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Poland Crime
In 1989 and 1990, the crime rate in Poland rose
substantially. The increase was attributed to several
factors:
social stresses from the uncertainties of the transition
period;
the institutional inadequacy of the Ministry of Internal
Affairs
to deal with social unrest without wielding unlimited
authority;
and widespread skepticism that prevented public
cooperation with
police investigations. Public confidence had been
destroyed by
numerous incidents of arbitrary and unpunished police
violence
against civilians. In Warsaw, where robberies increased by
50
percent between 1988 and 1989, police solved only 16
percent of
reported crimes in 1990. Police budgets were slashed, and
recruitment became very difficult because police work now
carried
low prestige and offered few benefits. For personnel
remaining
from the communist era, the drop in institutional support
was
especially demoralizing.
By 1990 these conditions led to citizen complaints
about
being defenseless against crime and to complaints by the
police
that they could not do their work properly because of poor
cooperation from citizens and insufficient budgetary
support.
Between 1990 and 1991, the police budget was cut by 13
percent
and distance limitations were put on the use of patrol
cars.
Already in early 1990, however, legislation had been
drafted to
put the police under a separate chief appointed by and
directly
responsible to the prime minister. Such a shift meant that
the
Ministry of Internal Affairs could not issue direct orders
on the
conduct of police business. Local jurisdictions also could
establish their own police forces as counterweights to the
national police system; political qualifications could not
be
considered in hiring at any level. The new law also placed
extensive limitations on police powers that interfered
with
citizen rights.
In 1991 the Citizens' Militia changed its name to
simply
Police (Policja). Personnel were retrained, and a strong
public
relations campaign was established to gain public trust.
Uniforms
and operational methods were changed, and by 1992 police
had
begun to flush pockets of crime from the inner cities. In
1992
the aura of fear had dissipated, and a large part of the
public
came to believe the police were performing as well as
possible
under strict budget limitations. A major newspaper poll in
early
1992 showed the police second to the military (and above
the
Roman Catholic Church) in respect afforded Polish
institutions.
By 1991 large increases had occurred in white-collar
crime
and economic scandals connected with privatization,
liberalization of foreign trade, and decentralization of
economic
policy making. The unsealing of Poland's borders also made
the
country vulnerable to foreign organized crime.
Accordingly, the
Ministry of Internal Affairs set up a special police unit
to
combat corruption and economic fraud. In 1991, with a
total
detail of 600, the special unit set up special departments
at
existing police stations in seventeen districts.
New international conditions fostered new types of
crime in
the early 1990s. By 1992 the large number of refugees
entering
Poland, many without legal status and without employment,
had
become a serious source of crime. And explosives and arms
left
behind by the Soviet armed forces combined with social
unrest to
contribute to a significant increase in terrorist
bombings. In
addition to actual bombings, police frequently had to cope
with
false reports. As many as 90 percent of false alarms
involved
Poles between eleven and sixteen years old.
By 1992 narcotics had also became a problem. Bands of
Polish
amphetamine producers and distributors had developed a
complex
underground organization that produced very pure
amphetamine
narcotics, laundered money, and smuggled large amounts of
their
products in Western Europe
(see Health Issues
, ch. 2). The
"Polish pipeline" of agents abroad moved hashish, heroin,
and
cocaine into Western markets with increasing frequency. In
the
early 1990s, the entry of international traffickers into
the
indigenous Polish system threatened to raise the
sophistication
of local operations and make Poland a central distribution
point
for the world narcotics industry. Asian, Latin American,
and
African traffickers found Polish operatives useful because
customs agents had not yet learned to identify East
Europeans as
potential smugglers. In 1991 some 20 percent of
amphetamines
captured in Western Europe originated in Poland.
Prevention of drug-related crime was hampered by
policies
remaining from the communist era and by budget
limitations. Drug
laws remained very lax in 1992; because drug trading was
regarded
as a minor offense, no Pole was convicted for amphetamine
activities between 1985 and 1992. The nation's police
force
included only thirty full-time drug enforcement officers
in 1992,
with an annual operating budget of between US$100,000 and
US$200,000.
Data as of October 1992
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