Jordan Dimensions of the Military Threat
Figure 13. Comparison of Force Strengths in the Middle East, 1988
Source: Based on information from International Institute for
Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1988-1989,
London, 1988, 98-116.
As of mid-1989, the Jordan River valley, forming the boundary
zone with Israel and the Israeli-occupied
West Bank (see Glossary),
had been quiet for nearly two decades. In 1970 Hussein's army had
begun its drive against the PLO militia that was using Jordan as a
base for attacks on Israeli positions in the West Bank
(see Jordan - The Palestinian Factor
, this ch.). The Israeli leadership has
acknowledged that pacification of this border has been the result
of Jordanian measures taken to prevent PLO terrorism. Jordan was
not a declared belligerent in 1973 when Egypt and Syria
simultaneously attacked Israel; however, Jordan did commit armored
units to support Syrian defenders on the Golan Heights during the
last stages of the war in actions confined to Syrian territory
(see Jordan - The Military Heritage
, this ch.). Jordan did not join Syria and the
PLO in contesting Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982.
Although Israel throughout the 1980s exercised restraint in its
military conduct with respect to Jordan, the destructive potential
of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) continued to preoccupy the
Jordanian command. Despite the long period intervening since raids
and bombardments by Israel in retaliation for attacks by PLO
guerrillas, the ferocity of Israel's earlier punitive actions--most
of the victims being Jordanians with no links to the PLO--had left
a permanent impression of Israeli belligerence and hostility.
Jordan was also conscious of the sentiment in Israel that favored
solving the West Bank Palestinian problem by ejecting all Arabs
from the area and sending them to Jordan. Any attempt to execute
such a plan would inevitably require military intimidation or the
direct application of Israel's military superiority.
In the event of renewed hostilities between Israel and Syria,
it was also possible that Israel would try to outflank Syrian
positions in the Golan Heights area by swinging south into Jordan.
Such an action would present its own problems, including a
difficult river crossing. During the 1973 conflict, neither Israel
nor Syria violated Jordanian territorial integrity in spite of
Jordan's efforts to reinforce the Syrian defenses.
Jordan was also obliged to take account of Syrian military
power. The aggressive Damascus regime had frequently been at odds
politically with Hussein until an easing of bilateral relations
began in late 1985. Syrian tank units had crossed into Jordan in
1970 to aid the Palestinian militia defying the government. The
Syrians had massed three divisions and more than 800 tanks on the
Jordanian border in 1980 in a dispute over military training camps
in Jordan for opponents of the Syrian regime. Only pressure from
the United States and Saudi Arabia, together with Hussein's promise
to limit anti-Syrian activity inside the kingdom, caused Damascus
to back down. Syrian-sponsored terrorist activity beginning in 1983
was intended to intimidate Hussein in his efforts to get the peace
process under way between the PLO and Israel.
Like Israel's, Syria's military establishment vastly outmatched
that at Hussein's command. Syria had a quantitative personnel
advantage over Jordan by a ratio of four to one, its tank and
artillery inventory exceeded Jordan's by a ratio of four to one,
and it had four times as many combat aircraft, most of them of more
advanced design. A corresponding disparity of scale existed between
the Jordanian and Israeli armed forces. The normal personnel
strength of the IDF was about 60 percent larger than that of
Jordan's armed forces, but Israel could rapidly expand its
personnel by mobilizing well-trained reserve units
(see
fig. 13).
Jordan also had common borders with Saudi Arabia and Iraq and
was separated from Egypt only by a narrow strip of Israeli
territory in the Negev Desert. The 1988 cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq
War left Iraq with a large number of experienced fighting units. As
a revolutionary Arab state opposed to settlement with Israel, Iraq
had in the past been perceived as a potential threat by the Amman
government. Relations between Jordan and Iraq had been good,
however, throughout the 1980s. Jordan viewed Iraq as a buffer
against the radical Islamic fundamentalism expounded by Iran's
leaders and provided tangible support to the Iraqi war effort.
Saudi Arabia, with an armed establishment about the size of
Jordan's but with no combat experience, was not regarded as a
military rival. To the contrary, the Saudi government had been the
primary financial source for equipment acquisitions by the
Jordanian forces. During the 1960s, Egypt's militant Arab
nationalist leader Gamal Abdul Nasser had tried to destabilize
Hussein's rule. Since that time, however, Egypt had not been a
source of concern militarily to Jordan. Under the political
conditions prevailing in the late 1980s, Egypt was perceived as a
peaceful neighbor against which no special security precautions
were required. Rather, the Jordanian-Egyptian rapprochement had
progressed so far that joint military exercises were held by the
two countries in 1985.
Further evidence of Jordan's intention to increase its
cooperation with other Arab states were the meetings in Amman on
February 12, 1989, and in Baghdad on February 16, 1989, that
resulted in the founding of an Arab economic association. King
Hussein took the lead in creating this organization, to be known as
the Arab Cooperation Council, consisting of Egypt, Iraq, Jordan,
and the Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen). The permanent
secretariat of the body, which is patterned on the European
Economic Community and the Gulf Cooperation Council, will probably
be located in Amman.
Except for the Jordan River valley separating Jordan from the
West Bank, no major terrain features present a barrier to an
invading army. Jordan shares a 375-kilometer border with Syria, and
the Syrian frontier is only 60 kilometers from Amman. The Yarmuk
River, which forms the western part of the boundary between the two
countries, falls into a deep gorge to Lake Tiberias (Sea of
Galilee), but farther east a number of major roads link the two
countries across undulating terrain with no natural obstacles. The
city of Irbid and the air base at Al Mafraq are fewer than twenty
kilometers from the border, vulnerable to surprise attack or
artillery bombardment. The 742-kilometer border with Saudi Arabia
and the 134-kilometer border with Iraq are in open desert areas to
the south and east.
The bulk of Jordan's population and its most productive
agriculture have concentrated in the northwestern corner of the
country, an area only about 60 kilometers wide and 160 kilometers
long. In the event of conflict, Amman and other cities would have
only a few minutes' warning against air attack from either Syrian
or Israeli planes based nearby. Israeli ground forces advancing
from the West Bank would face a major terrain obstacle in the form
of the escarpment about 800 to 1,200 meters above the floor of the
Jordan River valley. Although a number of surfaced roads lead to
the top of it, a well-entrenched defending force could make the
operation very costly. In the end, however, Israel's superior air
power, possibly combined with a helicopter assault on key high
points, would almost certainly succeed in dislodging the Jordanians
blocking an advance up the main routes to the central plateau.
Israel also would have the option of seizing Jordan's sole port of
Al Aqabah in the south, although its army would face long and
exposed supply lines in a subsequent drive north toward Amman.
In the event of aggression by one of Jordan's stronger
neighbors, the modest forces at Hussein's command might be obliged
to confine resistance to the vital northern upland region, holding
the heights above the
East Bank (see Glossary)
or defending the
likely invasion routes from Syria. The army combat units and most
of the air bases were concentrated in the northwest. Jordan's
vulnerability, particularly its limited defense against sustained
air strikes, would make it difficult for even a well-trained and
highly motivated army to prevail for long against a strong invading
force.
The overall national defense strategy was to maintain forces
that could give a good account of themselves, even when faced by
superior attackers. A potential aggressor might thereby be
deterred, realizing that a move against Jordan would be a costly
venture. Moreover, a strong defensive posture by Jordan would
oblige any aggressor to precede its attack by a mobilization in
expectation of major conflict, thus obviating the danger of a
surprise takeover. If an invasion nevertheless occurred, the
Jordanian strategy would be to conduct a stubborn delaying action
to allow time for pressure to be brought to bear by Jordan's
friends and the international community for abandonment of the
aggression.
Data as of December 1989
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