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Oman Internal Security
Oman has not been exposed to a significant internal
threat
since the defeat of the Dhofari insurgents in 1975. Tribal
dissension, a factor in the past, is considered unlikely
to recur
because most tribal chiefs and leading families share the
advantages of rising oil income. The foreign labor force
is
large--estimated at 58 percent of the working
population--and
most foreign workers are Indians and Pakistanis who are
not
politically active. A few observers foresee an internal
power
struggle over the succession because Sultan Qabus ibn Said
has no
designated successor, but others believe that the country
is
stable enough to avoid strife over the selection of a new
ruler.
The sultanate has not been the target of terrorist
acts; it
faces few problems from the narcotics trade and considers
the
level of general crime to be remarkably low. The security
services are described as large and efficient but not
overly
intrusive.
The Royal Oman Police (ROP), commanded by the inspector
general of police and customs, is under the supervision of
the
Ministry of Interior. The size of the force was estimated
in 1992
at 7,000, but this number is believed to include customs,
immigration, civil defense, firefighters, coast guard, and
prison
service. The principal crime fighting unit is the
Directorate
General of Criminal Investigation. An oil installation
division
has responsibility for security of the oil industry,
patrolling
pipelines, oil rigs, and oil terminals. The mounted
division
patrols border areas on horseback and camel and also
provides
security control at airports and border points. The coast
guard
contingent numbers 400; it is equipped with fifteen AT-105
APCs
and eighteen inshore patrol craft.
The home guard (firqat) units had been raised
and
trained for irregular counterinsurgency operations by
troops of
the British army's Special Air Services. Armed with small
arms,
firqat units serve as tribal police and defense
forces for
the mountain people engaged in herding cattle in areas
infiltrated by the Dhofari insurgents during the
rebellion. After
the insurgency, they remained as paramilitary tribal
police,
numbering about 3,500 in 1992.
Oman's criminal court system provides for fair trials
within
the framework of Islamic judicial practice. The defendant
in
criminal trials is presumed innocent and cannot be
detained for
longer than twenty-four hours without review of the case
by a
magistrate, who may then allow the police to hold a
suspect up to
fourteen days--extended if necessary up to seventy
days--to carry
out further investigation. Some suits have been filed
against
police officers for illegal arrest.
The accused can be represented by an attorney, but the
government does not pay for a public defender. There are
no jury
trials and no right to a public trial. The judge can
release the
accused on payment of bail. Only the judge questions
witnesses at
the trial. The verdict and sentencing are frequently
pronounced
within a day. Sentences of more than two months and more
than
US$1,300 in fines are subject to appeal. No executions
have been
carried out since 1975 and are, in any event, subject to
the
sultan's ratification. A rarely used security court system
handles internal security cases. The government can search
private residences and monitor telephones and private
correspondence without warrant but generally confines such
actions to investigations of potential security threats
and
individuals suspected of criminal activity.
According to the Department of State's Country
Reports on
Human Rights Practices for 1991, torture,
mistreatment, and
cruel punishment are not systematically practiced, nor are
they
countenanced by Omani authorities. The traditional
punishments
authorized by Islamic law, such as amputation and stoning,
are
not imposed. The Department of State reported that some
prisoners
had complained of beatings by police in 1991, and other
physical
abuse had been reported in earlier years. Prison
conditions are
described as harsh, with extreme temperatures in cells
without
proper ventilation. However, a practice of punitive hard
labor
under grueling desert conditions was discontinued in 1991.
* * *
Much of the data concerning the size and equipment of
the
armed forces of the Persian Gulf states is based on The
Military Balance and on Jane's Fighting Ships.
Some of
the discussion of internal security practices and judicial
systems is drawn from Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices for 1991 prepared by the United States
Department
of State.
Two general works, The Making of the Modern Gulf
States by Rosemarie Said Zahlan and The Turbulent
Gulf
by Liesl Graz, provide background on security perceptions
and
problems facing the smaller states of the gulf. Anthony H.
Cordesman's The Gulf and the West contributes
details on
the individual armed forces, the military strengths and
shortcomings of each state, and each state's involvement
in the
naval confrontation in the gulf in the 1980s. The
Middle
East, published by the Congressional Quarterly, treats
numerous topics dealing with Persian Gulf security,
including
local disputes, United States military sales, and the
events
leading up to the 1990-91 gulf crisis.
Studies of the military strategy employed in Operation
Desert
Storm in Desert Victory by Norman Friedman and
Thunder
in the Desert by James Blackwell give limited mention
to the
role played by the Persian Gulf states. Several analyses
of the
geostrategic environment in the region, although dating
from the
mid-1980s, still have relevance. They include Arms and
Oil
by Thomas L. McNaugher and Saudi Arabia: The West and
the
Security of the Gulf by Mazher A. Hameed. (For further
information and complete citations,
see
Bibliography.)
Data as of January 1993
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