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Russia Reform Plans
In 1996 Aleksey Arbatov, deputy chairman of the State Duma Defense Committee, stated that the armed forces must be reduced by at least 500,000 personnel, a force reduction of one-third, with a simultaneous increase in the annual military budget of abou
t US$20 billion--more than twice its level at the time.
The official plan for armed forces reorganization was put forth in a presidential decree of August 1995. Reforms would occur in two stages, which were outlined only vaguely. The first stage, to last from 1996 to 2000, would include reorganization of th
e civilian economy to provide better overall budgetary support, stabilize the defense industry, and revamp the territorial divisions of the national defense system to match a new concept of strategic deployment. The second stage, 2001 to 2005, would addre
ss the international role of the Russian armed forces, ending with the creation of the "army of the year 2005."
The first phase was defined by five goals. First, a "rational" level of strategic nuclear forces would remain in place on land, sea, and air to defend against a global nuclear or conventional war. The level of such forces would be influenced by whether
other powers had developed ABM defenses. Second, further downsizing was possible, depending on the leadership's estimation of optimal size given world conditions. Third, organizational structure would be changed only after comprehensive research, with nu
merous ground forces units to be combined and maintained at cadre strength. Fourth, procurement would be centralized, spending priorities strictly observed, and expenditures carefully monitored. Fifth, the command and control system would be improved in a
ll operational-strategic groupings, optimizing control to ensure maximum combat readiness. There would be a clear definition of the respective functions of the Ministry of Defense, the General Staff, and the main directorates. The newly created State Comm
ission for Military Organization and Development and the General Staff were to direct the fifth phase.
After issuing the reform decree, President Yeltsin periodically criticized the military (most notably Minister of Defense Grachev) for what he described as a complete lack of progress toward the stated goals. According to Western experts, this was a ju
stified criticism, given the disorder and internal friction that prevented the military establishment from reaching consensus on any policy.
Military service became particularly unpopular in Russia in the mid-1990s. Under conditions of intense political and social uncertainty, the traditional appeal to Russian patriotism no longer resonated among Russia's youth (see Social Stratification, c
h. 5). The percentage of draft-age youth who entered the armed forces dropped from 32 percent in 1994 to 20 percent in 1995. The Law on Military Service stipulates twenty-one grounds for draft exemption, but in many cases eligible individuals simply refus
e to report; in July 1996, a report in the daily Pravda
referred to a "daily boycott of the draft." In the first half of 1995, about 3,000 conscripts deserted, and in all of 1995 between 50,000 and 70,000 inductees refused to report. According to a 1996 Russian report, such personnel deficiencies meant that o
nly about ten of Russia's sixty-nine ground forces divisions were prepared for combat. The armed forces responded to manpower shortages by extending the normal two-year period of active-duty service of those already in uniform; only about 19,000 of the ap
proximately 230,000 troops scheduled for discharge in December 1994 were released on time.
The two most compelling reasons for the failure of conscription are the unfavorable living conditions and pay of soldiers (less than US$1 per month at 1995 exchange rates) and the well-publicized and extremely unpopular Chechnya operation. The Russian
tradition of hazing in the ranks, which became more violent and was much more widely reported in the 1990s, also has contributed to society's antipathy toward military service (see Crime in the Military, this ch.). By 1996 the approval rating of the milit
ary as a social institution had slipped to as little as 20 percent, far below the approval ratings achieved in the Soviet era.
Although by 1996 Russia's armed forces were less than one-third the size they reached at their Cold War peak in the mid-1980s, there still was a need for large numbers of personnel who were appropriately matched to their assigned duties and who could b
e motivated to serve conscientiously. The issue of gradually replacing Russia's ineffectual conscription system with a volunteer force has brought heated discussion in the defense establishment. The semiannual draft, which has set about 200,000 as its reg
ular quota, has been an abysmal failure in the post-Soviet era because of evasion and desertion. During evaluation of an initial, experimental contract plan, in May 1996 Yeltsin unexpectedly proposed the filling of all personnel slots in the armed forces
with contract personnel by 2000. In 1996 some units already were more than half staffed by contract personnel, and an estimated 300,000 individuals, about 20 percent of the total nominal active force, were serving under contract. At that time, more than h
alf of new contractees were women.
But the main obstacle to achieving Yeltsin's goal is funding. To attract competent contract volunteers, pay and benefits must be higher than those offered to conscripts. Already in early 1996, a reported 50,000 contract personnel had broken their contr
acts because of low pay and poor housing, and many commanders expressed dissatisfaction with the work of those who remained. In mid-1996 a final decision on the use of volunteers awaited discussion in the State Duma and a possible challenge in the Constit
utional Court.
Prospects for the Military
In the mid-1990s, Russia's military establishment included a number of influential holdovers from the Soviet era, together with incomplete plans for reform. That inauspicious combination of elements was not reconciled because there was little agreement
among military or civilian policy makers on the appropriate speed and direction of change, and because economic conditions offered no flexibility for experimentation.
To the extent that the Chechnya conflict of 1994-96 was a fair test of combat capability, Russia's armed forces were far from fighting form, even by their own evaluation. As they received pessimistic assessments of the current and future situation, Rus
sian policy makers faced a complex of other adjustments. In 1996 the shapers of policy on international relations and national security could not agree on Russia's status in the post-Soviet world (see Foreign Policy Prospects, ch. 8). Utilization of the m
ilitary's very limited financial resources would require a consensus on the areas of the world most vital to national security. For example, would a second Chechnya-type uprising within the Russian Federation merit the kind of effort expended on the first
one? What sort of response should the seemingly inevitable expansion of NATO elicit? Should Russia seek a permanent military presence in other CIS nations, to bolster national security? In answering such questions, military policy makers confront a natio
nal psyche still damaged by the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union itself. They also are tempted to divert attention from fundamental problems by renewing campaigns against old enemies.
No redirection of national security priorities could have meaning without a strong commitment to reorganize the military establishment that was inherited from the Soviet era. Only a leaner force could recapture the Soviet-era reservoir of skill, pride,
and dedication that was dissipated in the first half of the 1990s. Through 1996 the budgetary strategy was to finance selected high-technology R&D projects and MIC enterprises capable of satisfying foreign arms customers (together with internal secur
ity "armies" such as that of the Ministry of Internal Affairs), while literally starving conventional troops and neglecting maintenance budgets. With the formation of a new government in mid-1996, the voices of reform became louder, but consensus on the b
asic requirements had grown no closer.
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The Russian CFE Data Exchange
, supplied in concurrence with the terms of the CFE Treaty, provides current and accurate information on the organization, deployment, equipment, and staffing of Russia's armed forces in the European sector covered by the treaty. Translations of Russian m
ilitary periodicals and press releases in the military affairs section of the Foreign Broadcast Information Service's Daily Report: Central Eurasia
are an invaluable primary source of current material. The best recent monograph on the Russian armed forces is Richard F. Staar's The New Military in Russia
, which evaluates recent policy shifts and prospective changes of doctrine. Jane's Defence Weekly
and Jane's Intelligence Review
provide articles on specific issues of military policy. The annual The Military Balance
contains detailed listings of force strength, weaponry, and deployment, and the annual World Defence Almanac
addresses the same information with background on treaties such as START I and START II. The journals Military Technology
and Defense News
articles on the Russian defense industry and arms trade. A study by Graham H. Turbiville, Jr., "Mafia in Uniform: The Criminalization of the Russian Armed Forces," is a detailed report on post-Soviet criminal activity in the military. (For further inform
ation and complete citations, see Bibliography.)
Data as of July 1996
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