Singapore FOREIGN POLICY
Figure 12. Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 1989
Queen Elizabeth II visiting Prime Minister Lee Kwan Yew in 1989
Courtesy Singapore Ministry of Communications and Information
Governing Precepts and Goals
Minister for Foreign Affairs Suppiah Dhanabalan
described the
governing precepts of the country's foreign policy in 1981
as a
willingness to be friends with all who sought friendship,
to trade
with any state regardless of ideology, to remain
nonaligned, and to
continue to cooperate closely with Association of
Southeast Asian Nations
(
ASEAN--see Glossary) members
(see
fig. 12). These
precepts, while consistent with the thrust of foreign
policy from
the 1960s to the mid-1980s, failed to account for the
basic role
that the survival of the nation played in determining
foreign
policy goals. A primary foreign policy consideration until
the mid1980s , survival became an issue because of Singapore's
size and
location and Indonesia's Confrontation
(
Konfrontasi--see Glossary)
campaign against Malaysia in the 1960s. It was further
linked to
the concept of the "global city" first proposed in 1972 by
then
Deputy Prime Minister for Foreign Affairs Sinnathamby
Rajaratnam.
This concept suggested that Singapore's survival depended
on its
ability to create a continuing demand for its services in
the world
market. By implementing a policy of international
self-assertion,
Singapore would shift from a reliance on entrepôt trade
and
shipping to export-oriented industries.
The focus on survival was evidenced in Singapore's
reaction to
Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia in 1978. Of the many issues
surrounding the event, one of particular interest to
Singapore was
Vietnam's blatant disregard for the sovereignty of a small
nation.
Singapore's decision to draw international attention to
the
situation was based, in part, on the need for
international
recognition of its own sovereignty. Following the
invasion,
Singapore heightened its international profile by
expanding
diplomatic representation abroad and attending
international
forums. Singapore was a member of ASEAN, the Nonaligned
Movement
(
NAM--see Glossary),
the Asian Development Bank
(
ADB--see Glossary), the
Group of 77 (see Glossary), the
International
Telecommunications Satellite Organization
(
INTELSAT--see Glossary),
and the United Nations and its affiliated organizations.
With the passing of the first generation of leaders in
the late
1980s, foreign policy was shaped less by the old fears
produced by
the events of the 1960s and 1970s and more by the
experience of
regional stability that prevailed during the formative
years of the
new guard or second generation of leaders. The
self-assertion of a
decade earlier was no longer required, and Singapore could
afford
to be less abrasive in its foreign policy style. Foreign
policy
objectives in the late 1980s were far more subtle than
simple
survival.
In March 1989, Singapore announced that it was charting
a new
course of "economic diplomacy" to meet future
international
challenges. It sought expanded economic ties with China,
the Soviet
Union, several Eastern European nations, and the three
nations of
Indochina: Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. In a speech to
Parliament
on March 17, 1989, Minister of Foreign Affairs Wong Kan
Seng
announced that Singapore was hoping to reverse its
previous
staunchly anticommunist posture and normalize relations
with
several communist countries to promote more compatible
relationships based on mutual economic interests.
Foreign policy also had to accommodate the views of
predominantly Islamic neighbors who were viewed by
Singapore's
leaders as possible threats to its existence. As a gesture
toward
its neighbors and in recognition of its own regional
roots,
Singapore maintained its membership in the Nonaligned
Movement,
although it consistently rejected neutrality as a foreign
policy
option. Singapore's leaders had reasoned that avoiding
entanglements with the great powers would leave Singapore
far too
vulnerable to threats from regional neighbors, as
Indonesia's
Confrontation campaign had demonstrated. Neutrality also
was
perceived to be inconsistent with the Total Defence style
of
defensive vigilance that the PAP attempted to instill in
the
citizenry following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and
the
Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia. The guiding concept of
Total Defence (see Glossary) was known as national integration
and was
meant to unify a population made up of immigrants and a
mix of
racial groups into a people with the "human will" to be
"unconquerable."
Foreign policy, therefore, stressed maintaining a
balance of
power in the region. Singapore promoted the regional
involvement of
all great powers because it feared aggravating a neighbor
by
relying on any one power. Although it would have preferred
relying
upon the United States to guarantee its security, such
dependence
would not have been tolerated by the other ASEAN states.
Singapore
also remained suspicious of the ability of the United
States to
pursue a consistent foreign policy following its
withdrawal from
Vietnam.
Retaining its developing nation status was another
foreign
policy goal of the 1980s. The 1989, however, Singapore
lost the
concession enjoyed under the United States government's
Generalized
System of Preferences
(
GSP--see Glossary) on imports from
developing countries and the ability to borrow from the
World Bank
and the ADB at concessional rates
(see Trade, Tourism, and Telecommunications
, ch. 3).
Data as of December 1989
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