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Oman NATIONAL SECURITY
Armed Forces: In mid-1993 personnel strength
36,700,
including 3,700 foreign personnel, as follows: Royal Oman
Land
Forces, 20,000; Royal Oman Navy, 3,500; Royal Oman Air
Force,
3,500; and Royal Household, 6,000 (including Royal Guard,
4,500;
Special Forces, 700; Royal Yacht Squadron, 150; and other,
650).
Army primarily infantry force but has some tanks and
armored
cars. Navy a coastal patrol force, expanding and
modernizing by
acquiring guided missile (Exocet) craft and new gunboats.
Air
force has more than fifty combat aircraft, all of British
manufacture.
Overview
SINCE 1970, WHEN OMAN'S RULER, Sultan Qabus ibn Said Al
Said,
assumed power, the sultanate has moved from a poor
underdeveloped
country toward a modern nation state. Indexes of
development
measuring per capita gross national product, infant
mortality,
literacy rates, and availability of social services
validated the
government's claim that its policies have effected
positive
change. Although the government's administrative structure
expanded to accommodate public services, change in the
political
system has been slow. Oman remains a conservative
monarchy, with
the sultan relying on the support of a traditional
political
elite comprising the Al Said ruling family, established
merchant
families, and, to a lesser extent, tribal shaykhs.
Until the commercial production and export of oil in
1967,
Oman's budget was exclusively dependent on religious taxes
(zakat), customs duties, and British loans and
subsidies.
The bulk of this revenue served as a mechanism through
which the
sultan could co-opt his traditional allies among the
merchant
families and tribal shaykhs. By transferring income from
the
state treasury, the sultan was able to draw in influential
segments of Omani society and ensure continuance of Al
Said rule.
Post-1970 economic developments were in part constructed
on these
antecedents. Income distribution remained a principal
mechanism
for ensuring political stability, but the network involved
a
state administrative structure rather than the more direct
and
personal individual-ruler relationship. Also, the system
expanded
to incorporate the average Omani through the creation of a
public
sector. The net effect has been the establishment of a
salaried
middle class whose economic interests are closely tied
with the
government.
Since the development of the country's infrastructure
in the
1970s, national development plans have given priority to
reducing
dependency on oil exports and encouraging
income-generating
projects in non-oil sectors (diversification), promoting
privatesector investment, and effecting a wider geographical
distribution of investments to correct regional
imbalances. Such
a wider distribution is intended to narrow the gap in the
standard of living in different regions, develop existing
areas
of population, and discourage migration to densely
populated
urban centers, such as Muscat (also seen as Masqat), the
capital.
Equally important are the national goals to develop local
human
resources, to increase indigenous participation in the
private
sector, and to improve government management and
organization.
Constraints on the government in implementing its
economic
diversification program include the limited growth
potential of
alternative sectors, such as agriculture, fishing, and
industry.
Constraints also include the limited involvement of the
private
sector in businesses other than trade, the low-skilled
labor
force, the limited water resources, and the inability of
government ministries to manage and expand services.
Sultan Qabus ibn Said, therefore, faced different
challenges
in 1993 than those he confronted when he assumed power in
1970
through a palace coup d'état. Then, the rebellion of
tribes in
southern Dhofar (also seen as Zufar) region and the
exploitation
of the country's oil reserves had taken precedence.
Opportunities in urban centers stimulated a rural-urban
shift, reducing the number of individuals engaged in
agricultural
labor and contributing to the key role of the oil sector
in the
economy. On the one hand, an increasingly urbanized
population
has the potential to be better educated and better
enumerated. On
the other hand, the small indigenous population has
necessitated
the presence of a large foreign labor force. This has
contributed
to an informal caste system, with Omanis clearly ranked
highest
in the hierarchy, followed by Westerners, with non-Western
foreigners at the bottom.
Economic development has resulted in social
transformation,
not only in terms of diminishing the importance of the
tribal
element in Oman and stratifying Omani society but also in
terms
of inadvertently engendering a sense of entitlement among
the
public, common to social welfare states. In doing so, the
government has been under increasing pressure to provide
suitable
employment for new migrants to the cities from village
communities and to new graduates from colleges, to expand
its
social services, and to maintain the security of the
country.
To fulfill these expectations, the government must
ensure
sustainable economic growth. Therefore, the policies of
diversification and indigenization have taken on greater
importance. Diversification is needed to ensure growth in
the
post-oil era; indigenization potentially eliminates the
demand
for foreign labor and increases opportunities for Omani
nationals. The problems of the 1990s are resistant to
change,
however. The depletion of the country's proven oil
reserves (at
the production rate of 1992, reserves will be depleted
within
seventeen years) heightens the need for economic
diversification,
but so far, non-oil sectors have shown limited potential.
The net effect of the government's policies has been to
link
economic conditions with political stability. The
suppression of
the Dhofar rebellion in the first half of the 1970s
provided a
lesson for Sultan Qabus ibn Said. By addressing the gross
economic neglect of the south, the government was able to
ensure
some political quiescence. In providing the majority of
Omanis
with adequate income through employment in the public
sector,
health and medical services, education, and other social
services, the government has similarly ensured a modicum
of
public political support.
Data as of January 1993
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