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Jordan WAR AND DIPLOMACY
After his victory over the fedayeen, Hussein sought to
reestablish his authority in the country and his image in the Arab
world through the implementation of dynamic domestic and foreign
policies. In September 1971, he announced the formation of the
Jordanian National Union to serve as the nation's sole authorized
political organization, representing--at least in theory--both
banks of the Jordan. The union was not a political party in the
traditional sense but, according to the king, would be used "as a
melting pot for the Jordanian people." With the exception of
communists, Marxists, and "other advocates of foreign ideologies,"
all citizens were eligible for membership within the union, which
would "provide constructive opposition from within its own ranks."
Hussein also introduced a plan for the creation of a federation
to be called the United Arab Kingdom. Under the plan, the West Bank
and the East Bank would become autonomous provinces within the
sovereign Hashimite kingdom. Seats in the National Assembly would
continue to be divided equally among representatives of the two
regions. The PLO repudiated the United Arab Kingdom and the
Jordanian National Union, and neither plan was ever implemented.
Hussein paid a state visit to the United States in February
1973 during which President Richard M. Nixon assured him of his
"firm. . . support for Jordan" and promised increased economic and
military aid. During interviews Hussein, who earlier had called for
United States intervention to bring about a comprehensive Middle
East settlement, reaffirmed that he contemplated no partial or
separate agreements with Israel that would be prejudicial to Arab
unity, but he left the door open for bilateral talks and condemned
the PLO for its divisive influence. On his return to Amman, Hussein
reemphasized that all of East Jerusalem must be returned but
offered to put the holy places there under international
supervision.
At the Arab summit in Cairo in September 1973, a reconciliation
mediated by King Faisal of Saudi Arabia took place between Egypt,
Syria, and Jordan, the "front-line" or confrontation states against
Israel. On October 6, less than a month after the meeting, Egyptian
and Syrian armies launched simultaneous attacks across the Suez
Canal and the Golan Heights that caught the Israelis by surprise.
After initially threatening to break through Israel's inner
defenses, the Syrians were checked and then thrown back by an
Israeli counteroffensive that drove to within thirty kilometers of
the strong defense emplacements surrounding Damascus. By October
10, Jordan had mobilized nearly 70,000 men, forcing Israeli troops
to deploy in the West Bank. Hussein did not open a third front
against Israel but he sent 3,000 Jordanian troops in two armored
brigades to the Golan front on October 13, and they saw limited
action under Syrian command in fighting near Lake Tiberias. More
than 25,000 regular Palestinian troops also were engaged under
separate command.
With the Arab armies in retreat, the Soviet Union called a
special session of the UN Security Council on October 21 to impose
an immediate cease-fire. Although accepted by Israel and Egypt, the
cease-fire did not become effective for another three days. On the
northern front, Israeli troops retained control of the Golan
Heights, and in the southwest they had opened bridgeheads across
the Suez Canal and occupied more than 1,500 square kilometers of
territory in Egypt. UN Security Council Resolution 338, submitted
on October 22, reiterated the Security Council's position on
Israeli-occupied territory, first expressed in Resolution 242 in
1967.
At a postmortem on the fourth Arab-Israeli war held in November
in Algiers, the Jordanian representative stressed that the ceasefire did not mean peace and called again for Israel to evacuate the
occupied territories that combined Arab forces had failed to win
back in battle. Over Jordanian protests, the summit conference
voted to recognize the PLO as the legitimate representative of the
Palestinian people. Hussein, who conceded in Amman that he did not
claim to speak for the Palestinians, supported their right to selfdetermination --"but," he added, "only after the occupied
territories are liberated."
Hussein stated on more than one occasion his willingness to
leave the liberation of the West Bank to the PLO, but he pointedly
boycotted a meeting with PLO officials in Cairo at which Egypt and
Syria were expected to deal with the PLO as the "only legitimate
representatives" of the Palestinian people--a position that Hussein
admitted he had no alternative but to accept in practice. President
Anwar as Sadat of Egypt, however, warned the PLO that its refusal
to cooperate with Hussein could lead to an Arab civil war on a
broader scale than that of 1970-71. When the Palestinians refused
to compromise their claim to total sovereignty in the West Bank,
Hussein requested a postponement of the Arab summit scheduled for
Rabat in October 1974. The purpose of the summit was to give formal
recognition to the PLO's role. In an abrupt turnabout in policy,
Egyptian foreign minister Ismail Fahmi responded by declaring that
Egypt now opposed the return of the West Bank to Jordan and
accepted without reservation the PLO claim to represent the
Palestinian people.
Data as of December 1989
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