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Soviet Union [USSR] Democratic Centralism
Democratic centralism involves several interrelated principles:
the election of all leadership organs of the party from bottom to
top; periodic accounting of party organs before their membership
and before superior organs; strict party discipline and the
subordination of the minority to the majority; unconditional
obligation by lower party bodies to carry out decisions made by
higher party bodies; a collective approach to the work of all
organizations and leadership organs of the party; and the personal
responsibility of all communists to implement party directives.
In the words of American specialist on Soviet affairs Alfred G.
Meyer, democratic centralism is primarily centralism under a thin
veil of democracy. Democratic centralism requires unanimity on the
part of the membership. The concept requires full discussion of
policy alternatives before the organization, as guided by the
leadership, makes a decision. Once an alternative has been voted
upon, however, the decision must be accepted by all. In principle,
dissent is possible, but it is allowed only before a decision
becomes party policy. After the party makes a decision, party norms
discourage criticism of the manner of execution because such
criticism might threaten the party's leading role in Soviet
society.
The principles of democratic centralism contradict one another.
One contradiction concerns the locus of decision making. Democratic
centralism prescribes a collective approach to the work of all
organizations, which connotes participation of all party members in
decision making. Yet, democratic centralism also holds that
criticism of agreed-upon policies is permissible only for the top
leadership, not for rank-and-file party members. Hence, discussion
of these policies can take place only after the leadership has
decided to permit it. The leadership will not allow discussions of
failed policies, for fear that such discussions will undermine its
power and authority.
A second contradiction concerns the issue of accountability.
Democratic centralism holds that lower party bodies elect higher
party bodies and that the latter are accountable to the former.
Nevertheless, democratic centralism also prescribes the
unconditional subordination of lower party bodies to higher party
bodies. In reality, superiors appoint those who nominally elect
them to their positions and tell them what decisions to make
(see Soviet Union USSR - Nomenklatura
, this ch.).
Democratic centralism undermines intraparty democracy because
the party has formally proscribed factions. The Tenth Party
Congress in 1921 adopted a "temporary" ban on factions in response
to the Kronshtadt Rebellion
(see Soviet Union USSR - Revolutions and Civil War
, ch. 2).
In 1989 this ban remained in effect. Every party member has the
right to express an opinion in the party organization to which he
or she belongs. Before a decision is taken, however, party members
cannot appeal to other members in support of a given position.
Moreover, party members cannot engage in vote trading. In
democratic systems, a party member holding a minority position on
an issue can exercise influence if allowed to organize people with
similar views and if allowed the opportunity to persuade others.
Without these opportunities, democratic procedures remain an empty
formality.
Devoid of democratic content, the political and organizational
logic of democratic centralism contributed to the emergence of
dictatorship in the Soviet Union. Despite the formal ban, in the
early 1920s factions emerged in the party because Lenin failed to
work out orderly procedures for leadership succession
(see Soviet Union USSR - The Era of the New Economic Policy
, ch. 2). In the absence of these
procedures, new leaders had to attempt to cloak their policies in
the mantle of ideological orthodoxy. To prevent criticism from
rivals, the new leader could label real and potential opponents a
faction and, according to the
Party Rules (see Glossary),
which banned factions, take steps to remove them from the party.
For example, Nikita S. Khrushchev took these steps against his
opponents in 1957
(see Soviet Union USSR - Collective Leadership and the Rise of Khrushchev
, ch. 2). The leader
thus could eliminate real and
potential rivals, but ultimately, however, only success in action
could prove a leader's policies correct. Success in action required
the commitment of the party, and commitment of the party demanded
that ordinary party members perceive that the leader possessed
infallible judgment. Democratic centralism provided a necessary
condition for the leader's claim to infallibility because it
prevented ordinary party members from criticizing the policies of
the party elite.
Data as of May 1989
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