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Iran
Introduction
DURING IRAN'S LONG HISTORY, the country has evolved its own great
Persian civilization, in addition to forming a part of a number
of world empires. Iran has created sophisticated institutions,
many of which still influenced its Islamic regime in the 1980s.
Despite the turmoil surrounding the establishment of its revolutionary
government, Iran's development has shown continuity. Major trends
affecting Iran throughout much of its history have been a tradition
of monarchical government, represented in the twentieth century
by Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi; the important political role of
the Shia (see Glossary) Islamic clergy, seen most recently in
Ayatollah Sayyid Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini; and, since the late
nineteenth century, pressure for Westernization or modernization.
Iran has been distinguished for having regimes that not only
conquered neighboring areas but also devised ingenious institutions.
The Achaemenids (550-330 B.C.)--who ruled the first Iranian world
empire, which stretched from the Aegean coast of Asia Minor to
Afghanistan, as well as south to Egypt--created the magnificent
structures at Persepolis, the remains of which still exist. The
Achaemenids also inaugurated a vast network of roads, a legal
code, a coinage system, and a comprehensive administrative system
that allowed some local autonomy, and they engaged in wide-ranging
commerce. Iran has also influenced its conquerors. Following its
conquest of Iran, the Muslim Umayyad Empire (A.D. 661- 750) adopted
many Iranian institutions, such as Iran's administrative system
and coinage. Moreover, Tamerlane (1381-1405), the famous Mongol
ruler, made use of Iranian administrators in governing his far-flung
territories.
Despite their primarily tribal origin, for most of the country's
history the people of Iran have known only monarchical government,
often of an absolutist type. For example, the Sassanids who ruled
Iran for four centuries, beginning in A.D. 224, revived the Achaemenid
term shahanshah (king of kings) for their ruler and considered
him the "shadow of God on earth." This concept was again revived
in the late eighteenth century by the Qajar monarchy, which remained
in power until Reza Khan, a military commander, had himself crowned
as Reza Shah Pahlavi in 1926. Many considered Reza Shah's son,
Mohammad Reza Shah, to be an absolutist ruler in his later days,
especially because of his use of the internal security force SAVAK
(Sazman-e Ettelaat va Amniyat- e Keshvar) to repress domestic
opposition.
After the Muslim conquest, Iran was strongly influenced by Islam
and, specifically, the political role exercised by the Shia clergy.
Such influence was established under the indigenous dynastic reign
of the Safavids (1501- 1722). The Safavids belonged to a Sufi
religious order and made Shia Islam the official religion of Iran,
undertaking a major conversion campaign of Iranian Muslims. The
precedent was revived in 1979 in a much more thoroughgoing theocratic
fashion by Ayatollah Khomeini.
In contrast to this traditional element in Iranian history has
been the pressure toward Westernization that began in the late
nineteenth century. Such pressures initially came from Britain,
which sought to increase its commercial relations with Iran by
promoting modernization of Iran's infrastructure and liberalization
of its trade. British prodding had little effect, however, until
Iranian domestic reaction to the growing corruption of the Qajar
monarchy led to a constitutional revolution in 1905-1906. This
revolution resulted in an elected parliament, or Majlis (see Glossary),
a cabinet approved by the Majlis, and a constitution guaranteeing
certain personal freedoms of citizens. Within less than twenty
years, the program of Reza Shah stressed measures designed to
reduce the powers of both tribal and religious leaders and to
bring about economic development and legal and educational reforms
along Western lines. Mohammad Reza Shah, like his father, promoted
such Westernization and largely ignored the traditional role in
Iranian society of conservative Shia religious leaders (see Shia
Islam in Iran , ch. 2).
Mohammad Reza Shah also strengthened the military by considerably
expanding its role in internal security matters to counteract
the domestic opposition that arose after Mohammad Mossadeq's prime
ministership (see Mossadeq and Oil Nationalization , ch. 1). In
addition, the shah stressed defense against external enemies because
he felt threatened by the Soviet Union, which had occupied Iranian
territory during and after World War II. To counter such a threat,
the shah sought United States military assistance in the form
of advisory personnel and sophisticated weaponry. He also harshly
repressed the communist Tudeh Party and other dissident groups
such as the Islamic extremist Mojahedin (Mojahedin-e Khalq, or
People's Struggle) and Fadayan (Cherikha-ye Fadayan-e Khalq, or
People's Guerrillas) organizations.
Meanwhile, the shah promoted Iran's economic development by implementing
a series of seven- and five-year economic development plans, of
which the first was launched in 1948. The programs emphasized
the creation of the necessary infrastructure and the establishment
of capital-intensive industry, initially making use of Iran's
enormous oil revenues but seeking ultimately to diversify the
country's economy by expanding heavy industry. In the 1960s, the
shah also paid attention to land reform, but the redistribution
of land to peasants was slow, and in many instances the amount
of land allocated to individual farmers was inadequate for economically
viable agricultural production. Moreover, Iran experienced high
inflation as a result of the shah's huge foreign arms purchases
and his unduly rapid attempts at industrial development and modernization.
Members of the bazaar, or small merchant class, benefited unevenly
from the modernization and gained less proportionately than the
shah's Westernizing elite (see Urban Society , ch. 2). This lack
of benefit from reforms was also true of the inhabitants of most
small villages, who remained without electricity, running water,
or paved roads (see Oil Revenues and the Acceleration of Modernization,
1960-79 , ch. 3).
Many factors contributed to the fall of the shah (see The Coming
of the Revolution , ch. 1). Observers most often cited such factors
as concern over growing Western influences and secularization,
the ignoring of the religious leaders, the repression of potential
dissidents and of the Tudeh Party, and the failure of the bazaar
class to achieve significant benefits from the shah's economic
development programs. Following a brief secular provisional government
after the shah was overthrown in 1979, clerical forces loyal to
Ayatollah Khomeini took control and launched a far- reaching Islamic
revolution.
In Khomeini's revolutionary regime, the Ayatollah himself acted
as policy guide and ultimate decision maker in his role as the
pious jurist, or faqih (see Glossary), in accordance
with the doctrine of velayat-e faqih (see Glossary),
under which religious scholars guided the community of believers.
Iran, officially renamed the Islamic Republic of Iran, became
a theocratic state with the rulers representing God in governing
a Muslim people, something not attempted previously even by the
twelve Shia Imams (see Glossary).
The Constitution of 1979 designates Khomeini as the faqih
for life. The Assembly of Experts in 1985 designated Hojjatoleslam
Hosain Ali Montazeri as the deputy to Khomeini and thus in line
as successor. In 1988 it was not clear, however, whether the country
would accept the choice of the experts when Khomeini died.
Other than appointing Khomeini faqih for life, the revolutionary
Constitution provides for political institutions to implement
the legislative aspects of the government. An elected legislative
assembly, the Majlis, charged with approving legislation devised
by the executive, was dominated by Muslim religious leaders. The
Constitution also created the Council of Guardians to ensure that
laws passed by the Majlis conformed with Islam. In practice, the
Council of Guardians has been conservative about economic legislation,
blocking Majlis measures on land reform, for example. To overcome
this blocking of legislation, in January 1988 Ayatollah Khomeini
gave a ruling to President Ali Khamenehi in which he claimed that
the Islamic state had the same powers as the Prophet Muhammad,
who was God's vice regent; therefore, the state could set aside
the Quran with regard to legislation if it were for the good of
the community.
Other than through legislative instititutions, political expression
occurred in principle through political parties. However, the
dominant political faction, the largely clergy-led Islamic Republican
Party established in early 1979, was dissolved in 1987 because
it had become unmanageable. Subsequently, only one legally recognized
political party, the Iran Freedom Movement (Nehzat-e Azadi-yi
Iran), which had been established by former Prime Minister Mehdi
Bazargan, operated in Iran. Estimates of the number of persons
opposed to the government or in prison varied. Officially, the
latter number was given as 9,000, but the antigovernment Mojahedin
maintained that 140,000 was a more realistic figure. In 1988 opposition
parties existed in exile, primarily in Western Europe, and included
ethnic Kurdish movements and the Mojahedin Islamic extremists,
as well as Marxists and monarchists (see Opposition Political
Parties in Exile , ch. 4). The Mojahedin also had created the
Iranian National Army of Liberation, which operated out of northern
Iraq against the Khomeini regime.
After the Ayatollah's government came to power, it initially
executed or imprisoned many members of the shah's regime, including
officers of the various armed services. But, following the outbreak
of the war with Iraq in 1980, substantial numbers of military
men were released from prison to provide essential leadership
on the battlefield or in the air war (see Iranian Mobilization
and Resistance , ch. 5). As early as June 1979, a counterforce
to the regular military was created in the form of the Pasdaran
(Pasdaran-e Enghelab-e Islami, or Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps, or Revolutionary Guards), an organization charged with
safeguarding the Revolution. The Pasdaran became a significant
military force in its own right and was overseen by a cabinet-level
minister (see Special and Irregular Armed Forces , ch. 5).
By 1988 the eight-year-old war with Iraq had evolved through
various stages of strategy and tactics (see The Iran-Iraq War
, ch. 5). Because Iran's population was approximately three times
that of Iraq, Iran's military manpower pool was vastly superior.
Capitalizing on this advantage, in the early stages of the war
Iran engaged extensively in "human-wave" assaults against Iraqi
positions, frequently using youths in their early teens. This
war strategy proved extremely costly to Iran in terms of human
casualties; it was estimated that between 300,000 and 400,000
Iranians had been killed by 1987, and estimated losses of matériel
were also large. The hostilities included a tanker war in the
Persian Gulf and the mining of the Gulf by Iran, events that led
to the involvement of the United States and other Western nations,
which sought to protect their shipping and safeguard their strategic,
economic, and political interests in the area. Furthermore, a
"war of cities" was inaugurated in 1985, with each side bombarding
the other's urban centers with missiles. Iran expended considerable
effort in developing a domestic arms industry capable of manufacturing
or modifying weapons and war matériel obtained from outside sources.
Iran's principal arms supplier was China, from which it acquired
Silkworm HY-2 surface-to-surface missiles, among other weapons
systems. Iran also obtained missiles from the Soviet Union, which
attempted to maintain amicable relations with both sides in the
Iran-Iraq War. In addition, in the ground war, which initially
had favored Iraq but then turned strongly in Iran's favor, in
April 1988 Iraq succeeded in regaining the Faw Peninsula. Iraq
thus recovered a significant part of the territory it had lost
earlier to Iran.
The war has severely strained Iran's economy by depleting its
foreign exchange reserves and causing a balance of payments deficit.
It has also redirected manpower that would otherwise have been
engaged in agriculture and industry (see The War's Impact on the
Economy , ch. 3). By 1987 Iran's overall war costs were calculated
at approximately US$350 billion. Moreover, wartime damage to urban
centers in western Iran, such as Abadan, Ahvaz, Dezful, and Khorramshahr,
caused refugees to flood into Tehran and other cities, further
aggravating the housing shortage. The destruction of petroleum
producing, processing, and shipping installations on the Persian
Gulf had reduced Iran's oil production and its export capability,
thereby cutting revenues. Sales of other domestic commodities,
such as carpets, agricultural products, and caviar, were unable
to compensate for the lost oil revenue, which was further reduced
by a world oil glut. Thus, in 1988 the revolutionary regime faced
a straitened economic future in which basic structural problems--such
as the degree of state involvement in the economy and the successful
implementation of agricultural reform--remained to be addressed.
Iran's economic situation has influenced its foreign policy to
some extent. Although ideological considerations based on revolutionary
principles dominated in the early days of the Revolution, Iran's
policies became more pragmatic as the war with Iraq continued.
For example, because of its need for weapons and other military
matériel, the Khomeini regime was willing to purchase arms from
Western nations and even from Israel. Initially, the revolutionary
government had made a radical foreign policy change from the pro-Western
stance of the shah. The United States, because of its support
of the shah, was branded as the "Great Satan" and the Soviet Union
as the "Lesser Satan." Both capitalism and socialism were condemned
as materialistic systems that sought to dominate the Third World.
In practice, however, the United States was the major target,
as evidenced most clearly in the seizure of the United States
embassy in Tehran and the taking of American diplomats as hostages
in November 1979.
Because of the Khomeini regime's desire to export revolution,
regional monarchies with Western associations, such as Saudi Arabia,
the Gulf states, and Jordan, were regarded with some hostility,
particularly after these countries came to the support of Iraq
in the Iran-Iraq War (see Relations with Regional Powers , ch.
4). Iran's militant foreign policy in the region was reflected
in the August 1, 1987, demonstrations during the Mecca pilgrimage.
As a result, over 400 pilgrims were killed (the majority of them
Iranian). As a protest against Iranian actions in the Gulf, in
late April 1988 Saudi Arabia severed diplomatic relations with
Iran. Another instance of Iran's militant policy was its funding
and sponsorship of Islamic extremist organizations in Lebanon,
particularly Islamic Amal and Hizballah, which contributed to
the ongoing civil war in Lebanon.
In 1988 the country with which Iran had the most cordial relationship
was Syria. Iran also maintained active economic relations with
the Soviet Union, especially with respect to direct trade, arms
purchases, and the transshipment of goods via the Soviet Union
to Western Europe.
Iran's future course in the late 1980s hinged upon a number of
factors. These included the smoothness with which it would be
able to make the transition to Ayatollah Khomeini's successor;
the duration, cost, and settlement terms of the war with Iraq;
the direction of Iran's foreign policy, in relation both to the
superpowers and to the remainder of the world, particularly the
countries of the region; and the skill of Iranian technocrats
in taking the necessary steps to address the country's economic
difficulties.
June 20, 1988
* * *
After the manuscript was completed in June 1988, two significant
events occurred in July 1988 that contributed to Iran's decision
on July 18 to accept the United Nations (UN) proposal of 1987
for a cease-fire to the Iran-Iraq War. On July 3, 1988, the United
States Navy shot down in error a civilian Iranian airliner that
it believed was planning to attack a United States Navy ship in
the Persian Gulf. In a step indicative of moderation, Iran took
the downing of Iran Air Flight 655 to the UN, a body to which
it had paid little heed since 1981 because Iran felt the UN was
supporting the United States position on the hostage issue. Just
prior to the UN debate, President Ronald Reagan announced that
the United States, without accepting blame for the accident, was
prepared to make an ex gratia payment to the victims'
relatives.
In the more immediate conduct of the war, on July 13 Iraqi forces
advanced on the south central front, capturing Dehloran, thirty
kilometers inside Iran. They took about 5,000 prisoners as well
as substantial amounts of Iranian military equipment during their
three-day occupation of the area. Foreign experts surmised that
Iraq sought to strengthen its bargaining position in the event
peace negotiations were forthcoming.
On July 18 Iran announced its acceptance of UN Resolution 598
of July 1987, which called for a cease-fire. Khomeini, taking
responsibility for accepting this "poisonous chalice," while at
the same time recognizing the great sacrifices of the nation,
stated that, in view of recent "unspecified events" (presumably
Iraq's "war of cities" and its use of chemical warfare, together
with the intervention of the "Great Satan") and the advice of
Iranian political and military experts, he believed the cease-fire
to be in the interest of the Revolution. As of mid-May 1989, although
the cease-fire was holding, no significant progress had been made
in UN-sponsored Iranian-Iraqi peace negotiations, and Iraq was
insisting on sovereignty over the entire Shatt al Arab as a condition
for the settlement.
Khomeini had often stated that he would not agree to an end of
the war without the overthrow of Iraqi President Saddam Husayn's
regime. His reversal of position raised questions concerning the
future of the Revolution. There was evidence in the spring of
1989 that factionalism was increasing among revolutionary leaders.
The most dramatic example of this was Ayatollah Montazeri's being
obliged in late March to resign as successor to Khomeini. Montazeri
apparently fell from grace because he had become unduly critical
in public of the regime's policies. He had repeatedly criticized
the continued execution of numerous individuals on the ground
that they were hostile to the Revolution and had questioned whether
Iran had actually won the war with Iraq.
The realignments taking place among the top hierarchy were not
clear as of mid-May 1989. For example, in early March Khomeini
had concurred with the appointment of Hojjatoleslam Abdullah Nouri,
a friend of Majlis Speaker Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, as his
personal representative to the Pasdaran. This move was thought
to be part of Rafsanjani's strategy to diminish the influence
of the Pasdaran and to integrate them more closely with the army,
because the regime considered the army a more loyal force than
the Pasdaran in the postwar period. Even before the war ended,
in early 1988, the government had begun following a pragmatic
policy, seeking to regain friends for Iran in the world community
through such means as reestablishing diplomatic relations with
France, Canada, and Britain. Relations with Britain were again
severed, however, in late February 1989, as a result of Khomeini's
imposition of the death sentence on February 14 on British writer
Salman Rushdie for his authorship of The Satanic Verses.
Since the end of the war in July 1988 a major issue among the
different factions in the government has been the degree of foreign
involvement to be permitted in Iran's reconstruction. Despite
some dissent in this regard, the government has sought to obtain
loans and credits for Iran from various West European sources
and from Japan because oil income is not projected to be adequate
to meet rebuilding needs, let alone allow for development projects.
Preoccupation with reconstruction and the lack of funds had obliged
the revolutionary regime to postpone, if not abandon, any measures
to export the Revolution. Instead, Iran was seeking a reconciliation
with some of the Persian Gulf states and with the Soviet Union.
Furthermore, it appeared that in its budgetary allocations for
the new Iranian year beginning March 21 and for the proposed new
five-year development plan, the regime was increasing its spending
on agriculture and water projects and stressing education, health,
and social measures, all of which were designed to show Islamic
concern for the downtrodden.
A second issue among the various factions concerned the extent
to which governmental centralization was appropriate. One faction
maintained that more centralized policy direction was needed for
the successful implementation of reconstruction programs, and
that to achieve this end the presidency needed to be a strengthened.
Rafsanjani supported this position and was one of more than 100
signatories of a proposal made to Khomeini that one of the ways
of strengthening the executive would be to eliminate the office
of prime minister. In this connection, a letter was published
in the Iranian press on April 16, 1989, and signed by 166 Majlis
delegates, asking Khomeini to establish a committee to amend the
Constitution in three areas: the faqih, the presidency,
and the judiciary. Khomeini responded in late April by appointing
twenty members to a Commission for the Revision of the Constitution,
with the Majlis appointing five additional members. Khomeini set
out guidelines for the commission to use in looking at eight areas
of the Constitution, including the three requested. Other aspects
to be examined included the role of the Discernment Council, appointed
to reconcile differences among the Council of Guardians, the Majlis,
and the government. By mid-May the commission had met several
times.
The press has reported that the deliberations included debate
on draft proposals for amending the articles of the Constitution
pertaining to qualifications for the post of faqih so
that lower-ranking clergy could serve on a collective council
of faqihs. This would permit Rafsanjani and Khamenehi,
for example, to serve. Other debate centered around proposed changes
in the presidency that would entail the elimination of the post
of prime minister or allow the president to appoint the prime
minister without Majlis approval, thus making the prime minister
responsible to the president. As early as January 1989, Rafsanjani
had hinted that he might run for president to succeed Khamenehi
when the latter's term ended in August 1989. Although as of mid-May
Rafsanjani had not publicly committed himself to running, he had
gained the endorsement for this post from revolutionary leaders
of all factions. It appeared, therefore, that the revolutionary
regime was on the way to some major changes in the executive structure
and in its leadership.
May 18, 1989
Helen Chapin Metz
* * *
As this volume was in press, Ayatollah Khomeini died on June
3, 1989, of a heart attack, following intestinal surgery two weeks
earlier. After lengthy deliberations, on June 4 President Khamenehi
was named Khomeini's successors as faqih by a two-thirds
majority of the Assembly of Experts. The future of Iran's government
in consideration of possible collective leadership and the proposed
reforms to the constitution affecting the executive, judicial,
and administrative structures remained unclear.
June 5, 1989
Helen Chapin Metz
Data as of December 1987
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