|
Israel
The Arab-Jewish Cleavage
The case of the Druzes highlights the peculiar problem of non-Jews,
even demonstrably loyal ones, in the Jewish state. Both conceptually
and pragmatically, the cleavage between Arabs and Jews is much
more profound and perhaps unbridgeable than the one between Orthodox
and secular Jews, or that between Ashkenazim and Oriental Jews.
There has been an inherent tension between evolving an authentic
Israeli national identity centered on the age-old religious character
of Judaism and forging an egalitarian socioeconomic system open
to all citizens. Reconciling the place of non-Jews within the
Jewish state has been a particular problem. These problems have
been characterized with special lucidity and frankness by the
Israeli-American political scientist, Daniel Elazar:
The views of Israeli Jews regarding the Arabs in their midst
are hardly monolithic, but whatever their character, all flow
out of a common wish and a general ambivalence. The common wish
of virtually all Jews is that the Arabs simply would go away
(and vice versa, it may be added). It is possible to get many
Israelis to articulate this wish when they are pushed to do
so, but needless to say, its very unreality means that it is
rarely articulated, and, if articulated by a few extremists,
such as Meir Kahane, it is rapidly dismissed from consideration
by the vast majority. Yet it should be noted at the outset,
because for Israeli Jews, every other option, no matter which
they choose, is clearly a poor second.
It is against this background that the Israeli settlement policies
of the West Bank and Gaza must be understood. To annex these areas
would be to add almost 1.5 million Arabs to the non-Jewish population
of the Jewish state--hardly a way to make the problem "simply
go away." Until late 1987, Israeli planners had proceeded to build
infrastructure in the West Bank as though operating under the
premise that two totally separate socioeconomic systems--one Arab,
the other Jewish--would exist side by side. Alternatively, the
Arab sector was hardly mentioned--as if it did not exist. Still,
West Bank Arab labor has been significantly absorbed into the
larger Israeli economy; the situation recalls the experience of
Arabs in pre-1967 Israel.
The violent protests that began in the Gaza Strip and the West
Bank in December 1987 may well change this sort of thinking (see
Palestinian Uprising, December 1987- , ch. 5). For example, it
has been argued by some analysts that the West Bank (as Judea
and Samaria) had already become part of a "cognitive map" for
a generation of Jewish Israelis born after the June 1967 War.
In light of this analysis, some have noted that security efforts
begun in April 1988 to close off the West Bank, thereby keeping
journalists (among others) out and, Israelis hope, violent Palestinians
in, have already had the unintended effect of reviving the old
Green Line (see Glossary). Israeli Arabs living within the old
Green Line have also been affected by events on the West Bank
and Gaza--events that might prove fateful for Israel.
Between 1948 and 1967 Israeli Arabs were effectively isolated
from the rest of the Arab world. They were viewed by other Arabs
as, at worst, collaborators, and, at best, hostages. After the
Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza and the economic
integration of its Arab population into Israel, social intercourse
between Israeli Arabs and West Bank and Gaza Palestinians increased.
Among other things, this contact has done much to raise the political
consciousness of Israeli Arabs and strengthen their sense of Palestinian
identity. In this sense, in the minds of many Jewish Israelis
the dismantling of the old Green Line and the movement of Jewish
settlers to fulfill their religio-nationalistic aspirations in
biblical Judea and Samaria has been a double-edged sword. Along
the way, the nationalist aspirations of Israeli Arabs have been
invigorated as well.
Renewed political activity among Israeli Arabs was already evident
when, in 1976, March 30 was proclaimed Land Day as a protest against
Israeli expropriations of Arab lands. Several Arabs were shot
by authorities during a demonstration, and since then Land Day
has become a major event for expressing Israeli Arab political
discontent, and for testing its organizational potential. Since
early 1988, the political energies of Israeli Arabs have also
been focused on expressing solidarity with their West Bank and
Gazan brothers and sisters, who themselves have pursued more violent
confrontations with Israeli authorities. It seems less and less
likely that an unproblematic Israeli Arab identity will develop
and that the Israeli Arabs will become, as Israeli Jews had once
hoped, "proud Arabs and loyal Israelis." In the late 1980s, it
was more relevant to speak of the Palestinization of Israel's
Arab minorities.
Data as of December 1988
|
