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Peru Return to Democratic Rule, 1980-85
Belaúnde inherited a country that was vastly different
from
the one he had governed in the 1960s. Gone was the old
export
oligarchy and its gamonal allies in the Sierra, and
the
extent of foreign investment in the economy had been
sharply
reduced. In their place, Velasco had borrowed enormous
sums from
foreign banks and so expanded the state that by 1980 it
accounted
for 36 percent of national production, double its 1968
share. The
informal sector of small- and medium-sized businesses
outside the
legal, formal economy had also proliferated.
By 1980 Belaúnde's earlier reforming zeal had
substantially
waned, replaced by a decidedly more conservative
orientation to
government. A team of advisers and technocrats, many with
experience in international financial organizations,
returned
home to install a neoliberal economic program that
emphasized
privatization of state-run business and, once again,
export-led
growth. In an effort to increase agricultural production,
which
had declined as a result of the agrarian reform, Belaúnde
sharply
reduced food subsidies, allowing producer prices to rise.
However, just as Velasco's ambitious reforms of the
early
1970s were eroded by the 1973 worldwide oil crisis,
Belaúnde's
export strategy was shattered by a series of natural
calamities
and a sharp plunge in international commodity prices to
their
lowest levels since the Great Depression. By 1983
production had
fallen 12 percent and wages 20 percent in real terms while
inflation once again surged. Unemployment and
underemployment was
rampant, affecting perhaps two-thirds of the work force
and
causing the minister of finance to declare the country in
"the
worst economic crisis of the century." Again, the
government
opted to borrow heavily in international money markets,
after
having severely criticized the previous regime for
ballooning the
foreign debt. Peru's total foreign debt swelled from
US$9.6
billion in 1980 to US$13 billion by the end of Belaúnde's
term.
The economic collapse of the early 1980s, continuing
the
long-term cyclical decline begun in the late l960s,
brought into
sharp focus the country's social deterioration,
particularly in
the more isolated and backward regions of the Sierra.
Infant
mortality rose to 120 per 1,000 births (230 in some remote
areas), life expectancy for males dropped to 58 compared
with 64
in neighboring Chile, average daily caloric intake fell
below
minimum United Nations standards, upwards of 60 percent of
children under five years of age were malnourished, and
underemployment and unemployment were rampant. Such
conditions
were a breeding ground for social and political
discontent, which
erupted with a vengeance in 1980 with the appearance of
the
Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso--SL).
Founded in the remote and impoverished department of
Ayacucho
by Abimáel Guzmán Reynoso, a philosophy professor at the
University of Huamanga, the SL blended the ideas of
MarxismLeninism , Maoism, and those of José Carlos Mariátegui,
Peru's
major Marxist theoretician. Taking advantage of the return
to
democratic rule, the deepening economic crisis, the
failure of
the Velasco-era reforms, and a generalized vacuum of
authority in
parts of the Sierra with the collapse of gamonal
rule, the
SL unleashed a virulent and highly effective campaign of
terror
and subversion that caught the Belaúnde government by
surprise.
After first choosing to ignore the SL and then relying
on an
ineffective national police response, Belaúnde reluctantly
turned
to the army to try to suppress the rebels. However, that
proved
extremely difficult to do. The SL expanded its original
base in
Ayacucho north along the Andean spine and eventually into
Lima
and other cities, gaining young recruits frustrated by
their
dismal prospects for a better future. To further
complicate
pacification efforts, another rival guerrilla group, the
Túpac
Amaru Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Revolucionario
Túpac
Amaru--MRTA), emerged in Lima.
Counterinsurgency techniques, often applied
indiscriminately
by the armed forces, resulted in severe human rights
violations
against the civilian population and only created more
recruits
for the SL. By the end of Belaúnde's term in 1985, over
6,000
Peruvians had died from the violence, and over US$1
billion in
property damage had resulted
(see Changing Threats to National Security
, ch. 5). Strongly criticized by international
human
rights organizations, Belaúnde nevertheless continued to
rely on
military solutions, rather than other emergency social or
developmental measures that might have served to get at
some of
the fundamental, underlying socioeconomic causes of the
insurgency
(see Shining Path and Its Impact
, ch. 2).
The severe internal social and political strife, not to
mention the deteriorating economic conditions, manifested
in the
Shining Path insurgency may have contributed in 1981 to a
flareup of the border dispute with Ecuador in the disputed
Marañón
region. Possibly looking to divert public attention away
from
internal problems, both countries engaged in a brief,
five-day
border skirmish on the eve of the thirty-ninth anniversary
of the
signing of the 1942 Protocol of Rio de Janeiro (Rio
Protocol).
Peruvian forces prevailed, and although a ceasefire was
quickly
declared, it did nothing to resolve the two opposing
positions on
the issue of the disputed territory. Essentially, Peru
continued
to adhere to the Rio Protocol by which Ecuador had
recognized
Peruvian claims. On the other hand, Ecuador continued to
argue
that the Rio Protocol should be renegotiated, a position
first
taken by President Velasco Ibarra in 1960 and adhered to
by all
subsequent Ecuadorian presidents.
Along with these internal and external conflicts,
Belaúnde
also confronted a rising tide of drug trafficking during
his
term. Coca had been cultivated in the Andes since
pre-Columbian
times. The Inca elite and clergy used it for certain
ceremonies,
believing that it possessed magical powers. After the
conquest,
coca chewing, which suppresses hunger and relieves pain
and cold,
became common among the oppressed indigenous peasantry to
deal
with the hardships imposed by the new colonial regime,
particularly in the mines. The practice has continued,
with an
estimated 15 percent of the population chewing coca on a
daily
basis by 1990.
As a result of widespread cocaine consumption in the
United
States and Europe, demand for coca from the Andes soared
during
the late 1970s. Peru and Bolivia became the largest coca
producers in the world, accounting for roughly four-fifths
of the
production in South America. Although originally produced
mainly
in five highland departments, Peruvian production has
become
increasingly concentrated in the Upper Huallaga Valley,
located
some 379 kilometers northeast of Lima. Peasant growers,
some
70,000 in the valley alone, are estimated to receive
upwards of
US$240 million annually for their crop from
traffickers--mainly
Colombians who oversee the processing, transportation, and
smuggling operations to foreign countries, principally the
United
States.
After the cultivation of coca for narcotics uses was
made
illegal in 1978, efforts to curtail production were
intensified
by the Belaúnde government, under pressure from the United
States. Attempts were made to substitute other cash crops
while
police units sought to eradicate the plant. This tactic
only
served to alienate the growers and to set the stage for
the
spread of the SL movement into the area in 1983-84 as
erstwhile
defenders of the growers. By 1985 the SL had become an
armed
presence in the region, defending the growers not only
from the
state, but also from the extortionist tactics of the
traffickers.
The SL, however, became one of the wealthiest guerrilla
movements
in modern history by collecting an estimated US$30 million
in
"taxes" from Colombian traffickers who controlled the drug
trade.
As the guerrilla war raged on and with the economy in
disarray, Belaúnde had little to show at the end of his
term,
except perhaps the reinstitution of the democratic
process.
During his term, political parties had reemerged across
the
entire political spectrum and vigorously competed to
represent
their various constituencies. With all his problems,
Belaúnde had
also managed to maintain press and other freedoms (marred,
however, by increasing human rights violations) and to
observe
the parliamentary process. In 1985 he managed to complete
his
elected term, only the second time that this had happened
in
forty years.
After presiding over a free election, Belaúnde turned
the
presidency over to populist Alan García Pérez of APRA who
had
swept to victory with 48 percent of the vote. Belaúnde's
own
party went down to a resounding defeat with only 6 percent
of the
vote, while the Marxist United Left (Izquierda Unida--IU)
received 23 percent. The elections revealed a decided
swing to
the left by the Peruvian electorate. For APRA García's
victory
was the culmination of more than half a century of
political
travail and struggle.
Data as of September 1992
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