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Saudi Arabia
Tribe and Monarchy
The rise of the centralized state has undercut tribal autonomy,
and sedentarization has undermined the economic benefits of tribal
organization, but in the 1990s the tribe remained a central focus
of identity for those claiming a tribal affiliation. Contemporary
tribal leadership continued to play a pivotal role in relations
between individuals and the central government, particularly among
those who were recently settled or still nomadic.
The tribal leader, the shaykh (see Glossary), governs by consensus.
Shaykhs acquire influence through their ability to mediate disputes
and persuade their peers toward a given course of action. The
qualities their position demands are a detailed grasp of tribal
affairs, a reputation for giving good advice, and generosity.
Shaykhs are essentially arbitrators; the process of resolving
disputes reflects the tribe's egalitarian ethos. Shaykhs do not
lead discussions but carefully ascertain everyone's opinion on
a given question. Consensus is necessary before action is taken.
To force a decision is to undermine one's influence; leaders are
effective only as long as they conform to the tribe's expectations.
Tribal leaders in the past brokered relationships among competing
tribes and clans. Raiding was a mechanism of economic redistribution
that conferred status on strong and successful raiding clans.
Tribes or lineages could opt out of the round of raiding and counterraiding
by seeking the protection of a stronger, more militarily oriented
group. The protected paid their protector an agreed sum (khuwa),
in return for which their lives and property were to be spared.
The shaykh who accepted khuwa was obliged to safeguard
those who paid it or compensate them for whatever damages they
incurred. As with the booty of raiding, the shaykh who accepted
the payment could only guarantee this influence by distributing
it to his fellow tribesmen. These client-patron relationships
based on payment of protection money were undermined by Abd al
Aziz in the 1920s when he released weaker tribes from obligations
to stronger ones and made himself the sole source of wealth redistributed
from the spoils of raiding, and then later from oil profits.
The working relationship between the monarchy and tribal leaders
is viewed in much the same framework as the traditional relationship
between the shaykh and tribal members. In fact, the same framework
of the relationship between tribal shaykh and tribal members is
the model for the ideal relationship between the monarchy and
all Saudi citizens. Just as the tribal shaykh was expected to
mediate disputes and assure the welfare of his group by receiving
tribute and dispensing largesse, governors in the provinces and
the king himself continue the custom of holding an open audience
(majlis--see Glossary) at which any tribesman or other male citizen
could gain a hearing. The largesse of the shaykh was dispensed
not as direct handouts of food or clothing, as in the past, but
through the institutions of the state bureaucracy in the form
of free medical care, welfare payments, grants for housing, lucrative
contracts, and government jobs.
The tribes of Arabia acknowledged the political authority of
the Saudi monarchy as being above the tribal group. Loyalty to
the state was not a matter of nationality or still less an abstract
notion of citizenship; it was a matter of loyalty to the Al Saud
(see Glossary) and to the royal family as the focus of the Islamic
nation. In a study of the Al Murrah, Nicholas Hopkins notes that
"The Al Murrah make a distinction between al-Dawlah (the state
or bureaucracy) and al-Hukumah (the Saudi royal family or governors);
they are loyal to the latter and fearful of the former, but fear
that the state is taking over the government." Most tribes were
affiliated with the Al Saud through marriage ties as the product
of Abd al Aziz's deliberate policy of cementing ties between himself
and the tribal groups. In the 1970s and 1980s, the political alliance
between tribe and state was reinforced by marrying tribal women
to government officials and Saudi princes. According to a 1981
study carried out among the Al Saar beduin in southern Arabia,
these marriages were encouraged by tribal leaders because they
were seen as a means of ensuring continuing access to government
leaders.
Tribal solidarity has been institutionalized and tribal ties
to both dawlah and hukumah have been cemented
through the national guard. The amir of the Al Murrah tribal unit
studied by Hopkins was the head of a national guard unit composed
mainly of Al Murrah, and most Al Murrah families in the unit under
study had at least one family member serving in the national guard.
Through the national guard former nomads received training and
the potential for high-level careers, as well as instruction in
military sciences, and housing, health, and social services for
dependents and families. The government also provided water taps
and markets in cities, towns, and villages that were used in marketing
livestock. Also provided were veterinary services, subsidized
fodder, and buildings for storage.
Data as of December 1992
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