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Saudi Arabia
THREATS TO INTERNAL SECURITY
Despite the political and military upheavals in surrounding countries,
Saudi Arabia's internal situation appeared to be under control
in early 1992. Most Saudis seemed to accept the authority of the
Al Saud and strict observance of Islamic law to ensure domestic
stability. However, the kingdom's sudden exposure to international
scrutiny after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 brought into
sharp relief the polarization between the two competing forces
of society--the powerful religious establishment and the liberal
reformist elements. The modern sector pressed for greater popular
participation in decision making and for greater accountability
by the government (see Other Groups , ch. 4). Criticism and anger
over corruption by members of the royal family and other members
of the elite were more openly expressed than previously. King
Fahd promised that he would create a majlis ash shura
(consultative council) to respond to political grievances. Such
promises had been made in the past, however, with little result.
Some potential for social instability arose from the modernists'
belief that the ruling family remained too deferential to traditional
Muslim interests. These liberal elements desired the opportunity
for involvement in the political process and a share of political
power. In May 1991, it was reported that even the conservative
religious establishment had petitioned the government for a consultative
assembly. This action was accompanied by demonstrations in several
cities. Extremists accused the religious establishment of hypocrisy
in adhering to Islamic practices and of the maldistribution of
wealth, fueling resentments within broad segments of Saudi society.
Marginal political groups of the left and right were considered
illegal and their members were subject to arrest and detention
by government security organs. These groups included the Organization
of Islamic Revolution in the Arabian Peninsula, the Arab Socialist
Action Party, and the Party of God in the Hijaz. The sizable alien
population, estimated at 4.6 million in 1992 and representing
more than half the labor force, was feared as a possible source
of divisiveness as well as a disruptive influence on the thinking
and attitudes of the indigenous population. It was assumed that
clandestine organs of external political movements such as the
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) were represented in the
labor force. Among the most numerous of the foreign workers were
Yemenis, who always tended to be regarded with suspicion. Because
many of these workers were employed in strategic economic sectors
and in the oil industry, strikes and sabotage were constant dangers.
In 1990 the Saudi authorities took measures to identify illegal
residents and to regularize their status or deport them. These
efforts intensified after the Persian Gulf crisis began, and about
1 million Yemenis as well as Sudanese, Iraqis, and Palestinians
were compelled to leave.
In the oil-rich Eastern Province (Al Ahsa) lived between 200,000
and 400,000 Shia. They had endured two centuries of Wahhabi subjugation
and remained disaffected elements in Saudi society. Riots in late
1979 and early 1980 among the Shia were believed to have been
inspired by taped messages of the Ayatollah Khomeini. Because
Shia comprised possibly half of the labor force of the Arabian
American Oil Company (Aramco), from 1988 called the Saudi Arabian
Oil Company (Saudi Aramco), the government treated their presence
as a security problem. During the 1980s, the government bolstered
its security forces in the area, while at the same time attempting
to allay Shia resentment by responding to their social and religious
grievances. Among other groups with a distinct identity within
the kingdom were the Hijazis, who lived along the mountainous
western coast extending to the holy cities of Mecca and Medina,
and the tribes of Asir Province just north of Yemen. Although
both groups benefited from the rising wealth of the country, they
lacked sympathy for the traditional royalist regime and for the
strict religious leadership. Accordingly, questions of their fundamental
loyalty to the Al Saud persisted.
The likelihood of schisms within the royal family arising from
policy differences or personal rivalries seemed remote but could
not be completely discounted. Factional disputes could arise over
such issues as the closeness of ties with the United States or
curbing the power of the religious establishment. For the most
part, the informal assembly of princes has succeeded in keeping
rivalries within bounds and has prevented internal differences
from becoming public issues.
In view of elaborate security measures, such as the division
of armed power between the regular military and the national guard,
and the substantial benefits enjoyed by both officers and enlisted
personnel, the possibility of an insurrection emerging from the
armed forces was regarded as highly unlikely. Nevertheless, in
1991 leaflets critical of royal princes were reportedly distributed
in garrisons. The influence of radical Islamists among soldiers
and lower ranking officers was said to be growing.
The military leadership has been free from serious conspiracies
against the regime except for an abortive coup by air force officers
in 1969. About 300 air force personnel were arrested even before
the plot was set in motion. The dissidents were tried and sentenced
to prison, but by the mid-1970s all had been released. High wages
and privileges tended to keep discontent among the officer corps
to a minimum. The appointment of many members of the royal family
to military positions also provided a measure of protection against
intrigue. The separate national guard, with its tribal roots,
provided an additional safeguard against any threat from the military.
The prestige of the House of Saud was closely associated with
the protection of the holy places. When, in 1979, an armed group
of about 500 religious extremists occupied the Grand Mosque of
Mecca, the standing of the royal family was seriously affected.
The insurgent leader condemned the Al Saud for corruption, declaring
that the kingdom's rulers had forsaken the primary tenets of Islam.
Security forces did not immediately respond to the occupation
because of the Quran's strictures against shedding blood in the
holy place. Partly as a result of lack of coordination and poor
discipline, it took troops, national guard, and security forces
fourteen days of heavy fighting to oust the insurgents. Many people
were killed. The occupation of the Grand Mosque inspired riots
and demonstrations by Shia dissidents, which were answered by
the liberal use of firearms and the sealing off of major trouble
spots by the national guard (see The Reign of Khalid, 1975-82).
Followers of Ayatollah Khomeini tried to stir up trouble by disrupting
the annual hajj, or pilgrimage to Mecca, on several occasions
during the 1980s, but heavy security controls usually succeeded
in preventing major incidents (see Pilgrimage , ch. 2). In July
1987, however, more than 400 people died as a result of a serious
riot instigated by thousands of Iranian pilgrims. Khomeini called
for the overthrow of the Saudi royal family to avenge the pilgrims'
deaths. Saudi Arabia, in turn, accused Iran of staging the riots
to support its demands that Mecca and Medina be internationalized
as pan-Islamic cities. Several Saudi Shia were tried and executed
for exploding bombs at Saudi oil facilities in 1988, probably
as retaliation by Iran and its sympathizers against restrictions
on Iranian attendance at the annual pilgrimage after the 1987
riots. A number of bomb attacks were made on Saudi agencies abroad--primarily
offices of the national airline, Saudia. Saudi diplomats were
assassinated by groups calling themselves the Party of God in
the Hijaz, Soldiers of the Right, and Arab Fury. Both types of
attack were thought to be the work of Saudi Shia instigated by
elements of the Iranian government. Saudi Arabia accused Iran
in connection with two bomb incidents during the 1989 hajj in
apparent retaliation for Saudi restrictions against Iranian pilgrims.
Sixteen Kuwaiti Shia were executed for these attacks (see Regional
Security , ch. 4).
Some easing of relations with Iran occurred after Khomeini's
death in 1989. During the 1990 pilgrimage, more than 1,400 pilgrims
were trampled to death or suffocated after they were stampeded
in an underground tunnel. The incident, however, was not linked
to Iran. Disputes over the size of the Iranian contingent and
rules governing their conduct prevented Iranians from participating
in the hajj for three years. In 1991 the Saudis accepted a quota
of 115,000 Iranian pilgrims and allowed political demonstrations
in Mecca. Although peaceful, the demonstrations included strident
attacks on the United States and Israel.
The Persian Gulf War placed new strains on the government's efforts
to maintain the allegiances of both the modern, secular segments
of Saudi society and the traditional, religious elements. Although
it offered some conciliatory gestures to the modernists, the government
appeared adamant and ready to respond forcefully to any dissent
against the authority of the Al Saud.
The existence of a large and diffuse royal family, the vast territorial
extent of the kingdom, and its widely scattered population centers
reduced the likelihood that an attempt to overthrow Saudi rule
could succeed. Still, the government continued to exercise control
over the information media and strictly supervised or prohibited
independent interest groups such as political parties or labor
unions.
Islamic radicals were few in number but had undeniable influence,
projecting their messages from the public mosques and university
classrooms. Their criticism that the government under King Fahd
had weakened in its devotion to Islamic principles was difficult
to silence because it was offered in an Islamic context. Islamist
pressure for greater Islamization in education, the press, and
foreign policy appeared to strengthen after the Persian Gulf War.
Data as of December 1992
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