive Committee
(Comité
Exécutif Militaire), were Garde commander Colonel Franck
Lavaud,
Major Antoine Levelt, and Major Paul E. Magloire,
commander of
the Presidential Guard. All three understood Haiti's
traditional
way of exercising power, but they lacked a thorough
understanding
of what would be required to make the transition to an
elected
civilian government. Upon taking power, the junta pledged
to hold
free elections. The junta also explored other options, but
public
clamor, which included public demonstrations in support of
potential candidates, eventually forced the officers to
make good
on their promise.
Haiti elected its National Assembly in May 1946. The
Assembly
set August 16, 1946, as the date on which it would select
a
president. The leading candidates for the office--all of
whom
were black--were Dumarsais Estimé, a former school
teacher,
assembly member, and cabinet minister under Vincent; Félix
d'Orléans Juste Constant, leader of the Haitian Communist
Party
(Parti Communiste d'Haïti--PCH); and former Garde
commander
Calixte, who stood as the candidate of a progressive
coalition
that included the Worker Peasant Movement (Mouvement
Ouvrier
Paysan--MOP). MOP chose to endorse Calixte, instead of a
candidate from its own ranks, because the party's leader,
Daniel
Fignolé, was only twenty-six years old--too young to stand
for
the nation's highest office. Estimé, politically the most
moderate of the three, drew support from the black
population in
the north, as well as from the emerging black middle
class. The
leaders of the military, who would not countenance the
election
of Juste Constant and who reacted warily to the populist
Fignolé,
also considered Estimé the safest candidate. After two
rounds of
polling, legislators gave Estimé the presidency.
Estimé's election represented a break with Haiti's
political
tradition. Although he was reputed to have received
support from
commanders of the Garde, Estimé was a civilian. Of humble
origins, he was passionately anti-elitist and therefore
generally
antimulatto. He demonstrated, at least initially, a
genuine
concern for the welfare of the people. Operating under a
new
constitution that went into effect in November 1946,
Estimé
proposed, but never secured passage of, Haiti's first
social-
security legislation. He did, however, expand the school
system,
encourage the establishment of rural cooperatives, raise
the
salaries of civil servants, and increase the
representation of
middle-class and lower-class blacks in the public sector.
He also
attempted to gain the favor of the Garde--renamed the
Haitian
Army (Armée d'Haïti) in March 1947--by promoting Lavaud to
brigadier general and by seeking United States military
assistance.
Estimé eventually fell victim to two of the
time-honored
pitfalls of Haitian rule: elite intrigue and personal
ambition.
The elite had a number of grievances against Estimé. Not
only had
he largely excluded them from the often lucrative levers
of
government, but he also enacted the country's first income
tax,
fostered the growth of labor unions, and suggested that
voodoo be
considered as a religion equivalent to Roman
Catholicism--a
notion that the Europeanized elite abhorred. Lacking
direct
influence in Haitian affairs, the elite resorted to
clandestine
lobbying among the officer corps. Their efforts, in
combination
with deteriorating domestic conditions, led to a coup in
May
1950.
To be sure, Estimé had hastened his own demise in
several
ways. His nationalization of the Standard Fruit banana
concession
sharply reduced the firm's revenues. He alienated workers
by
requiring them to invest between 10 percent and 15 percent
of
their salaries in national-defense bonds. The president
sealed
his fate by attempting to manipulate the constitution in
order to
extend his term in office. Seizing on this action and the
popular
unrest it engendered, the army forced the president to
resign on
May 10, 1950. The same junta that had assumed power after
the
fall of Lescot reinstalled itself. An army escort
conducted
Estimé from the National Palace and into exile in Jamaica.
The
events of May 1946 made an impression upon the deposed
minister
of labor, François Duvalier. The lesson that Duvalier drew
from
Estimé's ouster was that the military could not be
trusted. It
was a lesson that he would act upon when he gained power.
The power balance within the junta shifted between 1946
and
1950. Lavaud was the preeminent member at the time of the
first
coup, but Magloire, now a colonel, dominated after
Estimé's
overthrow. When Haiti announced that its first direct
elections
(all men twenty-one or over were allowed to vote) would be
held
on October 8, 1950, Magloire resigned from the junta and
declared
himself a candidate for president. In contrast to the
chaotic
political climate of 1946, the campaign of 1950 proceeded
under
the implicit understanding that only a strong candidate
backed by
both the army and the elite would be able to take power.
Facing
only token opposition, Magloire won the election and
assumed
office on December 6.
Magloire restored the elite to prominence. The business
community and the government benefited from favorable
economic
conditions until Hurricane Hazel hit the island in 1954.
Haiti
made some improvements on its infrastructure, but most of
these
were financed largely by foreign loans. By Haitian
standards,
Magloire's rule was firm, but not harsh: he jailed
political
opponents, including Fignolé, and shut down their presses
when
their protests grew too strident, but he allowed labor
unions to
function, although they were not permitted to strike. It
was in
the arena of corruption, however, that Magloire
overstepped
traditional bounds. The president controlled the sisal,
cement,
and soap monopolies. He and other officials built imposing
mansions. The injection of international hurricane relief
funds
into an already corrupt system boosted graft to levels
that
disillusioned all Haitians. To make matters worse,
Magloire
followed in the footsteps of many previous presidents by
disputing the termination date of his stay in office.
Politicians, labor leaders, and their followers flocked to
the
streets in May 1956 to protest Magloire's failure to step
down.
Although Magloire declared martial law, a general strike
essentially shut down Port-au-Prince. Again like many
before him,
Magloire fled to Jamaica, leaving the army with the task
of
restoring order.
The period between the fall of Magloire and the
election of
Duvalier in September 1957 was a chaotic one, even by
Haitian
standards. Three provisional presidents held office during
this
interval; one resigned and the army deposed the other two,
Franck
Sylvain and Fignolé. Duvalier is said to have engaged
actively in
the behind-the-scenes intrigue that helped him to emerge
as the
presidential candidate that the military favored. The
military
went on to guide the campaign and the elections in a way
that
gave Duvalier every possible advantage. Most political
actors
perceived Duvalier--a medical doctor who had served as a
rural
administrator of a United States-funded anti-yaws campaign
before
entering the cabinet under Estimé--as an honest and fairly
unassuming leader without a strong ideological motivation
or
program. When elections were finally organized, this time
under
terms of universal suffrage (both men and women now had
the
vote), Duvalier, a black, painted himself as the
legitimate heir
to Estimé. This approach was enhanced by the fact that
Duvalier's
only viable opponent, Louis Déjoie, was a mulatto and the
scion
of a prominent family. Duvalier scored a decisive victory
at the
polls. His followers took two-thirds of the legislature's
lower
house and all of the seats in the Senate.
Data as of December 1989
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