Maldives HISTORICAL INTEREST
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Figure 9. Comoros, Madagascar, Maldives, Mauritius, and Seychelles:
Strategic Airports and Ports, 1994
The Indian Ocean has a long maritime history. Since
approximately 2,500 B.C., traders, adventurers, and
explorers
from Egypt, China, India, Indonesia, Persia (Iran), and
Ceylon
conducted oceangoing commerce and at times maintained
maritime
empires in the Indian Ocean. Additionally, many peoples
who lived
in the Red Sea and Persian Gulf regions relied on the
Indian
Ocean for their livelihoods. The most notable local power
was
Oman. In 1841 the sultan of Oman moved his capital from
Muscat to
Zanzibar and established a trading empire along the East
African
coast based largely on ivory and slaves. In the wake of
these
activities, there was a migration of Asians into the
western
Indian Ocean. As early as 500 B.C., Dravidians and
Sinhalese from
India and Ceylon had settled in the Maldive Islands. By
A.D.
1000, Malayo-Indonesians had established communities in
Madagascar.
The emergence of the great European maritime empires
marked
an historical watershed in the Indian Ocean. In the
sixteenth
century, the Portuguese, Dutch, French, and British
quickly
gained control over much of the region. To reach this
goal, they
used sophisticated ships and maritime strategies and
exploited
local rivalries to gain allies and territory. These
activities
signaled the beginning of the use of the Indian Ocean as a
theater where European maritime nations competed with one
another
for power and influence in the area. This rivalry spawned
many
extraregional wars and alliances, many of which caused
instability in the region's islands.
One of the most important personalities during the
early
European period was Alfonso d'Albuquerque, governor of
Portugal's
Indian Ocean possessions from 1508 to 1515. Rather than
devoting
his energies to territorial conquest, he used naval power
to
control trade routes. To achieve this goal, d'Albuquerque
established a network of bases in the Indian Ocean;
constructed
forts at the entrances to the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf,
and the
Strait of Malacca; and concluded alliances with
economically
powerful rulers on the African and Asian coasts
(see
fig. 9,
Indian Ocean: Five Island Countries). These tactics
enabled Portugal to dominate commercial activity in the
Indian
Ocean from 1511 to 1641.
From the seventeenth century until the opening of the
Suez
Canal in 1869, European and North American shipping relied
on the
western Indian Ocean and its islands for the transport of
eastern
goods and spices. As this shorter route quickly supplanted
the
longer Cape of Good Hope route and steam gradually
replaced sail,
the region's strategic importance diminished. The islands
of
Madagascar, Mauritius, Comoros, Seychelles, and, to a
lesser
extent, Maldives, all of which had been important way
stations
for international shipping, became remote colonial
outposts.
Although it enabled the British to consolidate their
hegemony
over the Indian Ocean, the Suez Canal also facilitated the
entry
of other European nations into the area. The latter
development
not only challenged British mastery over the Indian Ocean
but
also caused a scramble for colonies among the stronger
European
powers. The French established a presence in the Horn of
Africa
and Madagascar, both of which protected the route to their
Southeast Asia empire. Additionally, the Italians,
Germans, and
Portuguese created colonies along the East African coast.
Russia
viewed the Suez Canal as a vehicle to achieve its goal of
creating a network of warm water ports. However, Japan's
1904
victory over the Russian fleet ended this dream. Over the
next
several years, Japan and the United States posed a growing
naval
challenge to Britain's dominance in the Indian Ocean.
Nevertheless, British seapower remained preeminent
throughout the
region.
During World War I, the Indian Ocean aroused
international
interest, as the British and the Germans battled one
another for
control of various colonies. Also, these nations sought to
protect shipping routes that carried petroleum from the
Persian
Gulf, via the Suez Canal, to Europe. Despite the area's
importance, Madagascar, Mauritius, Comoros, Seychelles,
and
Maldives managed to escape the ravages of World War I.
World War II played a more significant role in the
western
Indian Ocean, especially as far as Madagascar was
concerned. On
May 5, 1942, the British 121 Force defeated pro-Vichy
French
troops and then occupied Diego Suarez. This action denied
an
important naval base to Japan, which undoubtedly would
have used
the facility to threaten British maritime communications
along
East Africa with the Middle East. After occupying Majunga,
Tamatave, and Tananarive (now Antananarivo), the British
established a military administration over Madagascar,
which
functioned until mid-1943. Apart from these activities,
German
submarines harassed Allied shipping throughout the western
Indian
Ocean.
The most notable wartime event occurred at the 1942
Battle of
the Java Sea, when the Japanese destroyed the British
Royal Navy.
This event marked the end of British hegemony over the
Indian
Ocean. During the postwar period, the British government
lacked
the ability and resources to reassert its maritime
dominance over
the region. However, in the absence of strong contending
naval
power, the British remained in nominal control of sizable
portions of the Indian Ocean. France confined its
activities
mainly to the western Indian Ocean. Politically, World War
II
weakened British and French holds over their respective
colonial
empires. The rising tide of nationalism that swept through
Africa
and Asia accelerated demands for independence on the part
of all
the western Indian Ocean islands.
During the postwar period, several factors affected the
strategic importance of the Indian Ocean. The onset of the
Cold
War increased superpower activity throughout the region.
By 1964
the United States had developed ballistic missile
submarines that
could hit industrial targets in the Soviet Union from the
Arabian
Sea. Moscow also feared that Washington's announcement
that it
intended to deploy some ballistic missile submarines to
the
Pacific Ocean and to build a very low frequency
communications
station (designed for submarine contact) in western
Australia
signaled a military build-up in the Indian Ocean.
The changing nature of British power in the region
caused
London and Washington to devise a strategy to uphold the
interests of both nations. In 1965, during talks with a
Mauritian
delegation, the British government made it clear that the
island's independence was contingent on the sale of the
Chagos
Archipelago and the transfer of sovereignty to Britain. On
November 8, 1965, the British government then created the
Crown
Colony of the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT). The
BIOT
consisted of the Chagos Archipelago, earlier administered
from
the British Crown Colony of Mauritius; and the Aldabra and
Farquhar islands and Île Desroches, previously
administered from
the British Crown Colony of Seychelles. In 1966 Britain
leased
the approximately eighteen-kilometer island of Diego
Garcia in
the Chagos Archipelago to the United States for a
fifty-year
period until the year 2016, with a twenty-year extension
available if neither London nor Washington opposed
continuation.
For political and security reasons, the indigenous
population of
1,200 who lived on Diego Garcia were resettled in
Mauritius and
Seychelles, and received US$8 million in compensation from
the
British government. The controversy surrounding these
actions
never has disappeared; even in 1993, the Mauritian
government
periodically attempted to reassert its sovereignty over
the
Chagos Archipelago, especially Diego Garcia.
When the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War between Israel and
Egypt
caused the closure of the Suez Canal, shippers had to
transport
their goods around the Cape of Good Hope. This increased
the
importance of Madagascar, Comoros, Seychelles, and, to a
lesser
extent, Mauritius, all of which had the potential to
command the
Cape route. After the Suez Canal reopened in 1975, these
islands
retained their significance because, to carry petroleum
more
economically over the longer route, many shippers had
built
supertankers that were too large to pass through the
canal.
In early 1968, the strategic situation in the Indian
Ocean
changed again when the British government announced its
intention
to withdraw all its military forces from east of the Suez
Canal
by 1971. Two months after this declaration, the Soviet
Union
deployed four warships to the Indian Ocean, and arranged
for them
to call at ports on the Indian subcontinent, the Persian
Gulf,
and the East Africa coast. After 1969 Soviet naval units
regularly visited the region. Throughout the 1970s, Moscow
also
succeeded in gaining access to several naval bases around
the
littoral and increasing the number of Soviet intelligence,
research, and fishing vessels operating in the Indian
Ocean. As a
result, the number of Soviet naval craft in the area often
exceeded those of the United States.
The British pullback from east of Suez also led to an
increased United States military presence in the Indian
Ocean. In
1972 a new agreement allowed the United States to build a
naval
communications facility on Diego Garcia for British and
United
States use. Also, in 1972 the United States naval element,
Commander in Chief Pacific (CINCPAC) extended its
operational
area to cover most of the Indian Ocean. In 1976 the United
States
transformed Diego Garcia into a naval support facility
with deep-
water docks and an expanded runway.
For the next several decades, the United States and the
Soviet Union competed with one another for strategic
superiority
in the Indian Ocean. After the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan in
December 1979, President Jimmy Carter announced his
intention to
use military force to prevent any foreign power (i.e., the
Soviet
Union) from gaining control of the Persian Gulf region. To
buttress this policy, the United States increased its
military
presence in the Indian Ocean to enhance its ability to
respond
quickly to any military contingency. After the downfall of
Iran's
imperial government in 1979, the United States deployed a
second
carrier task force to the area to join the one already on
station. Additionally, the United States government
concluded a
series of military access agreements with Egypt, Kenya,
Oman, and
Somalia, and arranged to conduct joint military exercises
with
these countries. On March 1, 1980, President Carter also
authorized the creation of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task
Force,
later reorganized as the United States Central Command
(USCENTCOM), whose area of responsibility includes
Afghanistan,
Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan,
Kenya,
Kuwait, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia,
Sudan, the
United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.
During the 1980s, the Indian Ocean continued to provoke
competition between Washington and Moscow. The United
States
increased its presence on Diego Garcia by building new
airfield
facilities and an air force satellite detection and
tracking
station, initiating Strategic Air Command (SAC)
operations,
improving navigational aids, and increasing anchorages and
moorings for pre-positioned warehouse ships stationed
permanently
at the island.
From Moscow's perspective, the Soviet Indian Ocean
Squadron
performed a defensive mission against the United States,
and
promoted Soviet foreign policy in the region. Apart from
access
to naval facilities in Seychelles, Mauritius, and Reunion,
the
Soviet Union also conducted long-range maritime
surveillance
flights over much of the Indian Ocean. Despite this
activity,
Moscow avoided a military confrontation with Washington in
the
Indian Ocean, largely because it lacked modern,
high-performance
aircraft carriers and the ability to defend long sea and
air
lines of communications to and from the region.
Throughout the Cold War years, France also remained
active in
the Indian Ocean. Until 1973, the headquarters of the
French
forces was in Madagascar. After Antananarivo severed
military
relations with Paris, French forces operated from Reunion,
Comoros, and Djibouti. Throughout much of the 1980s and
the early
1990s, France maintained the second largest naval fleet in
the
Indian Ocean. French naval forces normally consisted of a
marine
contingent attached to a carrier, two Polaris-type attack
submarines, two or three destroyers, two or three
frigates,
minesweepers, and ten to fifteen landing craft and
auxiliaries.
Additionally, France maintained 5,000 troops and a small
number
of fighter aircraft in Djibouti.
Data as of August 1994
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