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Soviet Union [USSR] PARTY LEGITIMACY
Western political scientists define legitimacy as the
acceptance by the people of their government's right to rule.
Legitimacy emerges from a broad range of sources. In democratic
countries, the citizenry holds governments legitimate because
citizens participate in the selection of their rulers, and these
governments are subject to laws that the people or their
representatives have made. Tradition also is a persuasive source of
legitimation because it places the origins of institutions and
political values in a distant and mythical past. Other governments
may acquire legitimacy because they have proved themselves able to
ensure the well-being of their people. Legitimacy also may emanate
from an ideology (such as communism, fascism, religious orthodoxy,
and nationalism) whose adherents portray it as the key to
understanding human history and resolving all social problems. In
reality, the legitimacy of any government emanates from a
combination of these sources.
The legitimacy of the CPSU, too, derived from various sources.
The party has managed to recruit a significant percentage of
members having occupations carrying high status in Soviet society.
In addition, the party has served as a vehicle of upward mobility
for a significant share of the citizenry. By joining the party,
members of the working class could ensure a secure future for
themselves in the political apparatus and access for their children
to a good education and high-status jobs. The party also justified
its right to rule by claiming to embody the "science" of Marxism-
Leninism and by its efforts to lead society to full communism. In
addition, the CPSU appealed to the patriotism of the citizenry. In
the more than seventy years of the party's rule, the Soviet Union
has emerged as a superpower, and this international status is a
source of pride for the Soviet people. Finally, tradition bolstered
the legitimacy of the CPSU. The party located its roots in Russian
history, and it has incorporated aspects of Russian tradition into
its political style.
The CPSU is an elite body. In 1989 it comprised about 9.7
percent of the adult population of the Soviet Union. Among the
"movers and shakers" of society, however, the percentage of party
members was much higher. In the 1980s, approximately 27 percent of
all citizens over thirty years of age and with at least ten years
of education were members of the party. About 44 percent of all
males over thirty with at least ten years of education belonged to
the CPSU. Hence, in the words of American Soviet specialist Seweryn
Bialer, males over thirty with at least an elementary education
formed a "strong, politicized, and involved stratum which provides
a buttress of the system's legitimacy within society."
Among certain occupations, party saturation (the percentage of
party members among a given group of citizens) was even higher. In
1989 some occupations were restricted to party members. These
positions included officers of youth organizations, senior military
officers, and officials of government bodies such as the
ministries, state committees, and administrative departments.
Occupations with saturation rates ranging from 20 to 50 percent
included positions as mid-level economic managers, scholars and
academics, and hospital directors. Low saturation existed among
jobs that carried low status and little prestige, such as
industrial laborers, collective farmers, and teachers. Thus, the
party could represent itself as a legitimate governing body because
it commanded the talents of the most talented and ambitious
citizens in society.
The CPSU derived some legitimacy from the fact that it acted as
a vehicle for upward mobility in society. People who have entered
the party apparatus since the 1930s have come from a working-class
background. The party widely publicized the working-class origins
of its membership, which led members of that class to believe they
could enter the elite and be successful within it
(see Soviet Union USSR - Social Composition of the Party
, this ch.).
Another source of party legitimacy lay in Marxist-Leninist
ideology, which both promises an absolute good--communism--as the
goal of history and shrouds its understanding of the means to that
goal with the aura of science. The party justified its rule as
leading to the creation of a full communist society. Hence, the
CPSU claimed that the purpose of its rule was the common good and
not the enrichment of the rulers. The party also identified
Marxism-Leninism and the policies that it developed on the basis of
this ideology with the absolute truth of science. The CPSU
maintained that the laws of this science hold with the same rigor
in society as the laws of physics or chemistry in nature. In part,
the party justified its rule by claiming that it alone could
understand this science of society.
Soviet society has not reached full communism, and so the party
has altered its ideology to ensure its continued legitimacy despite
the inability to fulfill the promises contained in Marxism-
Leninism. One modification has been the rejection of some of
Marxism-Leninism's original ideological tenets. For example, in the
early 1930s the party renounced an egalitarian wage structure. A
second modification has been the indefinite postponement of goals
that cannot be realized. Thus, the party continued to assure the
populace that the achievement of economic abundance or the
completion of proletarian revolutions in developed Western
countries would take place, but it did not specify a date. A third
modification has been the ritualization of some of the goals whose
fulfillment the party has postponed. American scholar Barrington
Moore has written that on party holidays CPSU leaders reaffirmed
various ideals that no longer served as guides for policy. For
example, in his first public address as general secretary in 1984,
Konstantin U. Chernenko averred that concern for the development of
the new Soviet man remained an essential part of the CPSU's
program. In the late 1980s, few accorded that goal much practical
import, but the reaffirmation of that objective probably reassured
the party faithful that the new leadership would remain true to the
CPSU's ideology and traditions.
The party attempted to strengthen its legitimacy with appeals
to the pride Soviet citizens feel for their country. The party has
led Soviet Russia from the devastation the country suffered in the
Bolshevik Revolution and Civil War (1918-21) to victory in World
War II over an ancient Russian enemy and then to superpower status.
In 1989, moreover, the CPSU could still claim to lead a world
communist movement
(see Soviet Union USSR - Communist Parties Abroad
, ch. 10). Since
World War II, Soviet influence has extended to Asia, Africa, and
Latin America. A feeling of patriotic pride for these
accomplishments united the Soviet elite, and it bound the elite to
the masses.
The CPSU has incorporated aspects of traditional Russian
culture into its political style. The party drew upon Russia's
revolutionary tradition and represented itself as the culmination
of a progressive and revolutionary movement that began with the
"Decembrists' revolt" of 1825
(see Soviet Union USSR - War and Peace, 1796-1825
, ch.
1). Most aspects of this revolutionary tradition centered on Lenin.
The fact that the state preserved his remains in a mausoleum on Red
Square echoed an old Russian Orthodox belief that the bodies of
saints do not decay. In addition, the regime bestowed Lenin's name
on the second largest city of the Soviet Union, a bust or picture
of Lenin decorated all party offices, and quotations from his
writings appeared on billboards throughout the country. All Soviet
leaders since Lenin have tried to show that they follow Lenin's
policies. The CPSU has sought to maintain and strengthen its
legitimacy by drawing upon the legacy of this charismatic figure.
Another element of old Russian culture that has entered the
CPSU's political style was the cult of the leader (also referred to
as
cult of personality--see Glossary). The Soviet cult of the
leader appropriated a cultural form whose sources lay deep in the
Russian past. Cults of saints, heroes, and the just tsar had long
existed in Russia. In the 1920s, the cult of Lenin emerged as part
of a deliberate policy to gain popular support for the regime.
Joseph V. Stalin, who built the most extensive cult of the leader,
was reported to have declared that the "Russian people is a tsarist
people. It needs a tsar." Stalin assumed the title of generalissimo
during World War II, and throughout his rule he was referred to by
the title vozhd' (leader). Other titles appropriated by
Stalin included Leader of the World Proletariat, Great Helmsman,
Father of the Peoples, and Genius of Mankind.
Soviet leaders since Stalin have also encouraged the
development of their own cults, although on a smaller scale than
that of Stalin. These cults of the party leaders replicated that of
the just tsar. Like the cult of the just tsar, who was depicted as
having remained true to his faith of Russian Orthodoxy, the cults
of party leaders such as Khrushchev and Leonid I. Brezhnev
represented them as leaders who remained true to their faith in
Marxism-Leninism. Like the just tsar, who was depicted as being
close to the common people, these leaders represented themselves as
having the interests of the common people at heart.
Data as of May 1989
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