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Qatar Military Capabilities of the Persian Gulf States
During the decade after the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq
War,
all the gulf states set out to strengthen their armed
forces by
converting to the most modern weapons they could obtain
and
assimilate. By 1993 each state had at least a modest
inventory of
tanks and other armored equipment, air defense missiles,
combat
aircraft, armed helicopters, and missile-armed naval craft
with
which to deter an intruder. Kuwait is less prepared than
the
others, not having recovered from the losses it suffered
in
personnel and equipment during the Persian Gulf War. A
fundamental constraint for all the gulf states has been
the
limited pool of qualified manpower and, in most countries,
the
problem of attracting recruits when better employment
opportunities exist in the civilian sector. The emphasis
on
advanced weaponry is part of an effort to minimize the
need for
personnel. As stated by a senior Kuwaiti officer, the
object is
to obtain the best equipment technologically, "easy to
maintain,
understand, and operate . . . the greatest firepower for
the
smallest human effort." But integrating modern weapons
into the
gulf armies and ensuring their effective operation create
other
problems. Such problems include the necessity of continued
reliance on foreign officers and foreign maintenance and
training
staffs at a time when all gulf states are trying to
achieve
greater self-sufficiency. Dependence on foreign personnel,
moreover, implies a degree of loyalty and trustworthiness
that
may not be forthcoming in times of crisis.
Although in every case the gulf armies are much larger
than
the air forces and navies, the ground forces have
traditionally
been oriented toward counterinsurgency actions and the
protection
of the ruling families. Most of the armies are organized
into one
or more combat brigades; actual fighting strengths are
generally
lower than the brigade structure implies. Except for the
officers
and men who were briefly exposed to modern military
operations
during the Persian Gulf War--and in the late 1960s and
first half
of the 1970s during Oman's war with Dhofari guerrillas and
their
supporters in the PDRY--most have not faced actual combat
situations.
In recognition of the great strategic importance of
their air
and sea defenses, the gulf states have all introduced
modern
combat aircraft and air defense missile systems, such as
the
United States Hawk surface-to-air missile (SAM). Several
of the
states have in their inventories or on order attack
helicopters
to help protect their oil facilities and oil drilling
platforms
in the gulf. All the gulf states have communications,
control,
and warning systems for the effective use of their fighter
aircraft and antiaircraft missiles. But each air force is
small,
and, unless integrated with others, the overall
effectiveness of
the GCC in air defense is marginal. In spite of the
attention the
problem has received, there is no common network linking
all air
defense squadrons and SAMs to the Saudi Arabian air
defense
system and to the Saudi airborne warning and control
system
(AWACS) aircraft. Technical difficulties, including the
incompatibility of national communications systems and the
reluctance to turn control of national air defense over to
a
unified command structure, account for this weakness.
Fast-missile attack craft acquired by all of the gulf
navies
with small but well-trained crews could inflict damaging
blows to
heavier fleets and discourage hostile amphibious
operations. The
sixty-two-meter corvettes belonging to Bahrain and the UAE
are
the largest vessels among the gulf navies. As the tanker
war
demonstrated, the navies lack minesweeping capability, and
their
shipboard defense weapons against air attack are also
weak. Only
Oman has available larger amphibious transports to convey
troops
and vehicles for defending islands or remote coastal
areas.
Defense expenditures of the gulf states are among the
highest
in the world relative to population. According to an
analysis
covering 1989, prepared by the United States Arms Control
and
Disarmament Agency, Qatar recorded the highest per capita
military expenditures of any country in the world,
followed by
Israel and the United States. Oman ranked fourth and
Kuwait
sixth. The UAE was eleventh highest; Bahrain, listed in
twentyseventh place worldwide, had the lowest outlays relatively
of the
gulf states. Military spending as a percentage of central
government expenditures also is high, amounting to more
than 40
percent in Oman and the UAE, for example. In contrast,
military
spending in Bahrain is 13 percent of central government
expenditure. Military expenditures as a percentage of the
gross
national product
(GNP--see Glossary)
are more moderate except for
Oman, whose military outlays were more than 20 percent of
GNP in
1989. Force ratios are also high in Oman and the UAE; both
countries had about twenty men in uniform per 1,000
population in
1989. Their respective rankings were eleventh and twelfth
highest
in the world. Bahrain and Kuwait had manpower levels of
about ten
per 1,000 population, whereas the level for Qatar was
fifteen per
1,000 in 1989.
In spite of the small personnel pools and the desire of
all
the gulf governments to train nationals to replace
foreigners as
quickly as possible, constraints found in traditional
Islamic
societies prevent the widespread recruitment of women to
serve in
the armed forces. Oman and Bahrain have allowed a few
women to
enlist. They receive combat-style training and learn how
to
operate small arms. In Bahrain, however, almost all the
women
have been assigned to hospital staffs. In 1990 the UAE
introduced
a five-month training course for female recruits with the
assistance of a team of female soldiers from the United
States.
About 1,200 women applied; only seventy-four were
accepted. Two
top members of the first class were selected to continue
with
officer training at the Royal Military Academy at
Sandhurst, in
Britain. The other graduates of the first class were
assigned as
bodyguards of female members of the ruling families and as
specialists in such fields as military intelligence.
Before the Persian Gulf War, some women served in
support
departments of the Kuwaiti armed forces, including
engineering,
military establishments, moral guidance, and public
relations. In
July 1991, noting that a large number of women had
volunteered
for service in the postwar military, the minister of
defense said
that some would be accepted for a training period of three
to six
months but would initially be unsalaried. A role would
then be
found for them. The minister cautioned that acceptance by
Kuwaiti
society was essential for the government to move ahead
with this
plan.
Data as of January 1993
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